






























































use	 of	 the	 structured,	 focused	 comparison	 method,	 this	 research	 examines	 two	 cases,	
Oman	and	Qatar,	to	provide	a	deep	analysis	of	the	policy	and	practice	of	entrepreneurship	
promotion	in	the	region.	Despite	a	claim	of	responding	to	regional	challenges	of	economic	
diversification	 and	 the	 weak	 participation	 of	 nationals	 in	 the	 private	 sector,	
entrepreneurship	as	a	key	component	of	each	country’s	quest	for	a	knowledge	economy	
seems	paradoxical	 in	 its	ostensible	 inconsistency	with	 the	Gulf	 rentier	state	status	quo.	
Path	 dependencies	 from	 oil‐led	 development	 and	 the	 concomitant	 labour	 market	
bifurcation	 have	 perpetuated	 incentive	 structures	 which	 obstruct	 innovation	 and	
entrepreneurialism.	Responding	to	this	puzzle,	this	research	answers	two	questions.	The	




often	perfunctory	assumptions	of	 rentier	 state	 literature	 to	 investigate	 the	unfolding	of	
development	 policies	 in	 the	 current	 milieu.	 This	 research	 finds	 that	 entrepreneurship	
promotion	risks	only	becoming	a	new	way	of	recasting	rentier	tools:	rentierism	2.0.	The	
study	argues	 that	 governance	 in	 the	Gulf	 is	best	understood	as	 a	 contestation	between	
reforms	 and	 rentier	 patterns.	 Being	 cognizant	 of	 this	 tension	 provides	 a	 venue	 for	
understanding	 how	 some	 policies	 contravene	 classic	 rentier	 expectations	while	 others	
appear	hypocritical	as	the	implementation	of	policy	announcements	become	obstructed	by	
structural	 contradictions.	 This	 dissertation	 makes	 an	 empirical	 contribution	 on	 a	
prominent	policy	shift	in	the	Gulf	that	has	been	largely	ignored	in	social	sciences.	As	well,	
it	 provides	 a	 theoretical	 contribution	 by	 integrating	 literature	 on	 development	 and	
innovation	which	is	generally	disconnected	from	scholarly	work	on	Gulf	political	economy	
to	deepen	understandings	of	development	and	transition	in	the	region.	Overall,	this	project	
provides	 a	 window	 into	 transition	 and	 transformation,	 demonstrating	 the	 way	 rentier	



















for	 the	 future	 and	 heard	 their	 struggles.	 The	 challenges	 they	 faced	 combined	with	 the	
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An	 interesting	 phenomenon	 has	 begun	 to	 unfold	 in	 the	 states	 of	 the	 Gulf	
Cooperation	 Council	 (GCC)	 over	 the	 past	 decade.	 That	 is,	 the	 promotion	 of	
entrepreneurship	by	the	state.	This	phenomenon	is	framed	in	the	context	of	developing	an	
innovation	system	toward	the	goal	of	shifting	to	a	knowledge‐based	economy.	Structurally	
typecast	 as	 hydrocarbon‐dependent	 economies,	 the	 Gulf	 Arab	 states	 have	 had	 their	
modern	development	trajectories	shaped	by	the	vicissitudes	of	the	petroleum	market.	Not	




region’s	 sustainability	 in	 a	 post‐oil	 future.	 In	 this	 light,	 the	 championing	 of	
entrepreneurship	has	burgeoned.		
The	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 promotion	 trend	 is	 especially	 intriguing	


















This	 dissertation	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 governance	 of	 development	 and	 policy	
making	in	the	GCC	countries,	Bahrain,	Kuwait,	Oman,	Qatar,	Saudi	Arabia,	and	the	United	
Arab	 Emirates	 (UAE).1	 It	 contributes	 to	 the	 scholarly	 reassessment	 of	 rentier	 state	
literature	by	providing	new	 insight	 into	 the	development	of	policy	 and	practice	 in	Gulf	

































among	 nationals.	 In	 the	 pursuit	 of	 “knowledge	 economies”	 and	 as	 part	 of	 a	 desire	 to	
diversify	 economies	 away	 from	 oil,	 all	 six	 GCC	 states	 are	 engaging	 in	 some	 form	 of	
entrepreneurship	and	 innovation	promotion.	Development	plans	 and	policy	documents	













Gulf	 countries.	 It	 is	 only	 in	 the	 last	 decade	 that	 the	 notion	 has	 been	 featured	 on	
development	agendas.	This	began	to	occur	after	the	2003	Arab	Human	Development	report	
infamously	chastised	the	Middle	East	North	Africa	(MENA)	region	for	its	developmental	





was	 popular	 to	 do	 so,	 he	 noted	 that	 “knowledge	 has	 become	 the	 central	 ‘factor	 of	
production’	 in	 an	advanced,	developed	economy.”6	 The	OECD	popularized	 the	 idea	of	 a	
knowledge	 economy	 in	 national	 development	 agendas.	 Its	 1996	 report	 on	 knowledge‐






















economic	 development	 has	 been	 rapid	 and	 vast.8	 GCC	 fiscal	 dependency	 has	 remained	
relatively	 constant	 over	 the	 years,	with	hydrocarbons	 accounting	 for	 approximately	80	
percent	of	revenue	and	exports	in	the	1990s	and	90	percent	of	revenue	and	80	percent	of	
exports	 during	 the	 2000s	 in	 most	 GCC	 countries.	 The	 exception	 has	 been	 Bahrain,	
































Investment	 in	 industrial	 projects	 and	 the	 development	 of	 steel,	 aluminium,	 and	
petrochemical	 factories	 was	 one	 such	 move.	 In	 later	 decades,	 this	 was	 followed	 by	








































than	 historical	 internal	 developments.	 Industrial	 plants	 were	 established	 through	
international	turnkey	contracts,	allowing	factories	to	develop	in	the	geographic	region	but	
remain	 externally	 dependent,	 tied	 to	 foreign	 construction,	 engineering,	 and	 expertise	




stagnated	 the	 integration	of	nationals	 into	 the	private	 sector	workforce.	As	explored	 in	
further	detail	 in	chapters	three	and	four	(sections	2.1	and	6	respectively),	 it	 is	not	only	
hydrocarbons	 that	Gulf	 economies	 are	 addicted	 too,	 but	 expatriate	 labour	 as	well.	 This	





labour	 market,	 resulting	 in	 peculiar	 employment	 trends	 and	 distorted	 labour	 market	
outcomes.		
The	GCC	region	now	faces	a	dual	demographic	imbalance.	One	based	on	indigenous	










population	 pyramid	 and	 straddling	 the	 years	 which	 should	 be	marked	 by	 high	 labour	
market	 participation.	 Instead,	 youth	 unemployment,	 underemployment,	 and	 economic	
inactivity	is	high	in	most	countries.15	The	public	sector	is	bloated,	and	the	private	sector	is	
seldom	willing	to	hire	local	labour	without	incentive	and	local	labour	is	often	not	interested	
in	 the	 low‐paying,	 insecure	private	 sector.16	The	 second	demographic	 imbalance	 is	 that	
between	citizens	and	non‐nationals.	As	noted	in	table	1.1,	the	expatriate	composition	of	the	
population	 of	 GCC	 countries	 ranges	 from	 approximately	 32	 percent	 to	 89	 percent.	
Expatriates	comprise	an	even	greater	proportion	of	the	labour	force,	ranging	from	59	to	94	




GCC GDP and Population Indicators 
Country Gross Domestic Product Population Labour Force 
  
GDP (million 
USD / Current 
Prices) 






Bahrain 28,991 24,260 1,195,020 53.9* 618,036 77.3 
Kuwait 160,897 52,481 3,065,850 64.40 1,800,033 80.5 
Oman 72,680 22,056 3,295,298 39* 1,099,188 59.4 
Qatar 173,519 100,143 1,732,717 72 1,275,971 94 
Saudi Arabia 597,086 21,042 28,376,355 32* 8,611,001** 50.2** 





















impacted	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 hydrocarbons.	 Notwithstanding	 all	 the	 language	 in	
development	plans	confirming	a	desire	to	diversify,	the	practice	has	been	constrained.	The	
contribution	of	hydrocarbons	to	GDP	has	remained	around	the	50	percent	level.	(See	figure	
1.3)	 Some	 positive	 movement	 in	 industrial	 developments	 occurred	 in	 the	 last	 decade.	
Buttressed	 by	 the	 oil	 price	 rise	 in	 the	 2000s,	 the	 Gulf	 became	 a	 major	 producer	 for	
petrochemicals,	fertilizers,	aluminium,	cement,	and	other	construction	materials.	Not	only	







































The	 exhaustibility	 of	 hydrocarbon	 reserves	 and	 oil	 price	 volatility	 has	 rendered	
diversification	 important,	 the	 latter	more	than	the	former.	Because	proven	reserves	are	
expected	to	last	for	around	a	century	in	several	GCC	countries	combined	with	the	potential	
for	new	discoveries	and	the	invention	of	new	extraction	technologies,	much	uncertainty	









































































and	 innovation.	As	 I	 show,	 a	 variety	of	 government	 agencies,	 financial	 institutions,	 and	
other	state	and	NGO	intiatives	are	stepping	into	various	components	of	nascent	domestic	
and	regional	entrepreneurship	support	ecosystems.	For	these	support	apparatuses	to	have	


















Oman	 and	 Bahrain	 are	 classified	 as	 economies	 in	 a	 transition	 stage	 moving	 from	 an	
efficiency‐driven	to	an	innovation‐driven	economy.	Meanwhile,	Kuwait,	Saudi	Arabia	and	










































especially	 given	 the	 rising	 breakeven	oil	 prices.	 Some	of	 the	 SME	promotion	moves	do	
promise	to	do	just	that,	yet	if	appropriate	mechanisms	are	not	put	in	place	which	address	
broad	 reliance	 on	 expatriate	 labour,	 supporting	 local	 SMEs	will	 expand	 the	 number	 of	
citizens	 who	 can	 access	 a	 business	 owner’s	 income	 while	 perpetuating	 reliance	 on	




in	 some	 cases	 mutually‐reinforcing,	 contradictions	 that	 evolve	 out	 of	 these	 broader	
structural	contradictions.	The	first	 is	 the	significant	amount	of	 institutional	competition	
between	 various	 government	 agencies	 in	 attempting	 to	 target	 this	 broad	 policy	 shift.	
Second,	 the	 notable	 policy	 disconnect	 between	 the	 plans	 and	 actual	 experience	 of	





accessing	 finance,	 monopolized	 market	 conditions,	 competing	 pressures	 from	
stakeholders	 for	regulatory	change,	and	preferences	 for	 foreign	expertise	and	business.	
Third,	 a	 lack	 of	 definitional	 clarity	 for	 SMEs,	 entrepreneurship,	 self‐employment,	 and	
microbusiness	frustrates	policy	efforts,	confuses	application,	and	misplaces	the	innovation	
imperative.	Fourth,	the	two‐tiered	labour	market	with	its	dual‐wage	structure	is	arguably	
the	 staunchest	 challenge	 to	 these	 development	 aims.	 It	 is	 extraordinarily	 difficult	 to	
reverse	 incentive	structures	 in	the	organization	of	 labour	and	business	 in	the	economy,	
especially	when	the	political	will	is	confronted	with	competing	outcome	preferences.	Fifth,	
the	 ideational	 challenge	 posed	 by	 the	 millennial	 generation	 is	 quite	 high.	 Millennial	
expectations,	sitting	at	the	nexus	of	rentier	expectations	and	new	global	ones,	are	difficult	
for	the	state	to	meet	in	the	current	governance	context.	Finally,	the	pull	of	consumption	in	




As	 part	 of	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 rentier	 political	 economy	 in	 the	
Arabian	 peninsula,	 I	 have	 conducted	 extensive	 field	 research	 on	 entrepreneurship	 and	










increasing	 politicization	 of	 the	 region	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 Arab	 uprisings	 along	 with	








the	 GCC	 states,	 and	 sit	 at	 opposite	 ends	 of	 the	 wealth	 spectrum	 and	 the	 ratios	 of	
hydrocarbon	 reserves	 to	 production.	 As	 shown	 in	 table	 1.1,	 Oman	 is	 among	 the	 lesser	
wealthy	of	the	GCC,	with	a	GDP	per	capita	of	$22,056	(USD).	Qatar,	on	the	other	hand,	is	the	
wealthiest	of	 the	 six.	 Its	GDP	per	 capita	 is	 among	 the	highest	 in	 the	world	at	$100,143	
(USD).		If	predictions	prove	accurate	and	production	levels	hold	constant,	Oman	is	expected	
to	have	17	remaining	years	of	oil	and	20	remaining	years	of	gas	production.	With	ample	
































































and	 participation	 in	 its	 consultative	 council	 (majlis	 al‐shura),	 and	 levels	 of	 political	
engagement	 are	 expanding	 at	 a	 faster	 rate.	 In	 Qatar	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 aside	 from	
municipal	elections	citizens	have	yet	to	go	to	the	polls.	Although	the	first‐ever	consultative	
council	 elections	 are	 regularly	 promised,	 they	 keep	 getting	 delayed.	 Nevertheless,	 the	
combination	 of	 economic	 and	 political	 characteristics	 makes	 these	 two	 countries	
compelling	paired	comparisons.	
This	 research	utilizes	 the	case	study	method,	defined	as	 “an	 intensive	study	of	a	
single	unit	for	the	purpose	of	understanding	a	larger	class	of	(similar)	units.”35	To	this	end,	
I	engage	the	method	of	structured,	focused	comparison.36	The	overall	project	engages	four	
levels	 of	 analysis.	 The	 first,	 as	 is	 clear	 in	 chapter	 two,	 speaks	 to	 broader	 theoretical	
arguments	 concerning	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 and	 market	 in	 development.	 I	 situate	 the	
literature	on	the	rentier	state	within	this	broader	debate,	and	assess	the	role	of	Gulf	states	
in	governing	development.	The	second	level	of	analysis	provides	some	empirical	specificity	


















the	 growing	 youth	 bulge,	 rising	 unemployment,	 and	 abnormally	 high	 percentages	 of	
expatriates.	 The	 final	 level	 of	 analysis,	 and	 primary	 thrust	 of	 the	 focused	 case	 studies,	
examines	 the	policies	 and	practices	 of	 entrepreneurship	promotion	 in	 the	 two	 country	




By	 drawing	 on	 the	 insights	 from	 the	 Omani	 and	 Qatari	 experience	 with	
entrepreneurship	promotion,	 I	am	able	to	speak	to	the	broader	entrepreneurship	trend	
and	 development	 policy‐making	 practice	 across	 the	 GCC.	 In‐person	 field	 research	 was	
carried	out	between	September	2011	and	August	2012	in	the	Sultanate	of	Oman	and	the	
State	 of	 Qatar.	 During	 this	 research	 period,	 I	 utilized	 three	 key	 qualitative	 research	




to	 the	 research	 questions.	 To	 the	 extent	 possible	 given	 the	 constraints	 of	 limited	
transparency,	documents	were	collected	from	various	ministries	and	government	bodies	








are	 the	 best	 source	 of	 tracing	 historical	 development	 plans	 and	 processes.	 These	 are	
developed	and	 released	by	 the	Supreme	Council	 for	Planning	 (formerly	 the	Ministry	of	
National	Economy)	in	five	year	intervals	beginning	with	the	first	one	in	1976.	Development	
visions	 and	 plans	 are	 a	 more	 recent	 development	 in	 Qatar,	 meaning	 policy	 plans	 and	
practice	are	more	difficult	to	trace	from	primary	document	sources	before	the	2000s.		
	 Participant	 observation	 played	 an	 enlightening	 role	 in	 the	 research	 collection.	 I	
attended	and	participated	in	conferences,	presentations,	existing	focus	groups,	initiative	
and	event	pitch	meetings	to	decision	makers,	competition	processes	(e.g.	Al‐Fikra	business	
plan	 competition	 in	 Doha),	 and	 other	 meetings	 and	 conferences	 organized	 by	 various	
government	and	private	groups.	This	involvement	allowed	me	to	gain	significant	insight	in	
the	 practice	 of	 policy	 development,	 promotion,	 and	 implementation.	 It	 also	 provided	 a	
first‐hand	 account	 of	 institutional	 competition	 between	 different	 SME	 support	
programmes.	My	involvement	was	primarily	in	an	observational	role,	but	I	was	often	asked	
to	 contribute	 to	discussions.	While	 serving	 as	 a	 visiting	 researcher	 at	 the	University	 of	
Nizwa	 in	 Oman’s	 ad‐Dakhiliyah	 province,	 I	 co‐directed	 workshops	 for	 students	 who	
aspired	 to	 be	 entrepreneurs.	 Being	 permitted	 to	 observe	 initiative	 directors	 making	











Centre	 (SDC)	 in	 Qatar	 with	 some	 of	 their	 programme	 beneficiaries	 who	 are	 new	
entrepreneurs.		
	 Semi‐structured	 elite	 interviews	 comprised	 the	 primary,	 and	 arguably	 most	










state	 conception	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 private	 sector	 development,	 its	 rationale	 for	
entrepreneurship	initiatives	and	how	these	fit	within	government	development	plans,	as	












above,	 these	 interviews	 also	 focused	 on	 the	 perceived	 challenges	 of	 these	 initiatives,	
challenges	and	opportunities	of	the	clients	and	programme	beneficiaries	(entrepreneurs	
and	 aspiring	 entrepreneurs),	 expectations	 for	 the	 future	 of	 local	 entrepreneurship	 and	
innovation,	and	policy	advice.		
	 Another	 important	 side	 to	 this	 aspect	 of	 my	 research	 involved	 semi‐structured	
interviews	with	 entrepreneurs	 and	 other	 business	 people.	 In	 this	 category,	 there	were	
three	broad	 types:	aspiring	millennial	entrepreneurs,	existing	millennial	entrepreneurs,	
and	 business	 people	 from	 earlier	 generations.	 Aspiring	 entrepreneurs	 included	 young	
Omani	 and	Qatari	millennials	 enrolled	 at	 the	 local	 universities,	 colleges,	 or	 involved	 in	
entrepreneurship	 initiatives.	 Existing	 entrepreneurs	 were	 found	 through	 a	 variety	 of	
channels	 including	 local	 academics,	 initiatives,	 and	 even	 funders	willing	 to	 share	 their	
contact	 lists.	These	were	multiplied	through	the	snow	ball	effect	with	an	aim	of	gaining	
sectoral	 diversity.	 These	 interviews	 focused	 on	 the	 entrepreneurial	 ambitions	 of	 the	
interviewees.	Questions	were	asked	on	career	and	economic	aspirations,	with	follow	up	
queries	focused	on	uncovering	the	future	expectations	with	regard	to	economic	well	being,	
political	 direction	 and	 societal	 hopes.	 Millennial	 entrepreneur	 interviewees	 were	
specifically	asked	questions	concerning	where	they	see	themselves	in	10	to	15	years,	what	
their	 ideal‐case	scenarios	with	their	businesses	will	 look	 like,	and	whether	they	plan	to	
publicly	list.	They	were	also	asked	about	perceptions	of	accessibility,	barriers	to	entry,	ease	











on	 development	 and	 their	 pro‐market	 versus	 government	 clientielist	 leanings.	 That	 is,	
were	 they	 seeking	 new	 ways	 of	 acquiring	 government	 income	 or	 favours,	 waiting	 for	
further	 government	 sponsorship	 in	 their	 business	 pursuits,	 or	were	 they	 interested	 in	
being	 subject	 to	 market	 forces?	 Economists,	 government	 advisors,	 and	 officials	 at	 the	
institutions	and	agencies	were	also	asked	whether	they	saw	a	difference	 in	the	cultural	
















Interviewees	 were	 granted	 their	 choice	 of	 confidentiality.	 In	 many	 cases,	
interviewees	wanted	either	full	or	partial	anonymity.	Interestingly,	participants	in	Oman	







consistency’s	 sake,	 I	 opted	 to	 provide	 partial	 anonymity	 even	 to	 those	 who	 granted	
permission	to	use	their	names.		Another	motivation	for	this	confidentiality	is	to	protect	the	
identity	 of	 my	 interviewees	 given	 rapidly	 changing	 political	 situations	 on	 the	 ground.	
Where	 in	 late	 2011	 some	may	 have	 been	 comfortable	 to	 say	 political	 opinions	 on	 the	
record,	as	2012	progressed	the	political	environment	tightened.		Interviews	are	labelled	in	
the	 references	 in	 the	 following	way:	Those	 interview	 references	which	 credit	 a	 “senior	
official”	 refer	 to	 those	 officials	 at	 the	 undersecretary	 or	 director	 general	 level	 (or	
equivalent	 titles).	 The	 term,	 “official”	 refers	 to	 bureaucrats	 at	 other	 levels.	 Some	
interviewees	 had	 specific	 credit	 requests,	 such	 as	 “expert”	 at	 a	 specific	 broader	
government	 body,	 rather	 than	 detailing	 their	 position	 details.	 Others	 requested	 even	
vaguer	 crediting,	 for	 fear	 of	 identification.	 In	 these	 cases,	 the	 ministry,	 agency,	 or	






overcome	 through	 personal	 visits	 to	 ministries,	 official	 offices	 and	 through	 personal	
meetings	and	formal	and	informal	interviews.	Due	to	the	personal	nature	of	the	culture,	








Although	 interview	 responses	 provide	 subjective	 data,	 this	 is	 overcome	 by	 both	 the	
quantity	of	the	interviews	across	a	variety	of	actors	as	well	as	by	triangulation	with	other	
data	and	reports	which	can	corroborate	or	refute	responses.	
Along	with	 exercising	 some	 caution	or	 skepticism	when	 looking	 at	 the	 available	
numeric	data	presented,	a	note	must	be	made	about	what	may	appear	 to	be	conflation	
between	 economic	 and	 political	 liberalization.	 In	 this	 research,	 it	 is	 often	 difficult	 to	
disaggregate	 economic	 from	 political	 reform	 because	 “an	 intrinsic	 link	 exists	 between	
politics	and	economics	in	rentier	states.”38	Indeed,	there	is	a	danger	of	conflating	economic	



























scholars,	 the	 characteristics	 of	 rentier	 states	 have	 become	 axiomatic.	 Hence,	 their	
governance	processes	remain	unexplored.	The	decision	and	policy	making	practices	of	Gulf	
rentiers,	 however,	 are	 important	 to	 understand	 to	 gain	 a	 more	 rounded	 view	 of	 their	
development.	 Through	 examining	 the	 policy	 practices	 related	 to	 the	 promotion	 of	










labour	 flows.	 	 Indeed,	 domestic	 and	 regional	 development	 practices	 are	 intrinsically	
connected	 to	 international	 forces	because	of	 their	 reliance	on	 them.	Although	receiving	
surprisingly	 scant	 attention	 in	 international	 political	 economy	 considerations,	 the	 GCC	
states	 play	 an	 increasingly	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 global	 economy.	 Despite	 the	 best	
Orientalist	arguments	to	the	contrary,	no	system	remains	stagnant	over	time.	Changes	in	
regional	 political	 economy	 are	 evident.	 From	 sovereign	 wealth	 funds	 and	 high‐profile	






etching	 out	 political	 and	 economic	 niches	 for	 themselves	 aside	 from	 their	 traditional	
centricity	to	commodity	markets.	Not	only	this,	but	also	the	eastward	shift	of	power	and	
finance	has	not	skirted	over	the	Gulf.	These	states	may	still	consult	Western	expertise,	yet	
having	 had	 their	 global	 business	 interests	 slighted	 by	 the	 West	 they	 are	 increasingly	
looking	East	for	economic	advice	as	well	as	business	and	trading	interests.	Especially	at	a	
time	 of	 such	 regional	 upheaval,	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 development	 and	 reform	
trajectories	 of	 states	 that	 have	 been	 thrust	 into	 capitalism	 and	 been	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
neoliberal	reconfiguration	of	the	region	for	several	decades	demands	attention.40	
In	this	dissertation,	I	examine	the	promotion	of	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	in	
the	 Gulf	 Arab	 states,	 which	 seems	 a	 peculiar	 policy	 push	 given	 conceptualizations	 of	
development	and	governance	in	the	region.	I	focus	more	heavily	on	the	entrepreneurship	





I	 argue	 that	 understanding	 the	 ways	 rentierism	 impacts	 the	 trajectory	 of	















the	 limiting	 strictures	 of	 broad	 generalizations	 to	 understand	 ongoing	 political	 and	
economic	transformations.	The	deep	structural	contradictions	and	challenges	confronting	
the	 implementation	 of	 entrepreneurship	 policies	 noted	 in	 section	 two	 above	 and	
expounded	upon	later	in	this	dissertation	are	critical	to	understand.	The	difficulties	faced	
in	 interjecting	 entrepreneurship	 into	 the	 modern	 development	 narrative	 given	 the	
embedded	 rentier	 structures	 are	 only	 compounded	 by	 the	 realities	 of	 the	 segmented	
labour	 market.	 I	 argue	 that	 today	 governance	 in	 the	 Gulf	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 a	
contestation	between	reforms	and	rentier	patterns.	Being	cognizant	of	this	tension	allows	
us	to	understand	how	some	policy	outcomes	contravene	classic	rentier	expectations	while	
others	 appear	 hypocritical	 as	 the	 implementation	 of	 policy	 announcements	 become	

















capacity.	The	 third	body	of	assumptions	are	 related	 to	a	pervasiveness	of	 rent	 seeking,	
whereby	the	pursuit	of	rent	rather	than	productivity	commands	attention	of	all	levels	of	
society.41	 The	 chapter	 then	 explores	 development	 literature	 as	 applied	 to	 late‐late	
industrializers.	This	is	followed	by	an	engagement	of	developmental	state	literature	with	
academic	conceptualizations	on	 the	Gulf	 region.	 	The	 final	section	assesses	 the	study	of	




the	 plans	 and	 practices	 of	 state‐led	 entrepreneurship	 promotion,	 whereas	 the	 fourth	



















an	examination	of	certain	structural	contradictions,	 it	discusses	 the	absence	of	an	 ideal	
policy	practice	experience	where	despite	both	 countries	highlighting	 the	 importance	of	
entrepreneurship	and	innovation	in	their	overarching	visions	and	development	plans,	the	
actual	implementation	has	been	less	well	crafted.			
The	 fourth	 chapter	 addresses	 the	 second	 research	 question.	 It	 looks	 at	 how	 the	
promotion	of	entrepreneurship	in	the	Gulf	predates	the	stressors	from	the	so‐called	Arab	
Spring	 but	 shows	 that	 the	 emphasis	 on	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 since	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 uprisings	 has	 grown.	 It	 proceeds	 with	 analyzing	 the	 real	 state	 of	
entrepreneurship	in	Qatar	and	Oman,	particularly	among	the	Gulf	millennial	generation.	It	
begins	 with	 a	 definitional	 exploration	 of	 the	 terms	millennials.	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 an	
examination	of	the	cultural	critique	thesis,	which	suggests	an	inherent	cultural	deficiency	
as	the	reason	for	limited	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	in	the	region.	After	shattering	
this	myth,	 it	 examines	 the	 generational	 divide	 that	 became	 rather	 apparent	 during	 the	




political	 and	 social	 expectations	 than	 previous	 generations.	 This	 consequently	 places	
pressure	on	the	existing	Gulf	rentier	social	contract.		
The	aim	of	the	fifth	and	final	chapter	is	to	tie	the	lessons	of	the	empirical	chapters	
together	 and	 more	 clearly	 delineate	 their	 theoretical	 lessons.	 It	 explores	 the	 broad	
implications	of	the	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	trend,	and	considers	the	overarching	






poses	 while	 assessing	 the	 empirical	 state	 of	 these	 policies	 moving	 forward.	 The	
examination	 of	 transition,	 explored	 throughout	 the	 dissertation,	 illustrates	 a	 broader	
contradiction.	Hence,	 the	conclusion	weaves	a	 tale	of	 transition	against	 the	overarching	
incongruity	 between	 global	 neoliberal	 policy	 advice	 and	 the	 rationale	 and	 reality	 of	
economic	life	in	the	region.					
This	 dissertation	 makes	 three	 contributions	 to	 the	 advancement	 of	 scholarly	
knowledge	in	the	fields	of	Gulf	political	economy	and	development.	First,	scholars	of	the	








national	 and	 regional	 political	 economies.	 They	 have	 also	 developed	 hypotheses	
concerning	the	role	of	rentierism	in	shaping	state‐society	relations.	Much	 less	has	been	
learned	 about	 how	 these	 states	 actually	 develop	 and	 carry	 out	 policies,	 and	 how	 they	











































incorporates	 innovation	 literature	 into	 the	 development	 policy	 making	 context	 given	
current	policy	shifts.	This	chapter	offers	two	contributions	to	the	advancement	of	scholarly	
knowledge.	 First,	 it	 advocates	 increased	 dialogue	 across	 the	 fields	 of	 development,	
international	political	economy,	and	Gulf	studies.	Development	scholars	and	Gulf	scholars	
have	 tended	 to	 view	 the	 region	 in	 analytical	 isolation.	 This	 has	 resulted	 in	 scholars	 of	
development	rarely	including	the	Gulf	in	the	questions	and	debates	around	development	
and	 similarly	 Gulf	 scholars	 infrequently	 engaging	 broader	 development	 literature	 in	
relation	to	the	Gulf.			






literature	has	not	moved	significantly	beyond	 the	assumptions	of	 its	primary	 literature	
base	 from	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s.	 These	 make	 broad	 generalizations	 about	 patterns	 of	
development	and	linkages	between	oil	and	authoritarianism,	but	fail	to	provide	nuance.	
Empirically	 rich	 accounts	 are	 sorely	 lacking	 and	 can	 lead	 readers	 to	 believe	 that	 rents	


















economic	 and	 geopolitical	 realities.	 Gulf	 state	 behaviour	 today	 is	 best	 classified	 as	 a	
contestation	 between	 reforms	 and	 rentier	 patterns.	 In	 some	 cases	 this	 leads	 to	 policy	
outcomes	that	defy	classic	rentier	expectations	and	in	others	it	results	in	apparent	policy	
hypocrisy,	 where	 announcements	 and	 implementation	 are	 obstructed	 by	 structural	
contradictions.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 Gulf	 state	 can	 be	 cast	 as	 some	 genre	 of	 a	 neo‐
developmentalist	 state,	 absorbing	 capitalist	 tendencies	but	 still	harbouring	 some	of	 the	
deeply‐ensconced	 habits	 of	 patronage	 and	 rent	 seeking.	 In	 this	 usage,	 a	 neo‐
developmentalist	 state	 occurs	 in	 instances	 of	 late‐late	 development	 whereby	























provide	 a	 valuable	 heuristic	 device	 for	 identifying	 broad	 problems	 of	 oil‐dependent	
economies,	 they	seem	less	useful	as	an	explanatory	mechanism.	Still,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	
adequately	 conceptualize	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 the	 Gulf	 without	 appreciating	 and	
utilizing	rentier	state	literature.	This	work	is	thus	the	best	starting	point.	In	addition	to	this,	
















making	 and	 development	 path	 choices	 in	 the	 region.	 That	 is,	 development	 literature,	
particularly	that	which	focuses	on	the	developmental	state	and	that	which	examines	the	
role	of	innovation	in	development	policy.		




trends	 of	 globalization	 and	 the	 pressures	 of	 neoliberalism.	 It	 treats	 the	 Gulf	 as	 a	
geographically	distinct	area,	thereby	separating	it	 from	the	impact	of	capital	and	labour	
flows.	Moreover,	it	isolates	Middle	East	analysis	from	broader	political	science	and	makes	
it	 difficult	 for	 theorists	 to	 speak	 to	 other	 bodies	 of	 literature.2	 This	 trend	 is	 slowly	
devolving,	and	through	this	study,	I	hope	to	further	contribute	to	debates	that	span	more	
than	one	literature	set.	I	situate	this	dissertation	within	political	economy,	development	

















and	 labour	 poor	 economies,	 oil	 has	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 geopolitics	 and	
economics	 of	 the	 region	 and	 has	 arguably	 shaped	 state	 building	 and	 development	
programmes.3	 In	 effect,	 oil	 “restructured	 political	 life”	 and	 “produced	 a	 new	 kind	 of	
economy.”4	This	economy	became	known	as	rentier.	The	concept	of	the	rentier	state	was	
first	developed	by	Hossein	Mahdavy	in	1970,	where	he	explored	the	concept	through	the	
case	 of	 pre‐revolutionary	 Iran.5	 It	 has	 since	 been	 developed	 and	 popularized	 by	 other	
scholars,	 chief	 among	 them	 Giacomo	 Luciani	 and	 Hazem	 Beblawi.6	 Derived	 from	 the	
economic	 term	 ‘rent,’	 referring	 to	 returns	 on	 scarce	 resources	 that	 require	 little	 to	 no	
productive	effort	as	in	the	case	of	rent	given	to	landlords,	an	economy	is	defined	as	rentier	




remainder	 involved	 in	 the	 distribution	 and	 utilization	 of	 this	 wealth.	 In	 contrast	 to	
standard	 productive	 states,	 Gulf	 rentiers	 are	 also	 known	 as	 “allocative”	 due	 to	 the	
distributional	role	of	the	state	in	rent	circulation.	Rents	are	circulated	through	a	variety	of	
distributional	mechanisms	including	land	allotment,	housing,	public	sector	employment,	



















“resource	 curse.”9	 Literature	 related	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 resources,	 and	 particularly	 oil,	 on	
development	is	more	applicable	for	the	purpose	of	this	discussion	of	oil	and	development	
policy	 making.	 Two	 general	 premises	 shape	 the	 discussion	 on	 oil	 and	 its	 impact	 on	
development.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 oil	 hinders	 democracy.10	 The	 second	 is	 that	 oil	 leads	 to	
economic	 problems	 like	 limited	 diversification,	 slow	 growth,	 and	 Dutch	 disease.11	 The	
expression	Dutch	disease	encapsulates	the	essence	of	growing	and	depreciating	sectors	of	
the	 economy	 that	 result	 from	 a	 rising	 level	 of	 export	 earnings	 in	 resource‐wealthy	
countries.	 The	 term	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 economic	 phenomenon	 witnessed	 in	 the	




























exchange	 rate	 appreciation,	 thereby	 increasing	 the	 cost	 of	 exports	 and	 depressing	 the	
manufacturing	 sector.	 Although	 the	 service	 and	 transportation	 industries	 may	 grow	
rapidly,	other	industrial	sectors	are	marginalized.12	





this	 well,	 and,	 in	 his	 view,	 hinders	 global	 democratic	 outcomes.	 Oil	 requires	 a	 limited	























allows	 them	 to	 structure	and	 fortify	 their	political	 support	and	position.	This	has	often	
resulted	in	strategies	that	are	better	for	long‐run	growth	and	political	stability.16	Similarly,	
Thad	 Dunning	 demonstrates	 that	 oil	 export	 earnings	 can	 produce	 incentives	 for	
authoritarian	leaders	to	hold	on	to	power	while	simultaneously	reduce	the	incentives	to	








the	 importance	of	 institutions,	although	she	 focuses	more	on	 the	 impact	of	oil	on	 these	
institutions.	 In	 her	 view,	 countries	 that	 depend	 on	 the	 same	 rent	 source	 have	 similar	
characteristics	in	their	development	capacity	and	policy	making	practices.	Much	depends	
on	the	source	of	the	rent.19	Significantly,	the	mechanisms	utilized	by	the	state	to	collect	and	
















constrained	by	 the	 general	 “petrolization”	 of	 the	policy	 environment,	 international	 and	
domestic	private	vested	interests	linked	to	the	state	and	benefiting	from	the	rent	circuit,	
and	rentier	distributive	tendencies	which	importantly	involve	reliance	on	“the	progressive	




There	 are	 two	 general	 patterns	 to	 state	 building	 and	 development	 that	 can	 be	




































pearling	 industry	 and	 trade	 dominating	 the	 coastal	 areas.	 Families	 heeded	 lineage	 and	
claimed	authority	and	status	based	on	ancestry.	The	 concept	of	modern	 statehood	was	
largely	alien	given	the	diffuse,	 tribal	way	of	 life.	Yet,	a	governance	system	was	 in	place,	



















The	effects	of	 the	collapse	of	 the	pearling	 industry	 in	 the	 interwar	period	on	the	
merchant	class	were	compounded	by	the	consequences	of	oil	revenues.	Whilst	merchants	
once	 underpinned	 the	 economic	 base	 of	 governance	 arrangements,	 oil	 reoriented	 the	
economy	toward	oil	companies	and	eliminated	the	necessity	of	rulers	to	rely	on	merchant	
families	for	dues.	Once	the	economy	was	dominated	by	oil,	the	merchants	were	no	longer	






























demands	 and	 bestowing	 with	 them	 discretionary	 policy	 making	 power.	 Scholars	
frequently	invert	the	common	adage,	“no	representation	without	taxation”	to	illustrate	this	
negative	relationship	between	state	income	independence	and	pluralism.30	Michael	Ross	
extends	 this	 idea	 to	 explain	 the	 absence	 of	 democracy	 in	 oil‐exporting	 countries,	
purporting	that	oil	in	fact	impedes	democracy.31	
Thus,	fiscal	power	allows	the	state	to	reconstruct	entire	parts	of	society,	moulding	
dependency.	This	 comprises	part	of	 the	 “ruling	bargain,”	 alluding	 to	 the	 social	 contract	





















quo.	 So	 long	 as	 the	 rentier	 social	 contract	 persists,	 society	 is	 expected	 to	 remain	
complacent	because	its	economic	needs	are	attended	to.	There	is	no	expectation	that	the	




The	 second	 set	 of	 hypotheses	 suggests	 that	 externally‐generated	 income	 also	
hinders	the	development	of	strong	institutions	and	weakens	state	capacity.	The	magnitude	




regulating	 markets	 is	 lacking.	 This	 line	 of	 reasoning	 thus	 intimates	 that	 the	 level	 of	













within	 the	 society.34	 These	 scholars	doubt	 the	 real	 developmental	 potential	 of	 rentiers,	
suggesting	that	heavy	oil	dependence	“tends	to	produce	institutional	arrangements	which	
are	 conducive	 neither	 to	 real	 economic	 development	 nor	 to	more	 transparent,	 citizen‐
responsive	 systems	 of	 governance	 that	 better	 adjudicate	 state/civil	 society	 tensions.”35		
That	 is,	 consumption	and	stability	 tends	 to	be	prioritized	over	actual	development	and	
industrialization,	distorting	economic	and	political	development.	For	example,	in	the	early	
days	Gulf	 rulers	provided	a	pretence	of	 industrialization	which	often	amounted	to	 little	
more	than	spending	sprees	and	redundant	projects	from	competitions	aimed	at	boosting	




















on	 these	 practices	 in	 some	 detail	 in	 his	 work	 on	 Saudi	 Arabia.37	 He	 suggests	 that	 the	












or	 engaging	 in	productive	behaviour.	 Productive	 activity	becomes	 a	 second	 rate	 choice	
after	 inclusion	 in	 the	 rent	 circuit.39	 Essentially,	 attaining	 a	 piece	 of	 the	 economic	 “pie”	






















apathy,	 the	pervasiveness	of	 rent	seeking,	and	 institutional	weakness	delineated	above.	
While	these	descriptions	have	been	useful	tools	to	understand	the	economic	organization	
of	the	region,	it	sidelines	alternative	processes	and	diminishes	the	significance	of	ideational	
change.	 Thus,	 although	 these	 assertions	 offer	 interesting	 insights	 into	 some	 aspects	 of	
rentier	state	behaviour,	they	fail	to	explain	specific	outcomes.	More	crucially,	they	do	not	
elucidate	 the	 rationale	 behind	 recent	 economic	 policy	moves.	 In	 general,	 they	 lack	 the	





the	 context	 of	 broader	 development	 and	 political	 economy	 literature.	 Rather	 than	 just	
relying	 on	 insular	 works	 of	 the	 Gulf	 rentier	 state,	 this	 adds	 a	 useful	 theoretical	 and	







by	 global,	 regional,	 and	 local	 factors,	 have	 fluid	 social	 and	 governance	 patterns.	
Categorizing	Gulf	states	as	“late‐late	industrializers”	à	la	Atul	Kohli	and	Alice	Amsden	is	a	
facilitative	entry	 tool	 to	broader	development	discussions,	 and	a	 solution	 to	 the	absent	
agency	in	rentier	state	literature.41	
Thus,	I	suggest	that	along	with	understanding	the	predominant	paradigm	through	
which	we	view	 the	Gulf,	 answering	questions	 related	 to	a	political	economy	analysis	of	
development	paths	requires	this	research	be	situated	within	development	literature.	This	









prominent	 schools	 of	 thought	 deserve	 mention	 before	 exploring	 developmental	 state	



















would	 lead	 to	 growth.	 It	 viewed	 development	 as	 a	 primarily	 linear	 process,	 whereby	
nations	 would	 progressively	 achieve	 different	 benchmarks.	 The	 assumption	 was	 that	
developing	 countries	 would	 “modernize”	 according	 to	 the	 same	 pattern	 as	 European	
countries	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century.43	 One	 of	 the	 more	 common	 modernization	
trajectories	included	Rostow’s	growth	model.44		
Reacting	to	the	predictive	failure	of	modernization	theory,	a	variety	of	contending	
responses	developed.	One	of	 the	most	 tractable	 of	 these	 turned	out	 to	be	Dependency,	
which	grew	out	of	the	nationalist	thinking	and	economic	analysis	of	Raul	Prebisch	in	the	
1950s.	Whereas	neoclassical	growth	 theories	 like	modernization	suggest	 that	economic	





















“neoliberalism.”	 Championing	 a	 belief	 that	 a	 free‐market	 economy	 is	 best	 suited	 to	
promoting	 economic	 development	 regardless	 of	 national	 socio‐political	 and	 economic	
environments,	 neoliberalism	 conceptualizes	 development	 as	 economic	 growth,	
corroborated	by	aggregate	economic	indicators.	In	this	view,	the	role	of	the	government	in	
economic	management	should	be	limited.	Otherwise,	states	will	develop	economic	policies	


































development	 and	 integration	 in	 the	 global	 capitalist	 system	 –	 on	 national	 terms.	 	 The	
perspective	 offered	 here	 suggests	 that	 in	 reality	 dependency	 “is	 less	 a	 determinant	
international	 structure	 and	 more	 a	 set	 of	 shifting	 constraints	 within	 which	 individual	
nation‐states	have	room	to	manoeuvre.”50	This	is	reflective	of	Sayigh’s	entreaty	for	a	move	
from	dependent	to	self‐reliant	development	in	the	Middle	East.51	The	sentiment	that	Sayigh	
reflects	 in	 his	 entreaty	 for	 shifting	 from	 dependent	 to	 self‐reliant	 development	 in	 the	
Middle	 East	 is	 ensconced	 within	 developmental	 state	 theory.	 Indeed,	 the	 example	 of	
developmental	 states	 elucidates	 the	 shortfalls	 of	 earlier	 theories.	 Literature	 on	 the	
developmental	 state	emerged	as	an	explanation	of	 the	developmental	 successes	of	East	













The	 notion	 of	 a	 developmental	 state	 is	 most	 commonly	 associated	 with	 the	
“miracle”	of	East	Asian	development.	The	term	was	first	coined	by	Chalmers	Johnson	in	
1982	in	reference	to	Japan	and	its	Ministry	of	International	Trade	and	Industry	(MITI).52	It	
has	 since	 evolved	 into	 a	 quasi‐model	 of	 development,	 theorizing	 about	 the	 paths	 to	
industrialization	 predicated	 on	 a	 unique	 mixture	 of	 strong	 state‐led	 development	
strategies	 and	 manipulation	 of	 market	 mechanisms	 to	 exploit	 capitalist	 development.	
Developmental	states,	as	defined	by	Adrian	Leftwich,	are	
...		states	whose	politics	have	concentrated	sufficient	power,	autonomy	and	capacity	
at	 the	 centre	 to	 shape,	 pursue	 and	 encourage	 the	 achievement	 of	 explicitly	
developmental	objectives,	whether	by	establishing	and	promoting	the	conditions	
and	 direction	 of	 economic	 growth,	 or	 by	 organising	 it	 directly,	 or	 a	 varying	
combination	of	both.53		
	
Similarly,	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 her	 book,	 Meredith	 Woo‐Cumings	 engages	 the	 term	
developmental	states	as	“short	hand	for	the	seamless	web	of	political,	bureaucratic,	and	



















poles	 mandating	 both	 nationalism	 and	 international	 economic	 integration	 that	 the	
developmental	state	emerged.			
There	is	neither	a	consensus	on	what	ultimately	constitutes	a	developmental	state	
nor	 on	 what	 qualifies	 a	 state	 to	 be	 one.	 In	 all	 assessments,	 however,	 these	 states	 are	
characterized	 by	 regular	 state	 intervention	 in	 economic	 activities	 in	 order	 to	 promote	
domestic	competitiveness.	Oriented	toward	developing	their	national	economy,	long‐term	
economic	 development	 is	 prioritized	 over	 short‐term	 growth	 even	 though	 both	 are	
desired.	As	opposed	to	only	building	on	existing	comparative	advantage,	developmental	




at	 shifting	 from	 import	 substitution	 to	 export‐oriented	 industrialization,	 the	 mutual	
embeddedness	 of	 the	 state	 and	 society,	 and	 the	 embrace	 of	 market	 manipulation	 as	
opposed	to	the	“deified	Western	concept	of	‘the	market.’”58		
The	embeddedness	of	the	state	in	society	combined	with	autonomy	from	the	society	
is	what	 Peter	 Evans	 calls	 “embedded	 autonomy.”59	 In	 a	 developmental	 state,	 economic	




















...	 it	 is	 worth	 underlining	 that	 either	 autonomy	 or	 embeddedness	may	 produce	
perverse	 results	 without	 the	 other.	Without	 autonomy,	 the	 distinction	 between	





There	 is	 broad	 consensus	 that	 embedded	 autonomy	 constitutes	 an	 important	
characteristic	 of	 the	 developmental	 state.	 Nevertheless,	 some	 scholars	 reject	 the	 term	
developmental	 state	altogether	because	 it	 is	misleading	and	obfuscates	 that	many	such	
states	are	not	always	developmental	and	are	often	quite	“brutal.”62	Earlier	descriptions	of	
the	developmental	state,	however,	identify	“repression”	as	a	defining	component.63	These	
scholars	 attach	 repression,	 legitimacy	 and	 performance	 to	 their	 lists	 of	 identifying	

















Many	 theorists	 claim	 that	 developmental	 states	 are	 limited	 to	 the	 East	 Asian	
countries	of	 Japan,	 South	Korea	and	Taiwan.	Others	 expand	 this	 to	 include	Hong	Kong,	
Malaysia,	 Singapore	 and	 Thailand.66	 Pempel,	 for	 instance,	 believes	 that	 only	 East	 Asian	
states	qualify	as	developmental.	Reflecting	his	sense	that	the	developmental	state	model	
“is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 easily	 implanted	by	 other	 countries,”	 developmental	 state	 theory	has	
received	significant	attention	for	the	“particularity,	not	universality,	on	which	it	is	based.”67	
Some	scholars	do	broaden	 the	application	however.	Whereas	Evans	 situates	Brazil	 and	
India	 as	 “intermediate,”	 that	 is,	 those	 in	 between	 developmental	 and	 predatory	 states,	
others	such	as	Leftwich	claim	that	developmental	states	“have	not	been	confined”	to	East	
Asia.68	Some	have	even	expanded	the	applicability	 to	non‐Asian	states	 that	experienced	
high	 growth	 rates	 like	 Botswana	 and,	 with	 qualifications,	 industrialized	 states	 like	
France.69	The	strength	of	developmental	state	theory	therefore	lies	in	its	admission	to	the	
“possibility	of	more	than	one	historical	path	to	economic	development,”	lending	credence	




Recently,	 two	 scholars	 have	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 integrating	 developmental	 state	














suggests	 that	 the	 Gulf	 states	 may	 represent	 an	 “idiosyncratic	 variation	 of	 the	





he	 calls	 the	 “Dubai	model”	of	development,	which	he	 frames	using	Luciani’s	 allocation‐
production	 state	 dichotomy	 that	 he	 situates	 on	 a	 sliding	 scale.	He	 suggests	 that	Dubai,	
inspired	 by	 Singapore,	 represents	 a	 new	 development	 model	 in	 the	 Gulf.	 Even	 more	
recently,	Hvidt	has	suggested	that	there	are	attempts	to	replicate	the	Dubai	model	in	other	



















	Aside	 from	 this,	 new	ways	 of	 conceptualizing	 the	 Gulf	 states	 have	 begun	 to	 be	
engaged	 within	 the	 last	 decade.	 The	 Gulf	 has	 clearly	 undergone	 political	 economy	
transformations	during	this	time,	causing	a	small	flurry	of	academic	re‐engagement	among	
the,	albeit	small,	Gulf	studies	community.	Academics	such	as	Anoush	Ehteshami	and	Steven	







combined	 the	 positive	 attributes	 of	 a	 rentier	 state	 (huge	 oil	 investment	 and	
revenues)	 with	 those	 of	 a	 production‐oriented	 welfare	 state.	 The	 UAE	 have	
attempted	to	diversify	their	economy	and	to	attract	foreign	investments	as	part	of	
a	plan	for	the	post‐rentier	phase.	Their	policy	trajectory	shows	that	the	country	is	
leaving	 the	 rentier	 tendencies	 of	 the	 past	 behind,	 and	 that	 the	 foundations	 for	
lasting	stability	and	prosperity	have	been	laid.76		
	


























trend	 in	re‐examining	the	Gulf	 through	multiple	 lenses	and	avoiding	 the	reductionism	I	




























society	 even	 if	 the	 use	 of	 resources	 is	 operationalized	 in	 a	 way	 as	 to	 avoid	 popular	
discontent.	 Thus,	 rather	 than	 differing	 significantly	 from	 rentier	 arguments,	 these	
contribute	to	a	growing	body	of	literature	expanding	upon	them	and	deepening	the	level	
of	analysis.			




change	 are	motivated	 by	 regime	 security	 and	 the	 other	 which	 attributes	 reforms	 to	 a	
genuine	 development	 motivation.	 The	 first	 view	 contends	 that	 economic	 reforms	 are	
undertaken	 as	 regime	 survival	 strategies	 and	 serve	more	 as	 “a	 political	 project	 for	 the	
modernization	 of	 authoritarian	 rule”	 than	 a	 project	 for	 economic	 development.82	
Accordingly,	rentier	states	pursue	economic	reform	in	response	to	domestic	unrest	to	quell	


















regime	 durability.85	 Structural	 reform,	 in	 Oliver	 Schlumberger’s	 terms,	 resulted	 in	
capitalist	but	non‐market	economies.86	
The	 second	 view	 diverges	 slightly	 from	 the	 first,	 and	 seems	 to	 imply	 a	 genuine	
commitment	 to	 development	 and	 progress.	 These	 assessments	 point	 to	 the	 Gulf’s	 pro‐





owned	 enterprises	 (SOEs).88	 These	 evolutions	 coincide	 with	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	
developmental	 states	 outlined	 in	 section	 3.2.	 Like	 other	 developmental	 states,	 the	 Gulf	
rentiers	 have	 a	 strong	 capacity	 to	 shield	 themselves	 from	 society,	 and	 direct	 national	


















Whereas	 the	 one	 view	 grants	 society	 limited	 agency,	 the	 other	 removes	 it	
altogether,	 affording	 greater	 credence	 to	 the	 belief	 in	 the	 weakness	 of	 civil	 society	
throughout	the	region.	This	is	rooted	in	the	historical	story	of	severe	underdevelopment	in	
the	pre‐oil	era	which	bestowed	unprecedented	power	to	ruling	families	once	oil	conferred	
them	 fiscal	 autonomy.	 	 This	 view	 fits	 comfortably	within	 the	 Coxian	 definition	 of	 state	
corporatism,	suggesting	the	power	of	the	state		
in	 the	 hands	 of	 political	 leadership,	 predominates	 over	 both	 management	 and	
labour	 without	 there	 being	 any	 effective	 counterweight	 through	 parliamentary	
control	or	accountability.	This	mode	of	social	relations	of	production	accordingly	is	
to	be	found	in	countries	where	liberal	political	institutions	and	competitive	party	































the	 underlying	motivation,	 economic	 policy	 making	 is	 elite	 driven	 in	 the	 Gulf.	 Neither	
grants	much	credence	to	popular	agency.	The	first	school	of	thought	contends	that	decision	
making	is	comprised	primarily	of	ad	hoc	responses	to	internal	(domestic)	concerns.	The	




of	 the	 developmental	 state	 prior	 to	 democratic	 reform.	 Speaking	 about	 contemporary	
developmental	states,	Leftwich	notes	that		
Combining	varying	degrees	of	repression	and	legitimacy,	where	civil	society	is	weak	
or	 weakened,	 these	 states	 have	 concentrated	 considerable	 power,	 authority,	
autonomy	 and	 competence	 in	 the	 central	 political	 and	 especially	 bureaucratic	
institutions	 of	 the	 state,	 notably	 their	 economic	 bureaucracies,	 and	 they	 have	
generated	 pervasive	 ‘infrastructural	 capacity’	 (Mann,	 1986)	 to	 achieve	 their	
developmental	objectives.	This	has	enhanced	 the	capacity	of	 these	states	 to	deal	

























contemporary	Gulf	 scholars	are	 indicating	 that	 rentier	systems	appear	 to	be	evolving.97	
Hertog	 notes	 that	 rent‐seeking	 is	 in	 decline	 and	 more	 sophisticated	 systems	 of	
redistribution	 and	 brokerage	 are	 developing.98	 Claiming	 that	 the	 ‘secular	 decline”	 of	



















the	 nature	 of	 state‐business	 relations.100	 In	 fact,	 examining	 entrepreneurship	 within	






seemingly	duplicitous	desire	 for	 the	maintenance	of	 illiberal	 political	 orders	 as	 long	 as	
economic	reform	continues	in	their	favour.102	Thus	despite	any	agency	some	may	attribute	
to	them,	the	business	elite	may	not	actually	be	change	agents.	Later	chapters	speak	to	this	
contention,	between	entrenched	business	 interests	 and	 the	promotion	of	new	business	
hopefuls.		
The	promotion	of	 entrepreneurship,	 especially	 among	 the	millennial	 generation,	
arguably	contains	potential	for	shaking	the	assumption	of	a	stagnant	business	community	
in	favour	of	the	status	quo	as	we	move	into	the	future.	This	is	assessed	in	greater	detail	in	
chapter	 four.	 State	 intervention	 through	 policies	 which	 advocate	 and	 support	
entrepreneurship	and	 innovation	may	ultimately	 fashion	certain	social	norms.	To	some	

























transformation.	A	 great	 deal	 of	 faith	 is	 placed	 in	 the	 autonomy	of	 the	 state.	One	 noted	






intervention.	 	 Areas	 ranging	 from	 labour	 practices	 and	 ethics	 to	 education	 levels	 and	
quantity	 of	 entrepreneurs	 are	 often	 impacted	 by	 state	 intervention.	 He	 thus	 suggests	
placing	 the	 analytical	 focus	on	 “variations	 in	 the	patterns	of	 state	 intervention.”106	 This	

















so	 oriented	 toward	 allocation	 or	 distribution	 could	 be	 cast	 in	 similar	 terms	 with	
developmental	states.	Yet,	it	is	the	inherent	developmentalism	in	their	language	and	the	
attempts	 at	 guiding	 and	 stimulating	 economic	 activity	 toward	 different	 aims	 that	 has	
prompted	scholars	such	as	Hvidt	to	engage	this	debate.	As	pointed	out	in	the	introduction	























in	 technological	 developments,	 new	 production	 processes,	 and	 the	 size	 and	 flow	 of	
international	 financial	 capital.	 The	 investment	 environment	 now	 privileges	 short‐term	
commitments,	 trade	 in	services,	global	 financial	markets,	and	securities.110	Emphasis	on	
innovation	 and	 the	 knowledge	 economy	has	 replaced	 the	 stress	 on	manufacturing	 and	
industrialization	as	 the	perceived	means	 through	which	 to	engage	globalization	 toward	
developmental	aims.		


















defines	 innovation	 as	 “technologies	 or	 practices	 that	 are	 new	 to	 a	 given	 society.”111	
Innovation,	in	this	view,	is	not	only	derived	from	high	technology,	but	also	“low–technology	
developments	 and	 the	 exploitation	 of	 indigenous	 knowledge.”	 Innovations	 thus	 “come	
from	 entrepreneurs	 who	 make	 them	 happen	 and	 ultimately	 depend	 upon	 a	 society’s	
receptiveness.	 Innovation,	 therefore,	 is	 fundamentally	 a	 social	 process.”112	 Innovation	
should	be	promoted,	in	this	view,	because	it	improves	economic	growth,	competitiveness,	
and	welfare.	
The	 study	 of	 innovation	 and	 innovation	 systems	 is	 intricately	 connected	 to	 the	
study	of	development	and	developmental	states.	During	the	1950s,	scholars	like	Solow	and	
Abrahamovitz	 identified	 a	 link	 between	 technological	 advances	 and	 economic	 growth,	
which	 has	 been	 attributed	with	 prompting	 questions	 around	 the	 role	 of	 innovation	 in	
development.113	One	can	even	trace	the	roots	of	the	discussion	further	back	to	Friedrich	
List’s	 idea	of	a	national	system	of	political	economy.114	The	study	of	national	systems	of	
























assessing	 how	 newly	 industrializing	 states	 could	 catch	 up	 with	 industrialized	 ones.		
Different	eras,	but	similar	development	enquires.		
The	focus	on	innovation	has	intensified	in	the	last	several	decades,	and	has	been	
coupled	 with	 theorizing	 around	 entrepreneurship	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 entrepreneur.116	
Scholars	like	Audretsch	and	Thurik	claim	that	new	firms	play	a	key	role	in	technological	
development.	 In	 their	view,	 this	role	has	been	enhanced	by	the	declining	 importance	of	
scale	 economies	 and	 rising	 levels	 of	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 global	 economic	 environment,	
allowing	space	for	innovation.117	The	central	idea	is	that	traditional	industrial	policies	have	
lost	their	effectiveness	as	policy	instruments	in	the	face	of	both	globalization	and	the	notion	

























response,	 policy	 makers	 are	 looking	 to	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 policy,	
considering	them	crucial	ingredients	for	economic	growth	and	employment	creation.119		
Promoting	 innovation	 and	 developing	 a	 comprehensive	 innovation	 policy	 for	 a	
nation	 is	no	easy	task.	Although	 it	 is	often	conflated	with	science	and	technology	(S&T)	




policy,	but	also	moves	beyond	this	 to	 include	educational,	 training,	and	finance	aspects.	
Improving	 strategies	 and	 policy	 mechanisms	 around	 both	 innovation	 and	
entrepreneurship	policy	requires	a	view	of	all	of	these	elements.121	Research	suggests	that	
for	 innovation	 policy	 to	 thrive,	 both	 scientific	 and	 business	 environments	 need	 to	 be	
conducive	 to	 innovation.	 Regulatory	 frameworks	 need	 to	 be	 amended	 to	 facilitate	
innovators	 and	 innovative	 ideas.	 As	 such,	 technical,	 commercial,	 financial	 and	 other	
support	services	ought	 to	be	designed	with	 the	 innovator	or	entrepreneur	 in	mind	and	
designed	in	such	a	way	that	it	is	easily	accessible	by	them.122		
Like	most	development	questions,	 the	state	versus	market	debate	perforates	the	



















While	no	 country	 achieves	 a	 relatively	high	 level	 of	 innovative	 capacity	without	
such	innovation‐oriented	policy	commitments,	policy	commitments	appear	to	be	




As	 far	as	entrepreneurship	promotion	 is	 concerned,	 simple	policies	 that	 remove	excess	
regulations	 and	 call	 for	 strengthening	 education	 are	 generally	 viewed	 as	 positive.	
However,	the	benefits	stemming	from	policies	around	grants,	financing,	and	strategies	like	
building	innovation	cities	or	strategies	like	clustering	are	far	less	conclusive.125		
























needed	 to	 effectively	 promote	 entrepreneurship.	 Overall,	 the	 promotion	 of	


























The	 most	 rigorous	 domestic	 attention	 to	 intellectual	 property	 protections	 have	 been	
focused	 around	 cultural	 heritage	 and	 traditional	 knowledge.	Discussions	 around	 IP	 are	
increasing	however.132	This	 is	only	natural	given	 the	 recent	attention	 to	 innovation	and	
entrepreneurship	in	the	region.		
Discussions	of	innovation	within	national	and	regional	contexts	generally	include	a	
discussion	 of	 the	 level	 of	 innovation.	 Many	 researchers	 look	 to	 statistics	 such	 as	 the	
numbers	 of	 patents	 and	 scientific	 publications	 as	 indicators	 of	 innovation.133	 By	 these	
accounts,	the	Gulf	has	a	long	way	to	go.	Looking	at	the	two	cases	which	are	the	focus	of	this	
study,	 the	number	of	 scientific	 publications	per	million	of	 the	population	 in	Oman	was	
113.1	and	in	Qatar	was	152.2	according	to	a	2010	report.134	2012	data	based	on	the	Patents	
Co‐operations	Treaty	lists	Oman	with	0.4	and	Qatar	with	1.3	patent	applications	per	million	
of	 the	 population.135	 Compared	with	 Canada	 at	 77.6	 and	 Singapore	 at	 123.2,	 a	 shift	 to	
focusing	on	innovation	in	the	countries	is	arguably	quite	critical.136	If	the	GCC	patent	office	
figures	are	any	 indication,	 there	has	been	some	improvement.	They	suggest	 that	patent	





















a	 series	 of	 recommendations	 on	 improvements	 of	 the	 innovation	 system	 and	
environment.138	
		 Innovation	and	entrepreneurship	policy	has	captured	the	attention	of	development	
strategy	 throughout	 the	 Gulf	 region.	 A	 great	 deal	 of	 policy	 announcements	 and	 public	
discussions	revolve	around	this	policy	world	trend,	indicating	a	certain	impact	from	global	





The	 framing	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 support	 in	 these	 cases	 is	 the	





success.	 One	 would	 be	 hard	 pressed	 to	 find	 someone	 not	 intimately	 conscious	 of	 the	
challenges	 these	 new	 generations	 face,	 however	 varied	 they	 may	 explain	 the	 causes.	












or	 novel,	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 rajl	 aʿmal	 or	 businessman.	 Aside	 from	 the	 obvious	 gender	
implications,	this	terminology	is	problematic	in	reference	to	entrepreneurs,	the	definition	
of	which	connotes	an	element	of	risk	and	 innovation.139	 Indeed	an	entrepreneur,	as	 the	























behind	entrepreneurship	promotion.	Still,	 the	overall	 challenge	necessitating	 it	 is	much	
broader.	Enclosed	in	the	promise	of	entrepreneurship	is	also	the	hope	of	an	antidote	to	the	
much	 larger	 problems	 of	 diversification	 stagnation	 and	 the	 segmented	 labour	 market	
conundrum.	If	the	desire	is	for	the	entrepreneurship	effect	to	be	system	wide,	there	must	
be	 an	 inculcation	of	 innovation.	 Systemic	 innovation,	 as	Drucker	notes,	 “consists	 in	 the	
purposeful	 and	 organized	 search	 for	 changes,	 and	 in	 the	 systematic	 analysis	 of	 the	
opportunities	 such	 changes	 might	 offer	 for	 economic	 or	 social	 innovation.”142	 In	 this	
regard,	the	state	as	the	promoter	of	entrepreneurship	needs	to	delineate	with	some	clarity	
whether	 they	 are	 trying	 to	 stimulate	 the	 sort	 of	 systemic	 transformation	 that	 proffers	
innovation	and	change	or	merely	prompt	piecemeal	reforms	furthering	various	degrees	of	
self‐employment.		



















traditional	 and	 culturally	 separate.	 Its	 socio‐cultural	 orientation	 disconnected	 from	





state	 autonomy	 from	 the	 population,	 societal	 apathy,	 ubiquitous	 rent	 seeking	 and	
institutional	weakness	among	others.143	While	these	descriptions	have	been	useful	tools	to	
understand	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 the	 region,	 it	 sidelines	 alternative	 processes	 and	
diminishes	 the	 significance	 of	 ideational	 change.	 This	 literature	 reduces	 the	 state	




the	 structuralist‐functionalist	 assumptions	 underlying	 most	 writing	 on	 political	
economy,	whereby	states,	as	integral	parts	of	this	assumed	system,	are	represented	




















several	political	economy	pieces	 identify	the	challenge	posed	from	social	 issues	 like	the	
burgeoning	 youth	 ‘bubble,’	 few	 have	 explored	 the	 subject	 in	 detail	 or	 identified	 and	
assessed	 specific	 policy	 responses.	 This	 absence	 is	 significant	 because	 it	 limits	 our	





This	 can	 be	 largely	 attributed	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 theoretical	 tools	 available	 to	 deal	 with	 the	
complexity	of	the	social	world	within	Middle	East	political	economy	studies.	Two	factors	






















some	of	 these	 however.	At	 the	 very	 least	 it	 demonstrates	 that	Dubai	 is	 not	 a	 complete	
aberration	and	still	very	much	attached	to	the	underlying	structures	of	the	oil	economy	
despite	 trying	 to	 transcend	 them.	 Indeed,	 the	 trajectory	of	 late‐late	development	 in	 the	
Gulf,	even	in	its	intoxicating	Dubai	variation,	has	been	influenced	by	rentierism.	It	further	
demonstrates	 that	 bringing	 these	 different	 bodies	 of	 literature	 together	 and	 looking	 at	
wider	 development	 trends	 is	 essential	 for	 conceptualizing	 the	 Gulf’s	 new	 reality	 and	
understanding	of	these	patterns.	
On	 the	 ground,	 states	 are	 sending	 investigators	 to	 Asian	 countries,	 bringing	
speakers,	 experts,	 or	 advisors	 in	 who	 have	 looked	 at	 various	 Asian	 development	
experiences.	 However,	 researchers	 are	 still	 not	 speaking	 to	 these	 wider	 trends.	 They	
remain	consumed	by	one	body	of	literature.	Although	rentier	state	studies	may	have	first	
emerged	 out	 of	 discourses	 on	 wider	 international	 development,	 they	 evolved	 into	 an	
isolated	discussion	 and	 are	now	viewed	as	one	more	 example	of	 the	 exceptionalism	of	
Middle	Eastern	development	and/or	authoritarian	political	structures.	This	both	isolates	









Second,	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 role	 of	 ideas	 and	 norms	 on	 development	 and	
economic	 change	 is	 notably	missing	 in	 Gulf	 research.	 Scholars	 now	widely	 accept	 that	
prevailing	 ideas	 may	 certainly	 be	 “an	 important	 determinant	 of	 policy	 choice.”147	







the	 multivariate	 pressures	 from	 below	 and	 beyond	 the	 state	 which	 renders	 the	
contemporary	economic	policy	making	milieu	analytically	distinct	yet	still	not	detached	




Through	 an	 examination	 of	 two	 heretofore	 unanalyzed	 policy	 shifts,	 that	 of	
entrepreneurship	and	innovation	promotion,	I	assess	motivations	and	explanations	behind	
the	puzzle	of	their	promotion	given	our	expectations	from	rentier	state	literature.	I	further	
avoid	 the	 oversight	 of	much	 rentier	 state	work	 by	 examining	 generational	 change	 and	






















the	 Gulf	 Cooperation	 Council	 countries	 have	made	 it	 one	 of	 the	most	 “vogue”	 regional	
policy	 trends	 of	 the	 past	 few	 years.	 Breakeven	 oil	 prices,	 that	 is	 the	 price	 per	 barrel	
required	 for	 a	 country’s	 fiscal	 accounts	 to	 remain	 in	balance	 for	a	 given	 level	of	public	
expenditure	and	oil	revenue,	have	reached	record	levels.1	These	prices,	driven	in	part	by	a	
sharp	 increase	 in	 government	 expenditure	 responding	 to	 associated	 Arab	 Awakening	
pressures,	have	made	the	GCC	countries	more	acutely	aware	of	the	need	to	diversify	their	
economies.2	While	all	Gulf	rentier	states	face	similar	challenges,	the	stakes	are	higher	for	
relatively	 less	 affluent	 ones	 approaching	 the	 new	 post‐oil	 reality.	 The	 centricity	 of	
entrepreneurship	policies	is	stimulated	not	only	by	diversification	but	also	the	necessity	
for	governance	mechanisms	to	contend	with	a	unique	regional	employment	conundrum:	


















simultaneously	 rising	 with	 a	 growing	 youth	 population	 and	 private	 sector	 that	 either	
systematically	 excludes	 or	 fails	 to	 attract	 local	 labour.	 Policies	 aimed	 at	 promoting	
entrepreneurship	have	thus	been	looked	to	as	a	possible	policy	solution.	Their	diffusion	







sources.	 This	 includes	 content	 analysis	 of	 development	 plans	 and	 policy	 papers	 across	
from	interviews	with	a	multiplicity	of	actors.	The	interviews	were	conducted	across	three	
categories	 of	 stakeholders:	 (1)	 policy	 makers	 and	 bureaucrats,	 (2)	 public	 and	 private	












drive	 toward	 a	 knowledge	 economy.3	 It	 may	 have	 been	 the	 2003	 UNDP	 Arab	 Human	
Development	 Report	 which	 first	 placed	 the	 concept	 of	 “knowledge	 economies”	 on	 the	
regional	agenda	when	it	emphasized	the	imperative	to	establish	them	in	the	Middle	East	
North	 Africa	 (MENA).4	 The	 idea	 naturally	 reverberated	 in	 policy	 circles	 where	
diversification	 was	 already	 featured	 prominently	 but	 the	 end	 game	 had	 yet	 to	 be	
articulated.	This	was	followed	by	the	2008	World	Bank	report	on	education	reform	in	the	
MENA	 that	 stressed	 human	 capital	 development	 as	 a	 critical	 pathway	 on	 the	 road	 to	



























in	 productivity	 and	 economic	 competitiveness.”6	 This	 claim	 encompasses	 the	 vision	 of	
dynamism,	 sustainability,	 and	 growth	 that	 developing	 and	 emerging	 economies	 aspire	








revenue.	 Interestingly	 perhaps,	 both	 states	 point	 to	 these	 same	 challenges	 as	 concerns	
moving	into	the	future	and	entering	the	knowledge	economy.		
As	part	of	Gulf	development	goals,	human	capital	development	was	incrementally	
featured	 more	 prominently	 alongside	 industry	 and	 infrastructure	 from	 the	 mid‐1990s	
onwards.	The	mid‐2000s	marked	a	real	shift	in	development	moves	in	the	region.	By	2005,	
Saudi	 Arabia	 became	 the	 last	 GCC	 country	 to	 accede	 to	 the	World	 Trade	 Organization	
(WTO),	 and	 the	 visibility	 of	Dubai’s	 economic	boom	escalated.	 States	 and	 citizens	 alike	











the	 ability	 to	 attract	 FDI	 is	 considered	 advantageous	 to	 development	 promotion	when	
combined	with	the	nurturing	of	innovation	networks	and	linkages	between	local	and	global	
technology.8	
Buttressed	 by	 high	 oil	 prices,	 the	 mid‐2000s	 were	 characterized	 by	 high	 FDI,	
bilateral	free	trade	agreements,	and	rising	levels	of	expatriates	that	overwhelmed	even	the	
pretext	of	encouraging	labour	nationalization	quotas.	During	this	time,	a	focus	on	industrial	
development	 beyond	 hydrocarbons	 began	 which	 has	 continued	 into	 the	 present.	 The	
beginning	of	 this	 decade,	 however,	 has	been	 characterized	by	official	 discourse	 around	
stimulating	knowledge‐based	economies.	Stimulating	innovation	is	deemed	a	crucial	factor	
on	the	road	to	knowledge	economy.	To	this	end,	recent	years	have	been	imbued	with	high‐
profile	 research	 announcements,	 forums	 and	 conferences,	 and	 the	 announcement	 of	
innovation	and	entrepreneurship	promotion	initiatives.	Much	of	the	attention	is	dedicated	


























(with	 2000	 as	 the	 base	 year),	 we	 see	 a	 19.6	 percent	 decline	 in	 the	 relative	 share	 of	
petroleum‐related	 activities	 to	GDP	 from	1999	 to	 2009.	 This	 also	 is	 not	markedly	 high	
given	 the	 attention	 paid	 to	 diversification.9	 The	 Qatari	 case	 is	 quite	 similar	 with	
hydrocarbons	comprising	a	53	percent	 share	of	GDP	 in	2006	and	51.1	percent	 in	2010	


















Nizwa,	Sur,	and	Al‐Buraimi.	The	aluminium	sector,	 for	example,	 is	 in	a	good	position	 in	
Oman.	Sohar	Aluminium	Company	(SAC)	began	in	2008	as	a	joint	venture	between	Oman	
Oil	 Company	 and	 Rio‐Tinto‐Alcan,	 the	 result	 of	 an	 Australian‐Canadian	 merger.12	 Rio‐
Tinto‐Alcan	currently	has	a	20	percent	share	in	SAC	and	other	shareholders	include	Oman	
Oil	and	Abu	Dhabi	Water	and	Electricity	Authority,	each	with	a	40	percent	share.	In	2011,	




facility,	 and	 the	expanding	Sohar	 Industrial	Estate,	under	 the	auspices	of	PEIE.	 It	 is	 the	
industrial	development	of	Duqm,	in	the	al‐Wusta	governorate,	and	the	establishment	of	its	
Special	 Economic	 Zone	 Authority	 (SEZAD)	 in	 2011	 however	 which	 has	 been	 gaining	
increasing	attention	over	 the	past	 two	years.14	Duqm	projects	 include	a	 large	 industrial	
port,	 a	 dry	 dock	 and	 ship	 repair	 yard,	 an	 airport,	 an	 industrial	 and	 logistics	 zone,	 a	
petrochemical	complex,	water	and	power	generation	and	distribution,	natural	gas	supply,	
and	a	fisheries	harbour.	Imports	into	the	zone	will	be	duty	free,	and	there	are	plans	to	make	
the	 area	 into	 a	 transportation	 hub	 for	 the	 region.	 SEZAD	 is	 also	 developing	 an	 area	
dedicated	to	tourism.15	 In	fact,	Oman	has	been	pursuing	diversification	through	tourism	























gas	 industry	 as	 well	 as	 holds	 controlling	 stakes	 and	 joint	 ventures	 with	 several	 other	
companies	especially	concentrated	in	the	gas	and	petrochemical	industries.	It	also	retains	
investments	 in	 several	 others	 from	plastics	 and	metals	 to	 shipping.18	 Like	much	 of	 the	
region,	industrial	cities	exist	in	Qatar	as	well.	At	least	half	of	them	focus	on	oil	and	gas	with	
the	 others	 directed	 toward	 downstream	 and	 service	 activities	 to	 the	 energy	 and	
hydrocarbon	 sector.	 Steel	 and	 cement	 are	 growing	 segments	 given	 rapid	 construction	
development.19	 The	 benefit	 of	 state‐owned	 enterprises	 in	 Qatar	 is	 that,	 like	 in	



















(QAFAC),	 Qatar	 Fertiliser	 Company	 (QAFCO),	 and	 Qatar	 Steel],	 receives	 inexpensive	
petrochemical	 feedstock	 by	 QP,	 coincidently	 its	 largest	 shareholder.20	 Likewise,	 Qatar	
Airways,	 the	national	airline,	began	running	 its	 fleet	on	 locally‐produced	 fuel	 in	2007.21	





























Labour	 Organization	 (ILO)	 ranks	 as	 second	 only	 to	 North	 Africa	 for	 the	 highest	
unemployment	 rates	 in	 the	world,	 exceeding	10	percent.25	 Youth	unemployment	 in	 the	
region	is	estimated	to	have	reached	28.1	percent	in	2012.26	Yet	gathering	reliable	statistical	
data	on	employment	trends	in	the	GCC	is	rather	difficult,	with	variance	between	figures	
from	 the	World	 Bank,	 IMF,	 Economist	 Intelligence	 Unit	 (EIU),	 and	 local	 ministries.	 All	
studies	 suggest,	 however,	 that	 unemployment	 and	 underemployment	 among	 youth	 is	
significantly	higher	than	overall	levels.	Some	reports	indicate	unemployment	in	Oman	at	
15	 percent,	 with	 unemployment	 among	 16‐24	 year	 olds	 much	 higher	 at	 35	 percent.27	
Official	government	statistics	indicate	unemployment	is	less	a	problem	in	gas‐rich	Qatar,	
























	Despite	 these	 employment	 trends,	 the	 region	 remains	 excessively	 reliant	 on	
expatriate	 labour	 with	 migrant	 workers	 constituting	 approximately	 70	 percent	 of	 the	
labour	force	since	the	1980s.29	 In	fact,	Omanis	only	comprise	40.6	percent	of	the	labour	
force	while	Qataris	have	consistently	comprised	six	percent	of	the	labour	force	from	2008	
















Protests	 that	 emerged	 during	 the	 Arab	 uprisings	 of	 2011	 have	 heightened	 the	
significance	of	 labour	market	 and	youth	 inclusion	 items	on	 the	development	 agenda	 in	
Oman.	Although	entrepreneurship	has	been	given	policy	attention	in	recent	years,	it	was	















sector	 frequently	 pointed	 to	 the	 protests,	 rising	 levels	 of	 unemployment,	 and	 growing	
numbers	of	school	graduates	and	school	leavers	as	significant	concerns.	“The	motivation,”	
claimed	a	senior	official	from	the	Ministry	of	Commerce	and	Industry	(MOCI),		
...	 is	 to	 create	 jobs	 for	 Omanis.	 We	 have	 a	 problem.	 Every	 year	 a	 big	 number	









contribution.	We	 cannot	 just	 rely	 on	 the	 oil.	 ...	We	 have	 no	 choice!	We	 have	 to	














bestowed	 upon	 Qatar	 international	 renown.35	 To	 be	 sure,	 “elements	 of	 grandiose	 and	
prestige”	 underline	 many	 decisions	 in	 the	 Gulf	 where	 rulers	 desire	 to	 be	 considered	
regional	leaders	in	particular	policy	areas.36	Nonetheless,	an	argument	can	be	made	for	the	
























their	 connection	 to	 Qatar	 National	 Vision	 2030.	 Some	 would	 point	 to	 conventional	
American	economic	advice	which	describes	SMEs	as	the	backbone	of	the	economy.	As	well,	
the	idea	of	entrepreneurship	and	fast‐paced	development	seems	a	good	way	to	move	into	





Still,	 the	 prestige	 allocated	 to	 the	 entrepreneurial	 trend,	 especially	 in	 the	 Qatari	 case,	
cannot	be	disregarded	entirely.	














The	 impending	 challenges	 described	 above	 provide	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 motivation	
behind	 entrepreneurship	 promotion	 in	 the	 region.	 These	 problems	 have	 beleaguered	






attempting	 to	 transition	 to	 a	 new	 developmental	 phase,	 the	 knowledge	 economy.	 The	
language	in	the	development	plans	of	each	GCC	state	recognizes	knowledge	economy	as	a	
goal	 and	 several	 states	have	benchmarked	 their	development	plans	on	Singapore,	New	

















for	 advising	 roles	 in	 the	 Gulf,	 have	 encouraged	 the	 fostering	 of	 entrepreneurship	 for	
developmental	progress	and	for	helping	address	labour	market	challenges.40	The	role	of	








Entrepreneurship	 promotion	 sits	 within	 a	 broader	 mandate	 that	 involves	 the	
development	 of	 a	 national	 system	of	 innovation.	 Although	 these	 systems	 include	much	
more,	 there	 is	 hope	 that	 fostering	 entrepreneurship	will	 lead	 to	 the	 technological	 and	
managerial	 innovations	 characteristic	 of	 knowledge	 economies.	 A	 national	 system	 of	
innovation	can	be	defined	as		



















institutions	 that	 act	 within	 this	 ecosystem.43	 This	 account	 does,	 however,	 set	 up	 the	
discussion	in	such	as	way	so	that	I	can	later	speak	to	the	broader	definition.	The	“broad”	





		 Oman	has	perhaps	a	stronger	 impetus	 than	 its	wealthier	neighbours	 to	 invest	 in	
diversification	and	innovation.	Within	the	last	decade,	and	particularly	within	the	last	year,	
there	 has	 been	 growing	 focus	 on	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation.	 This	 is	 illustrated	






# Programme Type Level Date Shift Government 
Actors 
1. Sanad Funding / 
Training 








































National  2005 2010 tasked with 
drafting national 
scientific research 




5. National Career 
Guidance Centre 
Education National 2008 2011 MOE 
6. Intilaaqah / GroFin Training / 
funding 
Global - localized 1995 2010 shift to GroFin 
management 
Private / Shell 
7. Injaz Oman (Part 
of Injaz al-Arab, a 





Global - localized 2006 2012 Initiated by MoM, 
Sanad and later 
delivered via MOE, 
MOHE, and ITA 
8. Cisco  
Entrepreneurship 
Institute  




2009 2011 Delivered via local 
consultancy by the 
end of 2011 
 SME 
Development 
Fund   
Funding  National with 
global 
cooperation / fund 
management 











2012 N/A OMIFCO CSR via 
consultancy 
10. Start-Up Weekend 
(annual) 










Global project / 
local branch 
hosted by local 
entrepreneur, 
owner of Zajil 
Oasis, LLC. 
2011 N/A In cooperation w 
many public and 
private partners. 
 
As	 a	 result	 of	 Oman’s	 production	 of	 development	 plans	 throughout	 its	 modern	
history,	one	can	trace	the	evolution	of	language	and	usage	over	time.	This	provides	useful	
insights	into	the	trajectory	of	development	planning	over	the	years	and	one	can	trace	the	








discourse	 of	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	which	 solidified	 its	 capitalist	 tendencies.	 The	 global	
neoliberal	push	of	the	1980s	coupled	with	the	oil	price	slump	prompted	economic	policy	
language	 that	 mirrored	 prevailing	 international	 discourse	 of	 the	 time.	 Privatization,	
economic	 liberalization,	 and	 free	 trade	 became	 buzzwords	 in	 press	 releases	 and	
development	plans.		





Economy	 2020.	 It	 is	 also	 tied	 to	 the	most	 recent	 five‐year	 development	 plan.45	 Human	






















In	 fact,	 early	 initiatives	 toward	 this	 end	 started	 a	 few	 years	 after	 Vision	 2020’s	
release.	These	include	Sharakah,	the	Fund	for	the	Development	of	Youth	Projects	in	1998	
and	 Sanad	 through	 the	Ministry	 of	Manpower	 (MoM)	 in	 2001.	 Sharakah	 is	 a	 type	 of	 a	
venture	capital	fund	aimed	at	promoting,	developing,	and	financing	SMEs.	It	is	the	brain	
child	of	Mohammed	Zubair,	economic	advisor	to	the	Sultan,	and	his	office.	Although	it	is	
officially	 a	private	 fund,	 it	was	 established	by	Royal	 decree	 and	 a	 sizeable	donation	by	
Sultan	 Qaboos.	 Funding	 from	 private	 sector	 actors	 soon	 followed.	 The	 programme	
experienced	road	bumps	along	the	way.	Many	of	the	early	projects	that	were	funded	went	
out	of	operation	by	2005,	and	the	organization	went	quiet.	It	basically	stopped	functioning	
for	 at	 least	 a	 year	 and	 a	 half.	 In	 2008,	 there	 was	 an	 organizational	 revamping	 which	
included	a	fresh	managerial	team.	Since	that	time,	they	have	been	performing	better	and	
have	also	been	involved	in	useful	research	projects.47		
The	Ministry	 of	Manpower’s	 programme,	 Sanad,	meaning	 support	 in	Arabic	 and	
standing	for	Self‐Employment	and	National	Autonomous	Development,	was	 launched	in	
2001	to	stimulate	local	business	creation,	ownership,	and	employment.	While	it	is	included	
in	 most	 discussions	 of	 entrepreneurship	 support	 in	 the	 country,	 its	 activities	 have	
traditionally	been	more	closely	akin	to	microfinancing	and	training	 for	micro	and	small	












up	 to	 four	others	 involved	 in	 the	same	project	 for	a	maximum	of	25,000.	During	2011,	
funding	was	 increased	 to	 50,000	OMR,	 and	 allocated	 on	 a	 per‐project	 rather	 than	 per‐
applicant	basis.	Despite	this,	programme	participants	seem	to	have	retained	unfavourable	
opinions	of	Sanad,	including	its	training	and	support	services.49	
It	was	 the	 last	 two	 development	 plans	 that	 really	 earmarked	 innovation	 on	 the	
development	 agenda.	The	 relatively	newly	 created	Research	Council	 of	Oman	has	been	





















innovation	 mentioned	 above.51	 The	 innovation	 division	 functions	 as	 an	 umbrella	 over	
three‐pronged	 project	 branches:	 Education	 and	 Academic	 Innovation	 Assistance,	
Community	Innovation	Assistance,	and	Industrial	Innovation	Assistance.	Mindful	of	state	






community	 ideas	 to	 commercial	 products	 and	 services.	 The	 final	 branch,	 Industrial	
Innovation,	 strategically	 positions	 itself	 as	 the	 main	 initiative	 building	 research	 and	








the	 idea	 to	 develop	 an	 innovation	 centre	 was	 first	 given	 birth.	 Initial	 activities	 were	
modelled	 after	 the	 Canadian	 Innovation	 Centre	 (CIC).	 Some	 suggest,	 however,	 that	 the	







endeavours.52	 	 New	 consultants	 and	 experts	were	 brought	 in	 to	 try	 to	 develop	 a	more	




























In	 addition	 to	 their	 tangential	 role	 in	 the	 IIC,	 the	 MOCI	 has	 recently	 created	 a	
directorate	general	for	small	and	medium	enterprises	(DG	SME).	Initiated	in	2007	by	royal	
decree,	the	DG	SME	began	by	connecting	with	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	to	look	into	
other	 country	 experiences	 in	 supporting	 entrepreneurship	 and	 SME	 development.	 The	
organizing	 idea	 was	 to	 develop	 a	 unit	 that	 facilitates	 increased	 collaboration	 and	
coordination	 among	 the	 various	 projects	 and	 programmes	 throughout	 the	 country.56	
Toward	the	end	of	2012,	they	relocated	their	offices	and	launched	a	centre	that	is	to	act	as	
a	 “one‐stop‐shop”	 for	 SME	 start‐up	 and	 support.	 This	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 first	major	 step	
toward	targeting	the	lack	of	collaboration	across	government	institutions.	Still	within	the	
early	days	of	operation,	it	remains	unclear	if	this	will	transpire.	If	anything	seems	constant	
in	personal	 interviews	across	the	government	bodies,	 it	 is	that	they	each	acknowledged	
policy	 coordination	 and	 cooperation	 problems	 and	 speak	 of	 potential	 future	 moves,	
databases,	and	initiatives	to	target	these.	Yet	at	the	same	time,	many	seem	oblivious	to	the	
plans	and	programmes	of	other	government	institutions.	































































SMEs.	 Injaz	 Oman	 is	 another	 interesting	 example	 that	 has	 historically	 been	 quite	
collaborative.	It	is	part	of	the	international	Junior	Achievement	World	Wide,	which	in	its	










targeting	 high	 school	 graduates	 and	 colleges	 students.	 It	 also	 focused	 its	 student	
competitions	at	the	college	level,	and	participated	in	local	and	regional	competitions.	Out	
of	seven	student	companies	that	competed	in	one	of	these	competitions,	two	turned	into	
start	 ups	 and	 one	 is	 in	 transition	 with	 an	 investor	 waiting.58	 Injaz	 has	 also	 signed	 a	
memorandum	of	understanding	with	the	Internet	Technology	Authority	to	participate	in	
its	programmes	like	its	incubator	and	its	hosting	of	an	innovation	camp	for	students.59	
There	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 other	 international	 initiatives	 and	 training	 programmes	
offered	through	local	partners	or	branches.	Ernst	&	Young,	for	instance,	organizes	annual	
“entrepreneur	of	the	year”	awards.	As	well,	the	Cisco	Entrepreneurship	Institute’s	training	
programme	 is	 offered	 in	 Oman.	 Initially,	 it	was	 delivered	 through	 the	 local	 AMIDEAST	
branch,	 but	 more	 recently	 has	 been	 available	 through	 a	 local	 consultancy	 owned	 and	
operated	 by	 an	 Omani	 entrepreneur,	 Sharifa	 Al‐Barami.	 Sharifa	 has	 become	 quite	 the	
powerhouse	 in	 the	 local	 entrepreneurial	 ecosystem,	 inspiring	 many	 young	 Omanis	 to	


















the	 South	 Sharqiya	 region.	 She,	 in	 partnership	with	 an	 expatriate	 consultant,	 has	 been	
contracted	by	the	Oman	India	Fertiliser	Company	(OMIFCO)	to	run	its	business	accelerator	
/	 incubator	 project,	 the	 Cell.	 The	 Cell	 is	 one	 of	 OMIFCO’s	 major	 corporate	 social	
responsibility	 (CSR)	 initiatives,	 and	was	 only	 launched	 in	 2012.	 It	 targets	 employment	
challenges	across	 the	country	but	primarily	 in	South	Sharqiya	where	 its	manufacturing	
plant	 is	 based.	 Oman	Oil	 Company,	wholly	 owned	 and	 operated	 by	 the	 government	 of	
Oman,	has	a	50	percent	stake	in	OMIFCO,	and	thus	has	a	keen	interest	in	encouraging	its	
state‐owned	 enterprises	 to	 join	 the	 broader	 state‐led	 entrepreneurial	 push.	 Even	 the	
Muscat	Youth	Summit,	run	by	royal	family	member	Sheikh	Faisal	bin	Turki	Al‐Said,	is	for	
the	second	year	in	a	row	focusing	on	entrepreneurship.	
	 Along	 with	 the	 more	 economically‐rooted	 initiatives,	 the	 various	 government	
bodies	 responsible	 for	 education	 are	 also	 participating	 in	 the	 promotion	 of	
entrepreneurship.	 These	 include:	 the	 Education	 Council,60	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	
(MOE),	the	Ministry	of	Higher	Education	(MOHE),	the	Ministry	of	Manpower	(MoM),	and	











earlier	age.	 In	 recognition	of	 this,	 the	MOE’s	National	Career	Guidance	Centre	has	been	
working	on	an	 initiative	 to	 reform	primary	and	high	school	 curriculum	as	well	 as	 train	
teachers	 to	allow	 for	an	earlier	 inculcation	of	entrepreneurship	as	a	viable	and	desired	
career	 path.	 The	 NCGC	 was	 established	 in	 2008.	 A	 2003	 Canadian	 consulting	 project	
designed	 its	 structure	 and	 this	 was	 blended	 with	 ideas	 from	 both	 Vision	 2020	 and	 a	
regional	Arab	symposium	in	2005	to	create	the	NCGC.	Through	the	centre,	career	guidance	
counsellors	are	located	throughout	the	country.	Students	are	able	to	access	training	and	
learn	 of	 career	 possibilities	 through	 these	 counsellors.	 As	 well,	 booklets	 have	 been	
developed	as	curriculum	addendums	for	grades	six	through	11,	which	help	orient	students	
to	the	various	options	available	post‐graduation.	In	addition	to	finding	ways	to	integrate	




high	 consciousness	 of	 female	 enfranchisement	 and	 the	 imperative	 of	 providing	 equal	
opportunities	to	female	students,	graduates,	teachers,	and	ministry	staff.61		
	 The	MOE	 is	 only	 responsible	 for	 primary	 and	 secondary	 education,	 leaving	 the	
Ministry	of	Higher	Education	(MOHE)	to	oversee	most	tertiary	education	across	Oman.	The	







outside	 the	 national	 capital.	 Initially	 set	 up	 as	 teacher’s	 training	 colleges,	 they	 were	
converted	to	Colleges	of	Applied	Science	in	2007.	In	the	last	couple	of	years,	these	colleges	
have	been	offering	courses	on	entrepreneurship	through	their	business	programmes	but	
open	 to	 the	 wider	 student	 body.	 As	 well,	 students,	 mostly	 through	 the	 initiative	 of	
instructors,	have	participated	 in	workshops	and	competitions	on	business	creation	and	
entrepreneurship.	 A	 recent	 conference	 hosted	 by	 the	 MOHE	 in	 cooperation	 with	 the	
Research	Council,	called	Moving	Mountains:	Entrepreneurship	Through	Higher	Education,	
brought	together	many	experts,	academics	and	practitioners	alike.	It	simultaneously	ran	a	































economy,	 places	 entrepreneurship	 front	 and	 centre	 of	 the	 agenda.	 It	 uses	 the	 terms	
entrepreneurship	and	entrepreneurial	21	times	and	speaks	of	innovation	and	innovations	
some	48	 times.	 The	 term	 “knowledge	 economy”	 occurs	 in	 36	 instances	 throughout	 the	
strategy.65	Despite	the	inconsistencies	and	contradictions	that	will	be	mentioned	in	more	
detail	 later,	 the	 strategy	demonstrates	a	genuine	desire	 to	 transition	 to	 this	knowledge	
economy	 and	 a	 very	 real	 sense	 of	 the	 challenges	 confronting	 the	 Qatari	 economy.	 For	
instance,	the	strategy	pragmatically	notes	that	“the	success	of	Qatar’s	efforts	to	graduate	
from	an	economy	based	on	non‐renewable	resource	inputs	to	one	in	which	productivity	











shifts	 that	 alter	 the	 incentives	 facing	 its	 citizens.”66	 Despite	 its	 lack	 of	 previous	
development	 planning,	 earlier	 scholarship	 suggests	 that	 even	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s,	







inception	 of	 the	 reform	 programme	 Education	 for	 a	 New	 Era.68	 The	 programme	 was	
developed	 by	 RAND,	 a	 non‐profit	 American	 policy	 institute,	 and	 highlighted	 several	





in	 broad	 policy	 incongruity	 and	 several	 reversals.	 Policy	 recommendations	 were	


















of	 the	 Qatar	 Foundation	 for	 Education,	 Science	 and	 Community	 Development	 (QF),	
founded	in	1995	by	the	Emir,	Sheikh	Hamad	bin	Khalifa	Al‐Thani.	QF’s	chairperson	and	
“driving	 force”	 is	Sheikha	Mozah,	 the	wife	of	 the	Emir	and	mother	of	 the	Crown	Prince,	
Sheikh	Tamim	bin	Hamad	Al‐Thani.71	The	goal	of	Education	City	 is	 to	 serve	as	a	bridge	
between	research	and	policy,	and	train	and	develop	young	generations	of	Qataris	for	the	
future.	 To	 this	 end,	 it	 houses	 campuses	 of	 several	 international	 universities	 like	































There	 are	 four	 key	 origins	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 support:	
government,	 quasi	 government,	 private,	 and	 global/local	 partnerships.	 The	 first,	
government,	is	actually	difficult	to	separate	from	the	others.	The	state	in	Qatar	is	deep,	and	
as	 both	 the	 arbitrator	 of	 the	 permissible	 and	 the	 centre	 of	 financial	 resources,	 most	










Foundation.	Although	QF	 is	 considered	a	non‐profit	non‐governmental	organization,	 its	
close	affiliation	with	the	royal	family	makes	it	difficult	to	distinguish.		
In	 addition	 to	 Education	 City,	 the	 Qatar	 Foundation	 founded	 the	Qatar	National	




carrying	out	 research	but	also	 in	delivering	 commercialized	 technologies	and	products.	
Similar	 to	 KOM	 in	Oman,	 QSTP	 operates	 as	 a	 science	 park	 that	 acts	 as	 a	 hub	 for	 large	
international	 corporations	 like	 Microsoft,	 Exxon,	 and	 Tata.	 It	 also	 tries	 to	 promote	





Foundation.	SDC	 is	 involved	 in	activities	 that	have	 to	do	with	community	development.	
Through	this	lens	then,	SDC’s	entrepreneurship	support	is	more	similar	in	scope	to	Sanad	















A	 focus	 group	with	 SDC	 beneficiaries	 revealed	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 appreciation	 toward	 the	
centre	and	its	team,	who	provided	them	with	a	fair	amount	of	support	in	the	form	of	hand	
holding	 and	 guidance.75	 Women,	 in	 particular,	 seemed	 to	 benefit	 from	 advice	 and	
microfinancing	for	small,	independent	businesses.	In	fact,	across	Qatar	women	seem	to	be	
popular	 beneficiaries	 of	 the	 promotion	 of	 entrepreneurship.	 Most	 organizations	 and	
initiatives	 indicate	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 interest	 from	 aspiring	 female	 entrepreneurs.	 Even	
university	programmes	mentioned	strong	interest	and	performance	by	female	students.	
























seem	to	 face	additional	difficulties	 in	 the	commencement	and	expansion	processes.	For	
instance,	the	Junior	Achievement	Worldwide,	Injaz	Al‐Arab	branch	in	Qatar,	Injaz	Qatar,	
was	slow	to	get	off	the	ground.	It	took	them	five	years	to	receive	a	commercial	license.	Injaz	
Qatar,	 directed	 by	 Roudha	 co‐founder	 Ayesha	 Al‐Mudehki,	 has	 also	 been	 active	 at	 the	






the	business	 of	 supporting	 technology	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation.	Through	 their	
initiative,	 the	 Digital	 Innovation	 Centre,	 ictQatar	 has	 two	 key	 projects.	 The	 first	 is	 a	




content	 business	 activities.	 The	 second	 project	 of	 the	 Digital	 Innovation	 Centre	 is	 the	












entrepreneurial	 ecosystem.	 Naturally,	 it	 is	 one	 necessary	 stop	 (and	 more	 frequently	
several)	 for	 registering	 a	 business.	 Although	not	 yet	well‐delineated,	 it	 is	 the	 centre	 of	






to	 the	 creation	 of	 institutions	 and	 initiatives	 to	 support	 SME	 development	 and	
entrepreneurship	among	the	young	in	Qatar.	The	announcement	notes,		
H.E.	 The	 Prime	 Minister	 has	 created	 a	 steering	 committee	 chaired	 by	 H.E.	 the	
Minister	of	Business	&	Trade	and	been	given	a	mandate	for	the	creation	of	a	new,	
independent	authority,	whose	goals	will	be	to	 foster	diversification	of	 the	Qatari	
















EQ	 was	 then	 announced	 in	 2008	 by	 the	 Emir	 with	 a	 two	 million	 Qatari	 riyal	 funding	
package.		Not	only	was	EQ	to	offer	a	full	range	of	training	and	business	support	services,	it	
was	to	aid	SMEs	in	finding	and	accessing	financial	products	like	venture	capital,	grants,	and	
loan	 guarantee	 programmes.	 Losing	 momentum	 after	 the	 death	 of	 a	 Sheikh	 who	 was	
especially	passionate	about	the	project,	it	was	not	until	2010	that	a	contract	was	awarded	
to	Capitas	Group	 International	 to	design	 the	 structure	and	 strategy	 for	EQ.80	 Its	 official	
establishment	did	not	materialize	until	March	2011	when	an	Emiri	decree	announced	EQ’s	
official	launch.	By	2012,	everyone	knew	of	EQ	but	no	one	could	point	to	concrete	projects	
or	 outcomes.	 Internally,	 the	 organization	 itself	 seemed	 caught	 in	 a	 web	 of	 constant	
reinvention.	 Insiders	 seem	pessimistic	 about	 the	whole	project.	They	attribute	EQ	with	
starting	what	 they	see	as	a	 trend,	but	not	 following	through.	Crippled	by	 infighting	and	
conflicting	interests	at	the	board	of	director’s	 level,	competition	between	different	state	
agencies	wanting	 the	 limelight	 in	 this	 new	niche	 rendered	 them	 ineffective.	The	whole	
landscape	has	become	“about	what	you	can	buy	rather	than	what	you	can	achieve,”	one	
individual	noted.81		
Institutional	 competition	 seems	 to	 come	 in	 the	 strongest	 form	 from	 the	 Qatar	

















A	 final	 project,	 but	 increasingly	 prominent	 and	 central	 to	 the	 entrepreneurship	
ecosystem,	is	the	Bedaya	Centre.	Launched	in	2011	as	a	joint	initiative	between	QDB	and	
Silatech,	 the	 Bedaya	 Centre	 focuses	 on	 entrepreneurship	 and	 career	 development.	 Its	
mission	is	to	provide	career	counselling	to	youth,	with	a	particular	 focus	on	developing	























institutions	 helps	 private	 development	 and	 growth	when	 these	 public	 research	 bodies	
expand	interaction	with	private	industry	and	when	the	research	body	itself	builds	rather	
than	competes	with	the	industry.85	In	this	light,	Qatar	and	Oman	would	do	well	to	intensify	
efforts	 around	 institutions	 and	 initiatives	 like	 QSTP,	 KOM,	 and	 IIC	 toward	 the	 goals	 of	
building	 research	 capacity	 and	 stimulating	 innovation.	 Of	 particular	 interest	 are	 those	
efforts	aimed	at	strengthening	ties	between	researchers	and	industry.		
As	 was	 noted	 earlier,	 one	 of	 the	 advantages	 Gulf	 governments	 have	 in	 their	
developmental	aims	is	the	ability	to	galvanize	actors	across	multiple	areas	to	focus	their	
activities	toward	national	development	agendas.	This	can	come	in	the	form	of	inexpensive	
products	 from	 some	 SOEs	 to	 others	 or	 the	 provision	 of	 logistical	 and	 infrastructural	
support	like	airports	and	sea	ports.86	This	ability	is	a	product	of	the	nature	of	governance	
in	the	countries.	Together	developmentalism	and	authoritarianism	provide	what	has	been	
suggested	 is	 a	 crucial	 leeway	 in	 directing	 or	 coordinating	 efforts	 toward	 development	
objectives.	 This	 type	 of	 manipulation	 and	 channelling	 of	 resources	 to	 achieve	 desired	
results	was	an	early	characteristic	of	developmental	states	like	Korea	and	Taiwan.87	Other	
























current	major	policy	 shift.	As	was	demonstrated	 above,	 governments	 in	both	 cases	 are	
funnelling	resources	and	a	considerable	amount	of	policy	language	toward	the	support	of	
entrepreneurship.	Oman	 is	 taking	 this	 a	 step	 further.	 It	 is	 assembling	 the	business	and	
trade	 arms	 of	 the	 government	 for	 external	 knowledge	 transfer	 support	 and	 export	
development	as	well	as	prompting	business	leaders	from	the	Omani	business	dynasties	to	
support	the	state’s	SME	push.		
With	 regard	 to	 the	 former,	 for	 example,	 the	 Ministries	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 and	
Commerce	and	Industry	are	reportedly	exploring	and	encouraging	trade	by	new	SMEs	with	
emerging	economies,	especially	India.88	A	foreign	affairs	delegation	recently	visited	India	
with	 the	 purpose	 of	 establishing	 contacts	 for	 knowledge,	 know‐how,	 and	 technology	
transfer	 toward	 the	 development	 of	 Oman’s	 SME	 sector.	 The	 goal	 is	 to	 explore	 “new	
methods	that	can	be	implemented	by	Omani	youth	to	help	them	set	up	commercially	viable	
SME	projects	in	manufacturing	products,	which	can	be	marketed	across	the	world.”89	As	













launched	 a	 seminar	 series	 introducing	 Omani	 SMEs	 to	 ways	 of	 expanding	 into	 and	












































The	 privileging	 of	 SME	 support	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 innovation	 and	 industrial	
development	 may	 be	 partially	 attributable	 to	 the	 role	 of	 IOs	 and	 international	
consultancies	 in	 emphasizing	 private	 enterprise	 and	 entrepreneurship.	 Along	 with	
appealing	 to	 human	 capital	 and	 employment	 concerns,	 it	 promises	 to	 pave	 the	way	 to	
















prove	 to	 have	 a	minimal	 political	 cost	 and	 still	maintain	 the	 appearance	 of	 addressing	
major	socio‐economic	problems.	Although	reframed,	rentier	practices	can	still	be	engaged.	
As	well,	this	policy	move	speaks	to	the	impact	of	both	global	and	domestic	pressures	on	the	
choices	Gulf	 rulers	make.	Should	 the	 focus	on	stimulating	 innovation	become	of	central	
importance,	it	could	crucially	change	this	assessment.	The	cooption	of	innovation,	and	the	
culture	 it	 creates,	 is	much	more	difficult	 than	widening	 the	 social	net	or	 reconstituting	
wealth	 distribution	 mechanisms	 to	 a	 certain	 mass	 of	 entrepreneurial	 nationals.	
Importantly,	 the	 practice	 of	 innovation	 and	 its	 concomitant	 technological	 and	 socio‐
economic	 changes	may	 bypass	 the	 usual	 rent‐seeking	 patterns,	making	 the	 revision	 of	
rentierism	more	difficult.99	
	




with	 contradictions	 and	 inconsistencies.	 These	 are	 present	 in	 both	 cases	 but	 vary	 in	













each	 government	 body	 seems	 more	 inclined	 to	 brandish	 their	 own	 name	 and	 claim	
contribution	toward	development	with	the	“new”	catch	phrase	than	actually	contributing	
to	sustainable	development	and	change.	There	is	a	dearth	of	cooperation	and	collaborative	
strategizing,	with	no	 coherent	unifying	 strategy	 in	existence.	 It	 still	 remains	 to	be	 seen	
whether	Oman’s	Research	Council	by	virtue	of	its	contribution	to	an	innovation	policy	or	
Qatar	Foundation	by	its	sheer	convening	power	will	remedy	this	deficiency.		
In	 the	 Omani	 case,	 the	Ministry	 of	 Commerce	 and	 Industry	 and	 the	Ministry	 of	






Its	 main	 aim	 is	 to	 stimulate	 an	 entrepreneurial	 culture	 at	 an	 early	 age	 and	 develop	
awareness	 of	 different	 career	 paths	 available	 to	 young	Omanis.	The	Ministry	 of	Higher	










few	 of	 their	 very	 motivated	 staff,	 even	 fewer	 meaningful	 activities	 would	 transpire.	
Moreover,	the	 lack	of	communication	between	ministries	dealing	with	education,	which	
also	 includes	 the	MoM	for	 their	 technical	colleges	and	training	 institutions,	has	 led	 to	a	
rather	 disjointed	 approach	 to	 revamping	 and	 improving	 quality.	 This	 can	 have	 serious	
ramifications	 for	 development	 as	 “variations	 in	 levels	 of	 education	 across	 societies	 are	




and	 limited	 meaningful	 consultation	 with	 mid‐level	 /	 front‐line	 bureaucrats	 may	
contribute	to	this	difficult	cooperating	environment.	With	a	few	exceptions,	interviews	in	
both	cases	revealed	that	even	at	the	level	of	director	general	bureaucrats	do	not	seem	to	
feel	 like	 they	 are	making	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 informing	policy.	 They	belong	 to	
committees,	often	multiple,	and	they	discuss	the	challenges	and	issues	of	the	time.	Yet	still,	
it	 is	 their	 overseer,	 the	 undersecretaries	 and	 those	 with	 ministerial	 rank,	 who	 are	
perceived	as	holding	the	ability	to	make	decisions.	Some	suggest	they	are	consulted	from	
time	 to	 time,	 others	not.	Many	 in	Oman	 indicated	 that	at	 times	 they	had	proposals	put	
forward,	and	that	limited	intra	and	inter‐ministerial	collaboration	occurrs.	Still,	decision	
making	remains	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	a	few.	Interviews	in	Qatar	were	indicative	of	











































specifically	 designed	 to	 improve	 external	 coordination	 will	 fail	 as	 long	 as	 there	 is	 no	
general	 strategy	 that	has	been	decided	at	 the	highest	 level	 of	 politics	and	 that	demand	
coordination	 efforts	 from	ministries.”106	 Although	overarching	 strategies	 are	 present	 in	
both	 cases,	 the	 means	 of	 implementation	 are	 left	 open	 to	 interpretation	 at	 various	
bureaucratic	 intervals.	At	present,	ad	hoc	policy	measures	or	 the	Qatari	 “rule	by	whim”	
style,	prevail.107	Added	to	this,	what	little	coordination	does	exist	is	often	negative.	Negative	






















A	 common	 charge	 by	 entrepreneurs	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 sectors	 levied	 against	








In	 Oman,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Manpower	 seems	 to	 inspire	 the	most	 resentment,	 with	 livid	
accusations	 levied	 against	 it	 for	 burdensome	 labour	 regulations.	 A	 majority	 of	
interviewees,	 especially	 those	 entrepreneurs	 not	 connected	 to	 the	 long‐dominant	 large	
business	 families,	point	 to	 favouritism	and	personal	 connections	as	 complicating	 issues	
and	 discouraging	 potential	 new	 start	 ups.112	 This	 sentiment	 was	 also	 reflected	 in	


















is	 a	 broad,	 though	 understandable,	 unwillingness	 for	 commercial	 banks	 (and	 even	 the	
Oman	Development	Bank	following	its	retooling	after	years	of	near	bankruptcy)	to	fund	
new	 start	 ups.	 78	 percent	 of	 GCC	 banks	 indicate	 that	 their	 collateral	 requirements	 are	
higher	for	SMEs	than	for	larger	corporations	and	claim	that	SME	lending	is	82	percent	more	
risky	 than	 large	 corporate	 lending.116	 Problems	 financiers	 point	 to	 include	 weak	
educational	preparation,	inadequate	business	planning,	a	lack	of	commitment,	“part‐time”	
entrepreneurship,	 and	a	 lack	of	 risk	 taking.117	 Possibly	even	more	problematic,	 funding	
programmes	claiming	to	target	youth	and	young	entrepreneurs	in	practice	do	not.	While	
lauded	 in	 the	 media	 as	 programmes	 designed	 to	 facilitate	 youth	 employment,	 an	




















commitment.	 Thus,	 despite	 language	 targeting	 youth,	 young	 entrepreneurs	 and	 new	
business	entrants	are	deemed	financially	risky	by	all	financiers.118		
Compounding	this,	the	systemic	weakness	of	protection	for	borrowers	and	lenders	







have	 generous	 family	members	 offer	 to	 grant	 or	 loan	 them	money,	 they	 are	 put	 in	 the	
difficult	 position	 of	 pitching	 their	 business	 plan	 at	 financial	 institution	 after	 financial	
institution,	and	often	end	up	discouraged	and	ultimately	quit	the	process.121	This	does	little	
to	 encourage	 full	 time,	 local	 entrepreneurship,	 particularly	 among	 the	 youth.	Rather,	 it	
facilitates	 the	 existing	 model	 whereby	 individuals	 who	 decide	 not	 to	 quit	 the	 process	
instead	 settle	 for	 the	 path	 of	 less	 resistance.	 They	 opt	 for	 part‐time	 or	 “hobby”	
entrepreneurship,	dabbling	in	small	business	endeavours	during	after‐work	hours.	If	they	













design	 to	others.	This	only	 serves	 to	 reproduce	 the	same	problems	underlying	 the	Gulf	
economy.		
Some	 incremental	 change	 is	 occurring	 on	 this	 front.	 In	 Oman,	 for	 instance,	 the	
eighth	five‐year	Development	Plan	(2011‐2016)	includes	a	retooling	of	the	Central	Bank	to	
develop	 its	 capacity	 for	 supporting	 and	 granting	 loans	 to	 SMEs	 and	 for	 the	 state	 to	
stimulate	the	private	sector’s	investment	and	development	of	SMEs.122	Moreover,	several	
commercial	banks	have	recently	set	up	divisions	specifically	for	SMEs.	Bank	Muscat,	one	of	
the	 leading	commercial	bank	 in	the	country,	began	a	pilot	study	 in	 late	2011	with	new,	
perhaps	 easier,	 lending	 options	 for	 SMEs.	 The	 idea	 is	 to	 be	 specifically	 helpful	 to	 new,	





have	 for	 larger	 commercial	 firms,	 necessarily	 complicating	 the	 lending	 process	 and	
potential	for	accessing	start‐up	financing.124	
Within	a	national	context,	Chambers	of	Commerce	are	often	considered	the	crux	of	













percent	 of	 the	 number	 of	 businesses	 in	 each	 case.125	 The	 Chambers	 of	 Commerce	 and	
Industry	 in	Oman	and	Qatar	claim	to	be	promoting	entrepreneurship	and	 indeed	sit	on	
boards	 or	 tangentially	 participate	 in	 various	 initiatives.126	 Nonetheless,	 their	 primary	
constituency	remains	the	large,	family	business	empires	whose	interests	more	often	than	
not	conflict	with	those	of	new,	smaller	start	ups.	An	expert	at	GSDP	suggested	much	the	





Indeed,	 the	monopoly	 that	 the	 large	business	dynasties	of	Oman	and	Qatar	have	































Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 has	 an	 annual	 face‐to‐face	 between	 sectoral	 directors	 at	 the	
chamber	with	the	prime	minister	and	the	cabinet.	This	is	viewed	as	an	opportunity	for	the	
business	 community	 to	 raise	pressing	 issues	 facing	 the	private	 sector.	Despite	 this,	 the	
kinds	of	regulatory	changes	or	the	support	that	larger	companies	would	require	are	quite	














foreign	 expertise,	 a	 tender	 board	 equally	 geared	 toward	 big	 business,	 and	 competing	




Al‐Sa’adi	–	 just	one	among	12	other	ministerial	 changes	 through	 royal	decree	 that	also	
disbanded	the	Ministry	of	National	Economy	and	ousted	long‐standing	Minister,	Ahmed	
bin	 Abdulnabi	Macki.129	With	 another	 reshuffle	 a	 year	 later,	 Ali	 bin	Masoud	 bin	 Ali	 Al‐
Sunaidi,	former	Minister	of	Sports	Affairs,	was	appointed	the	new	Ministry	of	Commerce	
and	Industry.	Prior	to	his	role	at	Sports	Affairs,	Sunaidi	had	been	the	undersecretary	at	
MOCI.130	 In	 fact,	 American	 embassy	 staff	 seemed	 to	 hold	 a	 positive	 assessment	 of	 his	























programme,	 launched	 a	 new	 SME	 development	 fund	 with	 the	 National	 Company	 for	












Sunaidi’s	 institution	 of	 a	 standardized	 definition	 for	microenterprises	 and	 SMEs	
(MSMEs)	 is	a	 timely	step.	Here,	microenterprises	are	defined	as	 those	business	entities	
with	 fewer	 than	 five	 staff	 members	 and	 annual	 sales	 less	 than	 25,000	 OMR;	 small	
enterprises	 are	 defined	 as	 having	 between	 five	 and	 nine	 employees	 with	 annual	 sales	














do	 is	 standardize	 the	 points	 of	 reference	 within	 the	 Ministry	 and	 the	 Chamber	 of	
Commerce.	Other	actors,	including	banks	and	financial	lending	institutions,	continue	with	









used	 almost	 synonymously	 throughout	 the	 policy	 realm,	 conflating	 definitions	 and	




not	 begin	with	 the	 individual.	 Instead,	 it	 starts	with	 the	organization.	 Programmes	 like	
Sanad	give	aspiring	entrepreneurs	a	list	of	businesses	they	are	willing	to	fund	to	choose	












creativity,	 then	who’s	going	 to	 start	 thinking	out	of	 the	box?”138	Rather	 than	promoting	
innovative	entrepreneurship	then,	 they	are	making	a	 job.	Entrepreneurship	 is	generally	
more	about	employment	than	innovation.	A	Qatari	initiative	director	noted,	“some	other	
colleagues	 would	 look	 at	 self‐employability	 as	 entrepreneurship…	 I	 don’t	 see	 self‐








One	 of	 the	 staunchest	 challenges	 besetting	 Gulf	 development	 remains	 the	




necessity,	 a	 certain	 path	 dependency	 ensued.	 As	 noted	 above,	 despite	 widening	













translated	 into	 youthful	 populations	 that,	while	 ready	 to	 enter	 the	 labour	market,	 find	
uncertain	 and	 inhospitable	 conditions.	 Misplaced	 incentive	 structures	 also	 perpetuate	
preferences	 that	 consider	 certain	 job	 categories	 undesirable.	 Remaining	 economically	
inactive,	 therefore,	remains	more	attractive	than	working	 in	these	generally	 low‐paying	
and	insecure	positions.			
Equally	 problematic,	 the	 private	 sector	 is	 generally	 an	 unwilling	 or	 reluctant	
employer	of	Gulf	nationals,	who,	along	with	higher	salary	expectations,	remain	stereotyped	
as	 ill	 prepared,	 unproductive	 and/or	 inefficient.	 This	 is	 combined	with	 abundant	 local	
sentiment	 that	 expatriates	 are	 sitting	 in	 positions	 that	 could	 be	 filled	 by	 locals.	 In	




following	 the	 UNDP	 Arab	 Development	 Report	 and	 World	 Bank	 report	 on	 education.	


















a	prime	example	of	 the	 inconsistent,	short‐term	and	 inappropriate	policy	measures	rife	
with	 endemic	 contradictions.	 The	 repercussions	 of	 the	 (un)employment	 dilemma,	
especially	 in	 the	 Omani	 case,	 are	 only	 compounded	 by	 the	 expansion	 of	 female	
representation	 in	 the	 labour	market.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 recognize	 the	 important	 role	 of	
labour	market	problems	and	attempted	policy	solutions	in	understanding	the	challenges	
surrounding	entrepreneurship	and	 innovation	 throughout	 the	 region.	 Indeed,	 the	usual	
neglect	 in	IPE	of	“labour	issues	hinders	thorough	analysis	because	they	are	intrinsically	
connected	to	issues	of	transformation	and	stability.”142		
Private	 companies	 in	 most	 industrialized	 economies	 are	 vital	 components	 of	
national	innovation	systems.	Their	motivation	“is	to	improve	profitability	through	product	
and	process	 innovation,	by	 creating	 technology	of	 an	essentially	proprietary	nature.”143	
Herein	 lies	 a	 twofold	 problem	 confronting	 the	 push	 for	 innovation	 in	 our	 cases.	 First,	
historically	many	of	the	incentives	for	technological	breakthroughs	stem	from	liberating	
manual	labour.	There	is	little	incentive	to	do	so	in	the	Gulf	where	the	(primarily	South	and	










accrue	 immediate	 savings	 by	 not	 incurring	 future	 pension,	 healthcare,	 and	 other	





































in	 the	 same	 way,	 they	 do	 have	 a	 variety	 institutes/organizations	 with	 programmes	






misconstrued,	 CSR	 motivation	 to	 employ	 (and	 educate	 to	 employ)	 graduates	 of	 elite	
educational	institutions.	The	oil	sector	is	known	to	be	the	most	well‐paying	in	Oman	and	
Qatar,	and	can	thus	attract	the	crème	de	la	crème	of	local	graduates	with	the	added	bonus	
















	 Although	 this	 competitiveness	 problem	 remains	 a	 challenge	 outside	 of	 the	
hydrocarbon	industry,	it	has	been	helpful	in	terms	of	innovation	within	the	sector.	Where	
entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	may	 be	 off	 to	 a	 tepid	 start	 in	 other	 sectors,	 they	 are	
performing	much	better	in	the	familiar	oil	context.	An	observation	supported	by	Lundvall.	
Innovation,	 he	 claims,	 “must	 be	 rooted	 in	 the	 prevailing	 economic	 structure,”	 since	
technological	 advancements	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 occur	 where	 the	 national	 economy	 “is	
already	 engaged	 in	 routine	 activities.”150	 This	 notion	 seems	 particularly	 true	 in	 Oman,	
where	 several	 entrepreneur	 interviewees,	who	had	 their	 start	 in	 the	oil	 industry,	were	




















primarily	youth‐based	 in	 the	 industrial	 city	of	Sohar,	ultimately	 intensified	 the	urgency	
policy	makers	placed	on	entrepreneurship	promotion.	Policy	makers	in	Qatar	also	point	to	
a	 need	 to	 find	 fulfilling	 opportunities	 for	 youth.	 Indeed,	 the	 dual	 promotion	 of	
entrepreneurship	and	innovation	holds	the	promise	of	responding	to	the	lack	of	prospects	
for	 youth,	 employment	 challenges,	 and	 economic	 diversification	 needs.	 Yet	 the	 policy	
experience	 has	 been	 far	 from	 ideal.	 Although	 both	 countries	 have	 highlighted	 the	
importance	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 in	 their	 overarching	 visions	 and	
development	plans,	the	actual	implementation	has	been	less	well	crafted.	Ad	hoc	and	rife	
with	 inconsistencies,	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 promotion	 efforts	 confront	 a	















cooperation,	 political	 disconnect	 from	 the	 realities	 of	 the	 private	 sector,	 and	 the	
considerable	 obstacles	 which	 result	 from	 the	 segmented	 labour	 market	 all	 must	 be	
addressed.	Yet	identification	of	the	problems	has	done	little	to	initiate	meaningful	change,	
where	 competing	 interests	 are	 endemic	 and	 especially	 while	 hydrocarbon	 revenues	
continue	to	surpass	the	breakeven	point.	What	remains	intriguing	is	how	both	Oman	and	






















apparent,	 however,	 that	 the	 emphasis	 on	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 since	 the	







lending	 to	 policy,	 practice,	 and	 behavioural	 contradictions	 that	 are	 difficult	 to	 resolve.	
Indeed,	 the	 state’s	 promotion	 of	 entrepreneurship	 will	 not	 prove	 the	 panacea	 to	 Gulf	

















their	 labour	market	 participation.	 The	 term	millennials	 is	 used	 globally	 to	 refer	 to	 the	




















ones	 largely	 because	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 technological	 repercussions	 of	 the	 Internet.3	
Some	writers	suggest	a	greater	civic‐mindedness	and	strengthened	sense	of	community	at	
both	 local	 and	 global	 levels	 in	 comparison	 to	 previous	 generations.4	 These	 broad	
characteristics	are	applicable	 to	 the	Gulf	millennials	as	well.	More	specifically	however,	




self‐esteem	 boosting,	 and	 unrealistic	 expectations	 did	 not	 prepare	 [millennials]	 for	 an	
increasingly	 competitive	 workplace	 and	 the	 economic	 squeeze,”6	 In	 the	 workplace,	
Western	millennials	are	criticized	for	“demanding	too	much	too	soon”	and	wanting	to	be	
“CEO	 tomorrow.”7	 Along	 with	 expecting	 higher	 pay,	 flexible	 work	 schedules,	 rapid	






















entitlement	 to	 better	 jobs	 despite	 lacking	 practical	 experience.	 Everyone	 spoke	 of	 how	
technology	 had	 changed	 the	 mode	 of	 communication,	 connectedness,	 and	 social	







It	 should	 also	 be	 reiterated	 that	 I	 am	 looking	 specifically	 at	 the	 Gulf	 national	
population	 throughout	 this	 dissertation.	 The	 impact	 of	 the	 bifurcated	 labour	market	 in	
Oman	and	Qatar,	where	59.3	and	94	percent	of	labour	force	is	comprised	of	expatriates,	
plays	a	significant	role	in	this	development	narrative.11	Yet,	 the	question	of	how	to	both	
encourage	 millennials	 into	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 make	 them	 competitive	 within	 it,	
although	intricately	and	intensely	influenced	by	the	two‐tier	labour	market	and	dual‐wage	













cheap	 foreign	 labour,	 and	 global	 expertise.	 In	 reality,	 this	 has	 only	 contributed	 to	 the	
difficulty	in	addressing	local	education,	labour,	and	sustainability	problems.		
Approximately	60	individuals	across	the	two	cases	participated	in	interviews	and	
focus	 groups	 as	 part	 of	 the	 interview	 category	 entitled	 entrepreneurs	 or	 aspiring	
entrepreneurs.	 Representatives	 of	 large	 business	 families	 and	 the	 older	 generation	 of	




social	 and	economic	 transformation	 resulting	 from	oil	 and	 those	who	were	born	 into	a	
world	with	certain	welfare	expectations.	It	is	the	ternary	evolution	and	intersection	of	oil	






A	 litany	 of	 articles	 indicates	 cultural	 deficiency	 behind	 the	 Gulf’s	 lack	 of	




















Although	 the	 merchant	 community	 in	 Qatar	 was	 small	 and	 weak	 before	 oil,	
especially	in	relation	to	Oman,	neither	country	is	a	stranger	to	business	and	trade.16	Their	
strategic	locations	at	the	edge	of	the	Arabian	Peninsula	have	long	etched	the	thoroughfares	
of	 trade	 coming	 across	 the	 Indian	Ocean.	 The	British	 had	protracted	 imperial	 strategic	
interests	in	the	region,	with	much	contestation	among	the	various	colonial	powers	vying	
























formal	 power.	 In	 effect,	 the	 merchants	 renounced	 their	 historical	 claim	 to	



























between	 the	 generations.	 Some	 interviewees	divide	 into	 two	 groups,	 others	 three.	 The	
major	delineation	in	the	first	division	is	between	those	who	grew	up	in	the	pre‐oil	era	and	
witnessed	the	rapid	transformation	of	the	state	and	those	who	were	born	after	the	major	





generation	 proving	 that	 business	 intelligence	 and	 an	 entrepreneurial	 spirit	 were	 not	
foreign	 to	 the	 region,	 but	 very	 much	 integral	 to	 it.	 The	 second	 category	 refers	 to	 the	
generation	that	worked	through	the	oil	transformation.	These	were	those	who	participated	





state	 was	 in	 place,	 families	 allotted	 prestige	 to	 employment	 in	 the	 government	 or	 oil	
industry,	and	other	business	activities	dwindled	or	eventually	fell	under	the	auspices	of	








technology.	 	 The	 millennial	 generation,	 then,	 expected	 more.	 Many	 attributed	 the	
generational	difference	almost	exclusively	to	technology.	Others	suggested	that	millennials	
also	offered	more	dynamic	visions,	new	operating	methodologies,	and	 the	aspiration	 to	
innovate.	 It	 has	 not	 only	 been	 technology	which	 has	 changed,	 but	 also	 education.	 The	
newer	generation	has	received	a	more	dynamic	education	than	was	offered	before	and	this	










are	entrepreneurs,	 but	 entrepreneurs	here	are	 cross‐defined	with	 employers.23	 Specific	
data	on	entrepreneurship	is	difficult	to	attain,	with	Chambers	of	Commerce	and	various	
government	 bodies	 often	 hesitant	 to	 release	 particular	 figures.	 The	 absence	 of	 a	











responsibility	 across	 government	 bodies	 combined	 with	 swift	 changes	 in	 government	
appointments	 in	 effect	 institutionalizes	 ambiguity.	 Rapid	 changes	 in	 government	 and	
ministerial	 responsibilities	 results	 in	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 over	 responsibilities	 and	 often	






assumptions	 and	 data	 collection,	 which	 contributes	 to	 the	 inconsistency.	 The	
establishment	 of	 the	 Qatar	 Statistics	 Authority	 (QSA)	 is	 an	 attempt	 at	 rectifying	 this	
tendency.	It	is	designed	to	function	as	the	exclusive	central	data	bureau	in	the	country.	All	
requests	 for	statistical	 information	must	be	processed	through	the	QSA.	The	creation	in	




rate	 of	 new	 firms	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 lagged	 total	 registered	 firms.	 Developing	 country	











environment.	 First,	 the	 information	 does	 not	 disclose	 the	 rate	 of	 failure	 or	 number	 of	
businesses	which	never	became	operational.	This	is	a	clear	informational	deficit.	Second,	










potential.	 Recent	 studies	 claim	 that	 Arab	 youth	 are	 increasingly	 entrepreneurially	
minded.26	The	results	of	the	2011	Arab	Youth	Study	suggest	that	Gulf	Arab	youth	are	even	
more	 likely	 to	 have	 entrepreneurial	 aspirations	 than	 young	 people	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	



































those	who	 need	 it.	 Many	 young	 people	 are	 under‐employed	within	 these	 agencies,	 or,	
because	of	the	bloated	nature	of	the	public	sector,	find	they	have	little	to	nothing	to	do	in	













of	 labour	 nationalization	 strategies.	 These	 policies,	 known	 as	 Omanization	 and	
Qatarization,	 preceded	 the	 push	 toward	 entrepreneurship	 and	 were	 its	 precursors.	
Omanization	 and	 Qatarization	 refer	 to	 government	 policies	 to	 promote	 their	 citizens’	
employment	 in	 the	workforce	 and	 encourage	 local	 instead	 of	 expatriate	 hiring.	 Labour	
market	nationalization,	or	localization	as	it	 is	sometimes	known,	was	the	initial	channel	
through	which	 local	participation	 in	the	 labour	market	was	encouraged.	Through	quota	
systems	and	enhanced	education	and	training	opportunities,	localization	seeks	to	reduce	













at	 reaching	 targets.30	 The	 percentage	 of	 Omanis	 in	 the	 private	 sector,	 however,	 only	
reached	a	22.5	percent	Omanization	ratio	by	2005	and	actually	decreased	to	15.6	percent	
by	 2010.	 31	 	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 though	 that	 this	 was	 primarily	 due	 to	 the	 increase	 in	
expatriates	 added	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 exaggerated	 by	 the	 push	 of	 economic	
liberalization	that	deepened	after	2005.32			
	 Qatar	 introduced	 its	 own	 localization	 policy	 about	 a	 decade	 after	 Oman.	 The	

































Obstacles	 to	 labour	nationalization	efforts	 in	 the	private	sector	can	be	organized	
into	two	main	categories,	the	relative	preference	of	nationals	for	public	sector	positions	
and	the	hesitation	of	the	private	sector	to	hire	nationals.	The	private	labour	market	is	less	
appealing	because	 it	 is	perceived	to	offer	 less	secure,	 lower	paying	 jobs	than	the	public	
sector.	As	well,	 the	psychological	association	of	an	 imported,	marginalized	 labour	class,	
dominating	 certain	 labour‐intensive	 sectors	 further	 reduces	 the	 attractiveness	 of	








to	better	 reflect	educational	and	experience	capabilities	at	 the	 time.	 In	addition	 to	 this,	















wage	 is	 one	 such	 endeavour.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 tends	 to	 further	 reduce	 private	 sector	
interest	in	hiring	nationals	since	expatriates	are	not	subject	to	the	same	minimum	wage	




Aside	 from	 this,	 minimum	 private	 sector	 wages	 remain	 below	 public	 sector	
averages.	While	this	is	not	a	problem	for	job	categories	with	high	educational	demands	that	
tend	to	pay	well,	it	is	particularly	challenging	for	low‐level	positions.	Other	attempts	have	
also	 largely	 failed	 to	 change	 these	 perceptions.	 For	 example,	 the	 Omani	 government	
implemented	 a	 social	 security	 law	 in	 1992	 to	 offer	 retirement	 security	 to	 permanent	
private	sector	employees.40	Despite	these	efforts,	graduates	continue	to	see	the	salaries,	
retirement	plans,	social	security,	compensation,	education	assistance,	vacations,	sick	leave	










necessity	 to	use	English	as	 the	medium	of	communication	also	serves	as	a	deterrent	 to	
many	graduates.	This	is	particularly	true	outside	the	capital	region	in	Oman	despite	having	




A	 further	 problem	 is	 the	 continuation	 of	 a	 system	 which	 requires	 majority	
ownership	of	business	by	a	national.	Other	than	separate	arrangements	made	with	large	
multinationals,	the	standard	51%	ownership	share	guarantees	a	level	of	local	involvement	
or	 income	 from	 a	 business.	 In	 many	 cases,	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 shadow	 ownership	
arrangements	 further	 complicates	 the	 picture.	 The	 motivation	 to	 be	 independently	
productive	or	develop	an	innovative	enterprise	is	reduced	when	one	can	simply	receive	an	
income	by	being	a	name	on	a	business	deed	which	is	for	all	intents	and	purposes	owned	







the	 underlying	 structures	 and	 inequality	 that	 pervades	 them	 must	 be	 addressed.	 The	







resolve	 the	 problem.	 As	 the	 Omani	 case	 demonstrates,	 raising	 the	minimum	wage	 for	
Omanis	 only	 serves	 to	 further	 reduce	 private	 sector	 interest	 in	 local	 hiring.	 As	 well,	
minimum	 wage	 increases	 consistently	 lag	 behind	 public	 sector	 averages.	 The	 private	
sector	continues	to	be	viewed	as	the	employment	of	last	resort.	Even	those	who	initially	












message.	 The	 structure	 of	 Gulf	 political	 economy	 is	 difficult	 to	 disentangle	 from	 the	
broader	global	structures	and	flows	of	capital	and	labour	that	underpin	it.		
Hence,	despite	the	policy	 language	over	the	years	aimed	at	 limiting	 immigration,	









to	 attract	 investment	 and	 brand	 the	 country	 pro‐business	 reduce	 the	 state’s	 desire	 to	
directly	intervene	in	the	labour	market	and	enforce	quotas.43	Pledges	for	the	Omanization	


























































foreigners	 is	of	particular	 local	 concern.	The	heavy	presence	of	 foreigners	 is	viewed	by	



































diversification	 strategies	 for	 the	 last	 several	 decades.	 Structural	 change	 is	 difficult	 and	





The	 role	 of	 entrepreneurship	 initiatives	 at	 creating	 genuine	 employment	
opportunities	has	been	questioned	by	stakeholders.	This	was	especially	true	of	financial,	
training,	 and	 incubation	 support	 initiatives	 like	 Sharakah,	 Injaz,	 programmes	 through	
Enterprise	Qatar,	QSTP,	and	the	Bedaya	Centre.	Despite	the	state’s	apparent	drive	behind	
entrepreneurship	 promotion,	 initiative	 directors	 expressed	 skepticism	 that	 the	
government	and	larger	corporations	would	even	be	willing	to	change	their	procurement	
policies	 and	 establish	 contracts	 with	 small,	 local	 companies	 to	 accommodate	
entrepreneurship	support.	 If	 they	already	have	a	reliable	vendor,	“they	are	not	going	to	
prioritize	 the	 local	 entrepreneur.”47	 It	 is	 not	 simply	 a	matter	 of	 encouraging	 people	 to	












corporations	 persist,	 a	 dynamic,	 independent,	 local	 private	 sector	 will	 be	 difficult	 to	
stimulate.	 Should	 the	 government’s	 desire	 to	promote	 entrepreneurship	 and	 a	broader	
national	 commitment	 to	 innovation	 be	 genuine,	 it	 must	 design	 suitable	 strategies	 to	
restructure	the	economy	and	transform	the	existing	incentive	structures.	Borrowing	from	
the	 playbook	 of	 the	 East	 Asian	 developmental	 state	 and	 its	 industrial	 development	
strategies	 including	 infant	 industry	protection	and	special	requirements	around	 foreign	
capital	 and	 investment	may	 be	 one	 approach.	Of	 course,	 the	Gulf	 states	 face	 particular	









grown	 up	 with	 certain	 expectations	 of	 what	 the	 government	 provides.	 Along	 with	
education	 and	 healthcare,	 this	 often	 includes	 real	 estate	 and	 employment.	 As	 new	
economic	realities	set	in,	it	is	becoming	increasingly	evident	that	the	status	quo	cannot	be	








tackles	 socio‐economic	 change.48	 This	 section	 assesses	 the	 convergence	 of	 millennial	
expectations	 in	 Oman	 and	 Qatar	 and	 suggests	 that	 the	 nexus	 of	 conventional	 rentier	
expectations	 with	 new	 global	 ones	 are	 difficult	 for	 the	 state	 to	 meet	 in	 the	 current	
governance	context.	
Not	only	do	young	people	expect	public	sector	jobs,	but	they	have	come	to	prefer	
them.	 Professors	 and	 other	 educators	 at	 higher	 education	 institutions	 in	 both	 cases	
frequently	mention	how	 their	 students	 cite	 government	 jobs	 as	 their	 first	 employment	
preference	post	graduation.	Others	indicate	oil	companies.	A	recent	Silatech	survey	found	







participating	 in	 entrepreneurship	 classes,	working	 groups,	 or	 volunteer	 societies	 often	


















What	 it	 really	 suggests	 then,	 is	 an	 aversion	 to	 risk	 taking	 which	 is	 necessary	 for	 an	
entrepreneurial	sector	to	develop.	It	also	stymies	possible	innovation	as	those	engaged	in	
business	will	be	too	preoccupied	with	other	work	commitments	to	dedicate	the	creative	
capital	 necessary.	 This	 can	 also	 reinforce,	 or	 lead	 to	 a	 return	 to,	 the	 default	 hiring	 of	
expatriates	to	manage	operations.	Without	real	financial	investment,	these	managers	are	
unlikely	to	have	the	creative	drive	to	innovate.			
Nevertheless,	 as	 much	 as	 these	 preferences	 continue	 within	 the	 millennial	
generation,	 new	 desires	 and	 hopes	 are	 burgeoning.	 It	 could	 be	 that	 entrepreneurship	
promotion	is	already	paying	off	to	some	degree,	but	more	young	people	seem	to	consider	















Are	you	kidding?	 It	 is	 impossible.	After	 running	 this	organization,	we	can’t	 give	up	our	
freedom	or	ideas.”53	
	 Freedom,	 in	 fact,	 was	 an	 oft‐cited	 reason	 for	 both	 pursuing	 and	 remaining	 in	
entrepreneurship.	It	seemed	to	particularly	strike	a	chord	with	millennial	entrepreneurs,	




the	development	of	our	country.	As	well,	and	 this	 is	very	 important,	we	want	 to	
make	our	own	private	income.	The	main	reason	however,	is	to	get	freedom	and	be	
free	in	thinking	and	free	in	movement.	This	freedom	is	what	you	will	hear	everyone	
tell	 you	 that	 is	 like	me	 and	wants	 to	work	 independently	 and	 operate	 our	 own	
business.	We	want	to	develop	our	skills	and	provide	new	things	for	society.54		
	








Qatar	 at	 all,	 the	 Arab	 uprisings	 may	 function	 as	 a	 silent	 game	 changer	 in	 both.	










narrative,	 even	 if	 only	 through	 economic	 development	 and	 social	 innovation.	 Despite	
frequent	admission	that	social	and	youth	engagement	are	nascent	concepts	in	the	region,	
many	 young	 people	 point	 to	 a	 growing	 presence.	 In	 fact,	 social	 entrepreneurship,	 and	
volunteer	 culture	more	generally,	 seemed	 to	be	on	 the	 rise.	This	was	especially	 true	 in	
Qatar	 where	 several	 young	 entrepreneurs	 had	 developed	 or	 were	 in	 the	 process	 of	




among	 young	 people,	 millennial	 interviewees	 almost	 universally	 expressed	 an	








degree	 of	 comfort	 allows	 more	 flexibility	 in	 pursuing	 formal	 social	 initiatives.	 Several	









volunteering.59	 In	 both	 cases	 however,	 bureaucracy	 often	 hinders	 the	 establishment	 of	
social	 organizations.	 Nonprofit	 registration	 proves	 extraordinarily	 tedious,	 and	
organizations	 in	 both	 countries	 often	 opt	 for	 commercial	 registration	 instead.	 These	
hassles	 only	 compounded	 the	 broader,	 general	 political	 disapproval	 of	 and	 constraints	
around	autonomous	associational	life.	If	more	flexibility	were	granted	to	civil	society,	the	
mood	suggests	that	initiatives	would	blossom.		
	 	The	 regional	 effect	 also	 seemed	 to	 influence	 who	 young	 entrepreneurs	 model	




























discussion,	 the	 impact	here	 is	more	 clearly	 linked	 to	 triggering	a	protest	 culture	 in	 the	
country,	and	along	with	that	rising	populism	and	the	politicization	of	the	mundane.61	One	


























participation	of	nationals	 in	 the	private	 sector	which	 is,	 as	mentioned,	part	of	 the	 shift	
toward	promoting	entrepreneurship	and	innovation.	Not	only	was	Oman	granted	a	share	
of	 a	 $20	 billion	 aid	 package	 from	 the	 GCC	 to	 divide	 with	 Bahrain,	 but	 the	 Sultan	 also	
announced	a	series	of	royal	decrees	aimed	at	quelling	dissent.63	 	Aside	 from	ministerial	
changes,	 the	 economic	 reforms	 included	 the	 abrupt	 creation	 of	 50,000	 state	 jobs,	 an	








school	students	will	 sit	 for	 their	 final	exams	 this	year.	Many	of	 those	won’t	move	on	 to	
college	 or	 university	 and	 will	 need	 jobs	 –	 but	 the	 government	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	






























fulfils	 their	 sense	 of	 being	 and	 through	 which	 they	 can	 strive	 to	 achieve	 their	
ambitions,	 rather	 than	wait	 to	 get	 a	 government	 job.	The	 state,	with	 all	 its	 civil,	


















The	 expectation	 of	 public	 sector	 employment	 is	 not	 an	 isolated	 socio‐political	
challenge.	Rather,	it	is	the	convergence	of	expectations	which	makes	the	millennials,	and	
youth	 more	 broadly,	 a	 particular	 generation	 to	 be	 reckoned	 with.	 	 The	 millennial	
generation	 expects	 more.	 Along	 with	 the	 usual	 welfare	 offerings,	 the	 promise	 of	

























Although	change	 is	demonstrably	necessary,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	break	free	of	deeply	














social	 groupings	 and	 empowering	 the	 bureaucracy.74	 Both	 the	 tribal	 and	 other	 social	
groups	that	secured	economic	or	political	significance	as	well	as	patterns	of	access	and	rent	











practices	 of	 economic	 life	 form	 a	 combination	 of	 challenges	 to	 attempts	 to	 retool	 the	
private	sector.	
The	millennial	generation	along	with	others	pushing	 for	employment	or	 seeking	
more	 meaningful	 work	 through	 embracing	 the	 push	 toward	 entrepreneurship	 are	
confronted	by	an	unfriendly	business	environment	riddled	with	bureaucratic	hurdles	and	
beset	 with	 nepotism	 and	 favouritism.	 The	 last	 chapter	 detailed	 some	 of	 the	 specific	
bureaucratic	and	financial	hurdles	facing	new	business	entrants.	This	section	discusses	the	
nexus	of	social	and	bureaucratic	behaviours	that	entrepreneurs	must	navigate.		
The	 term	wasta	 best	 captures	 part	 of	 the	 informal	mechanisms	 utilized	 to	 both	
navigate	bureaucracy	and	access	items,	individuals,	and	action.	For	those	who	have	spent	




can	 then	 bypass	 red	 tape,	 have	 access	 to	 jobs,	 resources,	 government	 contracts	 and	
business	 opportunities	while	 those	without	 can	 find	 themselves	 crushed	 under	 poorly	
defined	 bureaucratic	 processes,	 long	 wait	 times,	 burdensome	 regulations	 and	 anti‐























a	 case	 in	 point.	 In	 Oman,	 this	 also	 doubles	 as	 a	 way	 to	 guarantee	 additional	 local	
employment.	
















young	 people	would	 tell	 stories	 of	 purposely	 scoping	 out	 particular	majalis	 (plural	 for	
majlis)	where	certain	prominent	business	men	were	rumoured	to	frequent.	Several	Qataris	
noted	that	the	“majlis	is	where	all	contracts	and	business	networking	takes	place.”81	It	is	




		 Naturally,	 wasta	 is	 viewed	 more	 negatively	 by	 those	 who	 lack	 access	 to	


























requirement	 to	have	a	physical	 office	prior	 to	 registration	would	be	enforced,	 even	 for	
those	 starting	 training	 programmes	 or	 e‐commerce	 businesses	 that	 could	 easily	 be	
operated	from	home.	
Almost	 all	 millennial	 interviewees	 would	 bemoan	 the	 lack	 of	 information	 and	
transparency	of	regulations.	Rules	were	unclear	and,	it	seemed,	left	too	much	discretion	to	
front	 desk	 officers.	 It	 was	 not	 only	 entrepreneurs	 who	 complained,	 members	 of	 the	
bureaucracy	 also	 noted	 the	 unclear	 procedures	 leading	 to	 conflicting	 advice.86	 Several	
Qataris	remarked	that	front	desk	personnel	at	the	business	registration	desk	do	not	even	
know	 the	 rules.	 Those	who	had	no	 complaints	 readily	 admitted	 “knowing	people”	who	
would	 “take	 care	of”	what	 seemed	 to	 them	an	easy	process.87	These	 complaints	prevail	
despite	 the	alleged	efforts	of	 various	government	bodies	at	 streamlining	processes	and	
raising	awareness.	
As	 noted	 in	 the	 last	 chapter,	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 political	 disconnect	 from	 the	
realities	 of	 engaging	 in	 entrepreneurship	 and	 the	day‐to‐day	difficulties	 of	 setting	up	 a	
business.	 This	 has	 led	many	 to	 feel	 as	 though	 they	 are	 caught	 in	 a	web	 of	 entrenched	


















the	 market	 and	 creating	 another	 type	 of	 intermediary.	 By	 granting	 exclusive	 agency	
licensing	 to	certain	 family	businesses	however,	 this	practice	has	additionally	privileged	
these	 organizations	 to	 the	 disadvantage	 of	 new	 SMEs.	 It	 further	 perpetuates	 a	 system	
whereby	 it	 is	 both	 easier	 and	 more	 immediately	 lucrative	 to	 serve	 as	 an	 agent	 of	 an	
international	brand	than	develop	a	local,	innovative	one.	The	perpetuation	of	this	form	of	
rent	 seeking	 and	 the	 facilitation	 of	 various	 types	 of	 intermediary	 practices	 like	 the	
government	relations	officer	propels	the	current	organization	of	the	market	and	increases	
rigidity	to	attempts	at	change.	“Today,	[the	government]	is	trying	to	ease	it,	but	they	are	
still	 miles	 away,”	 remarked	 an	 entrepreneur	 with	 regard	 to	 recent	 entrepreneurship	
promotion	 efforts	 in	 Qatar.	 “The	 changes	 are	 only	 on	 paper	 now.	 I	 don’t	 see	 any	 real	
outcomes	to	all	the	discussions.	The	will	is	there	and	the	people	are	there,	but	it	is	not	yet	











these	 practices	 are	 not	 simply	 cultural	 norms,	 but	 have	 become	 embedded	 with	 the	
mechanisms	 of	 government.	 This	makes	 it	 especially	 difficult	 to	 change	 and	move	 the	
promotion	 of	 entrepreneurship,	 and	 private	 sector	 reform	 more	 broadly,	 beyond	 the	
language	of	government.	As	it	stands,	the	availability	of	state	employment	and	unfriendly	
environment	 reduces	 the	 drive	 toward	 innovative	 business	 ideas.	 Millennials	 become	




Along	with	 socio‐economic	 practices,	 socio‐cultural	 expectations	 can	 also	 prove	
challenging	to	entrepreneurs.	Familial	and	societal	norms	and	expectations	play	a	role	in	
the	lives	of	those	who	wish	to	engage	in	entrepreneurship.	Although,	as	one	would	expect	
anywhere,	 the	 role	 can	 be	 positive,	 the	 pressures	 are	 often	 difficult.	 Young	 female	
entrepreneurs	in	particular	find	these	to	be	an	additional	hurdle	to	overcome.	In	spite	of	











and	 financial	 planning,	 but	 that	 they	 achieve	 success	 more	 often	 than	 their	 male	
counterparts.	This	should	not	be	particularly	surprising.	Attitudes	toward	women	working	
in	 the	 Gulf	 have	 been	 evolving	 for	 some	 time.	 According	 to	 one	 survey,	 monetary	
independence,	a	sense	of	achievement,	and	ambition	are	among	the	strongest	reasons	Gulf	




As	well,	micro‐businesses	 are	 becoming	 a	 popular	 choice	 for	women	 from	 low‐
income	 families,	 those	 who	 live	 in	 conservative	 households,	 and	 divorcés.92	 By	 most	
standards,	 few	 women	 in	 Qatar	 are	 needy.	 Despite	 this,	 divorced	 women	 comprise	 a	
segment	 of	 the	 Qatari	 population	 that	 especially	 benefits	 from	 entrepreneurship	
initiatives.	 In	 a	 still	 heavily	 patriarchal	 society,	 women	 rarely	 remarry	 and	 micro‐
entrepreneurship	 becomes	 an	 attractive	 venue	 for	 economic	 independence.93	 Oman	 is	





















allowing	 people	 to	 open	 a	 business	 from	 home?	 If	 you	 continue	 having	 high	 capital	






desire	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 regional	 change	 narrative.	 This	 is	 combined	 with	 the	























Legally,	 there	 are	 no	 constraints	 on	 women	 registering	 businesses	 in	 Oman	 or	
Qatar.	Culturally,	however,	can	be	another	story.	This	is	particularly	true	of	rural	Oman	and	




“People	 have	 spoken	 ill	 of	 us	 and	 our	 goal,	 speaking	 about	 our	 dream	 to	 work	
independently…	But	we	do	not	mind.	We	also	have	a	lot	of	support.”97	Social	initiatives	in	




initiated	 is	 evidence	of	 change.	 In	 focus	groups,	 entrepreneurial	meetings,	 and	 in	 these	
volunteer	 organizations	 and	 events,	 discussions	pushing	 against	 gender	norms	and	 the	
boundaries	 of	 the	 acceptable	 for	 both	women	 and	 youth	were	 regularly	 discussed	 and	
challenged.		




















That	 these	 roles	 are	 being	 increasingly	 challenged,	 and	 that	 millennial	 women	 are	
emerging	 as	 strong	 participants	 in	 entrepreneurship,	 holding	more	 advanced	 levels	 of	
education	and	more	willing	to	work	in	non‐traditional	occupations	than	men,	is	of	socio‐
cultural	and	economic	significance.102		
The	 desire	 to	 please	 family	 is	 still	 paramount	 though.	 This	 contributes	 to	 the	
lingering,	if	latent,	risk	aversion	of	the	earlier	generation.	It	is	not	specifically	the	fear	of	
failure,	 one	 interviewee	 noted,	 but	 the	 “fear	 of	 being	 judged.	 It	 is	 about	 how	 I	 will	

















about	policies,	 it	 is	about	our	culture.”104	Young	entrepreneurs	 repeatedly	brought	up	a	
desire	to	not	disappoint	their	family.	
	 Many	 millennials	 do	 face	 a	 difficult	 time	 trying	 to	 overcome	 their	 family	
expectations.	Often	 these	expectations	 come	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	push	 to	 take	a	 traditional	
government	 job	 rather	 than	 risk	 going	 out	 on	 your	 own.	 For	 women,	 it	 is	 often	 this	
combined	with	 pressure	 for	more	 ‘female	 appropriate’	 business	 activities.	 There	 were	
frequent	mentions	of	family	pressure	to	not	quit	jobs	and	risk	going	into	business	full	time,	







they	have	no	experience	and	want	 to	make	projects	with	 their	 study	only.	Book	
learning	is	different	from	life	…	They	are	asking	heavy	questions	and	making	heavy	
requirements	 on	 the	budget	which	 is	 not	healthy.	They	want	 increased	 salaries,	



















One	 of	 the	 remaining	 trials	 confronting	 millennial	 entrepreneurs	 is	 the	 trap	 of	
consumption.	If	the	Gulf	economy	has	been	shifting	anywhere	in	the	last	decade	or	two,	it	




















facing	 the	 prospect	 of	 unemployment	 turn	 to	 simple,	 trendy	 consumables.109	 It	 is	 less	
surprising	 when	 considering	 statistics	 on	 female	 unemployment.	 With	 youth	




how	easy	 it	 is	 to	 take	a	 loan	 to	get	a	 car	and	compare	 it	 to	how	difficult	 it	 is	 to	 start	a	
business.	 It	 shows	you	how	much	we	are	pushing	 society	 to	be	 consumers	 rather	 than	
producers.”112	 Even	 in	 light	 of	 all	 the	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 promotion	 and	
support,	 governments	 are	 stimulating	 consumption	 rather	 than	 innovation	 and	
production.		
	 While	today’s	generation	may	have	to	fight	the	lure	of	consumption,	it	is	in	reality	
only	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 common	 traps	 which	 began	 in	 earlier	 years.	 These	 include	
contracting	as	well	as	asset	bubbles	like	property	and	equities.	They	are	again	part	and	
parcel	 of	 the	 broader	 distributive	 ailments	 of	 a	 rentier	 economy,	 where	 circulating	



























been	 rather	 successful	 in	 developing	 a	 financial	 service	 sector,	 which	 is	 particularly	
appealing	because	of	its	substantial	value‐added	activities	and	its	complementarity	with	














than	 be	 innovative	 and	 produce.	 In	 this	 context,	 then,	 society	 becomes	 adept	 at	 the	
consumption	of	both	products	and	ideas.		
In	 fact,	 the	ease	with	which	a	consumption‐based	economy	latched	onto	existing	
allocative	 patterns	 of	 rent	 recycling	 lends	 to	 an	 argument	 of	 how	 neoliberal	 growth	
complements	 the	 authoritarian	 nature	 of	 rentier	 states.	 Michelle	 Buckley	 makes	 a	
convincing	 case	 that	 among	 the	 central	 aims	 of	 “neoliberal	 urban	 policies”	 is	 the	
marshalling	of	urban	space	into	an	“an	arena	both	for	market‐led	economic	growth	and	
elite	 consumption	while	 securing	order	and	control	amongst	marginalized	groups.”116	A	









find	a	means	 to	extend	or	retool	rentierism	so	as	 to	 fortify	 the	state’s	position	vis‐à‐vis	
business	 and	 society.	 It	 has	 to	 be	 developed	 in	 a	way	 that	 actually	 allows	 business	 to	
succeed	autonomously,	and	encourages	innovative	activities	rather	than	only	commercial	

















have	 resonated	 with	 some	 of	 the	 millennial	 generation.	 The	 hope	 of	 freedom	 and	
independence	combined	with	the	expectation	for	government	support	and	services	may	

































to	 crucial	 regional	 challenges	of	 economic	diversification	and	 the	weak	participation	of	






























regional	 transformation.	 These	 questions	 encompass	 a	 broader	 set	 of	 subsidiary	 ones	
concerning	 the	 role	 of	 innovation,	 entrepreneurship,	 youth	 and	 ideational	 change,	
authoritarian	 government,	 and	 political	 and	 economic	 reform.	 The	 answers	 have	 been	
explored	in	some	detail	in	the	third	and	fourth	chapters.		
Unlike	the	story	of	transition	in	other	emerging	economies,	the	desired	transition	
of	 the	Gulf	 states	 from	hydrocarbon‐dependent	 economies	 to	 knowledge‐based	 ones	 is	
shaped	by	rather	anomalous	conditions.	The	dependence	of	the	economy	on	hydrocarbons	
on	 the	one	hand	and	 the	deeply	 ensconced	 segmented	 labour	market	 on	 the	other	has	
created	an	unusually	distorted	economic	environment	and	an	insidious	set	of	challenges	




Although	 the	 state’s	 entrepreneurship	 push	 encapsulates	 a	 desire	 to	 respond	 to	 these	
problems,	it	is	simultaneously	constrained	by	them.		
With	development	being	primarily	state‐led	and	the	 line	between	the	public	and	
private	 sector	 opaque,	 it	 is	 no	 surprise	 that	GCC	 countries	 are	not	 strangers	 to	market	
intervention.	 A	 history	 of	 preparing	 development	 strategies	 and	 plans,	 each	 with	 an	
emphasis	 on	 a	 particular	 developmental	 focus	 from	 infrastructure	 to	 human	 capital	
development,	has	generated	a	set	of	expertise	and	a	history	of	networking	with	 foreign	
specialists.	The	recent	push	for	a	transition	to	knowledge	economy	through	the	focus	on	








dedicate	 vast	 financial	 resources	 to	 new	 projects.	 Even	 without	 heavy	 resource	
dependence,	the	shift	to	innovation‐driven	knowledge	economies	took	over	twenty	years	


















Whereas	economic	well‐being	and	 the	employment	of	Gulf	 citizens	has	been	 the	
purview	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 demographic	 imbalances	 and	 changing	 economic	 conditions	
discussed	throughout	this	thesis	are	challenging	this	status	quo.	In	some	cases,	economic	
constraints	mean	it	 is	difficult	 to	rely	substantially	on	the	state	purse	to	solve	domestic	
concerns.	 In	 other	 cases,	 where	 additional	 wealth	 distribution	 alone	 would	 seem	 a	
sufficient	solution,	the	state	still	finds	it	necessary	to	respond	to	both	social	concerns	and	
international	 pressure.	 Involving	 the	 private	 sector	 in	 the	 restructuring	 of	 economic	
opportunities	available	to	the	citizen	population	has	become	an	essential	ingredient.	This	
is	enormously	difficult	in	the	Gulf	states	because	of	existing	networks	of	privilege	and	the	
cost	 disparity	 present	 in	 the	 segmented	 labour	 market.	 The	 hope	 is	 that	 encouraging	
indigenously	 created	 and	 operated	 small	 and	 medium	 enterprises	 will	 be	 the	 key	 to	











The	 state	 continues	 to	 hold	 the	 developmental	 reigns,	 and	 make	 the	 calls	 on	





The	 case	 studies	 have	demonstrated	 that	 despite	 the	 differences	 between	 them,	
both	Oman	and	Qatar	have	chosen	the	active	pursuit	of	entrepreneurship	promotion	as	a	
key	policy	 shift.	Although	 the	 evident	path	dependency	 in	both	 case	 studies	 suggests	 a	



















boredom,	are	unacceptable	outcomes	of	 the	system.	Naturally,	 the	continuance	of	 these	
challenges	can	spark	civil	unrest,	as	witnessed	in	Oman	in	2011.		
			This	is	one	point	where	local	challenges	intersect	with	regional	ones.	The	changes,	
both	 positive	 and	 negative,	 that	 began	 sweeping	 the	 region	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 2011	
impacted	 the	 psyche	 of	 all	 and	 did	 not	 escape	 the	 Gulf	 millennials.	 The	 global	
connectedness,	rising	political	awareness,	and	sense	of	shared	history	all	combined	in	a	












reform,”	 like	 Steven	Heydemann	 indicates,	 can	be	 conceptualized	 “as	 a	 social	process.”3	
While	Gulf	rulers	continue	to	manage	the	trajectory	of	development	and	economic	change	
tends	 to	 be	 elite‐driven,	 this	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 social	 change	 does	 not	 occur.	 In	 fact,	





their	 announcements,	 strategies,	 and	 reforms	 in	 generic	 policy	 terms	 rather	 than	




What	 is	particularly	 interesting	 is	how	 ideational	 shifts	are	occurring.	Of	course,	
measurement	of	ideational	movement	is	difficult	to	attain	with	any	quantifiable	degree	of	














to	 counter.	 	 They	 are	more	 often	 than	 not	 re‐configuring	 a	 nanny‐state	 approach.	 The	
programmes	supposedly	aimed	at	working	against	these	classically	 ‘rentier	mentalities,’	
actually	serve	to	reinforce	them,	perpetuating	the	conventional	rentier	sense	that	it	is	the	
government’s	 responsibility	 to	 support	 and	 aid	 all	 types	 of	 productive	 activity.5	 In	
combination	 with	 a	 pervasive	 lack	 of	 risk	 taking,	 several	 of	 these	 programmes	mould	
dependency	 and	 continue	 to	 foster	 the	 expectation	 for	 government	 support	 and	 ‘hand	
holding.’6		























Caught	 between	 conflicting	 sources	 of	 culture	 and	 identity,	 young	 Gulf	 adults	 are	
influenced	by	local	mores,	technological	innovation,	nascent	national	identity,	and	Western	
media.	Drawing	on	Scholte,	 I	view	globalization	here	as	not	 just	 international	economic	
integration,	but	also	the	supraterritorial	spread	of	connections	between	people.9	 In	 this	







claims	 about	 entrepreneurship.	 They	 suggest	 that	 “SMEs	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 economic	
development	and	make	an	important	contribution	to	employment	and	GDP.”10	In	addition,	




















popular.	 If	 real	 innovation	 is	 injected	 into	 the	 mix,	 it	 could	 lead	 to	 many	 positive	
externalities.	 However,	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 excessive	 consumption,	 labour	 market	








traceable	 history	 of	 Qatar’s	 entrepreneurship	 support	 ecosystem.	 Oman’s	 was	 more	
difficult	to	trace,	reflective	of	its	more	complicated	relationship	with	economic	growth	and	
national	employment.	 Its	earlier	promotion	of	 labour	nationalization	strategies	and	self	




announcements	 are	 cast	 in	 developmental	 and	 nationalistic	 terms,	 emphasizing	
indigenous	support,	employment,	and	national	pride	in	growth.	The	practice	has	been	less	





the	 system	because	 the	 logic	of	 interventions	 are	not	often	designed	with	 the	 systemic	
challenges	of	 the	Gulf	 in	mind.	Thus,	entrepreneurship	support	and	promotion	are	met	
with	 contradictions	 endogenous	 to	 the	 political	 economy.	 Many	 of	 the	 mechanisms	
introduced	demonstrate	a	political	disconnect	from	the	realities	of	the	GCC	private	sector.	
As	 well,	 it	 has	 created	 conditions	 promotive	 of	 institutional	 competition	 rather	 than	




elaborate	 ecosystem	 of	 programmes	 and	 initiatives,	 nearly	 all	 connected	 to	 varying	
degrees	with	the	government.12		Those	initiatives	which	were	truly	independent	struggled	
immensely	 to	 emerge	 and/or	 were	 eventually	 absorbed	 in	 or	 connected	 to	 the	 state	
apparatus.	This	demonstrates	the	state’s	ability	to	manipulate	the	process	in	a	way	so	as	to	
remain	pervasive	in	new	‘private’	activities.	By	incorporating	private	actors	into	the	state	
process,	 it	 can	 co‐opt	 the	 narrative	 to	 its	 own	 end.	 This	 is	 different	 from	 cooption	
techniques	of	the	past,	although	those	remain.	Rather	than	the	individual,	they	seem	to	be	
aimed	 at	 co‐opting	 and	 owning	 the	 narrative	 of	 innovation	 and	 entrepreneurship.	
Moreover,	 state	 grants	 and	 loans	 as	 well	 as	 government‐prompted	 loans	 or	 contracts,	









others	 into	new	forms	of	patronage	networks	–	whether	via	 lending	or	 integration	 into	
supply	 chain	networks.	 Still	 this	 cooption	 is	 limited.	 Since	 it	 is	 so	 integrated	with	 state	
capacity,	it	faces	the	same	shortfalls	as	other	mechanisms	of	state	patronage.	Instead,	when	
genuine	entrepreneurship	is	produced,	it	creates	socio‐business	classes	independent	from	





successful	 innovation	 in	 any	 country	 requires	 the	 long‐term	 vision	 national	 planning	

























an	 inherent	 incongruence	 between	 the	 logic	 of	 policy	 and	 the	 structural	 logic	 of	 the	
economy.	 Policy	makers	 are,	 however,	 cognizant	 of	 what	 needs	 to	 be	 done	 even	 if	 an	
inability	or	unwillingness	remains.	In	the	Omani	case,	there	is	a	growing	sense	of	urgency	
and	somewhat	higher	political	will	since	2011.		This	is	evidenced	not	just	by	the	flurry	of	
royal	 decrees,	 but	 more	 recently	 by	 a	 series	 of	 lower	 level	 policy	 changes	 helping	 to	
facilitate	 the	 implementation	 of	 entrepreneurship	 promotion.	 In	 Qatar,	 attempts	 at	
implementation	are	occurring	as	well,	but	they	tend	to	be	limited	to	the	proliferation	of	
trendy	initiatives.		













sector,	 where	 in	 the	 second	 quarter	 of	 2013	 the	 Central	 Bank	 of	 Oman	 announced	 a	






Majlis	 Oman	 in	 2012.17	 In	 addition	 to	 evoking	 senses	 of	 nationalism,	 these	 policies	
demonstrate	the	government’s	genuineness	to	the	population.	Nevertheless,	they	are	still	





	 Although	 we	 have	 yet	 to	 see	 as	 many	 similar	 micro‐level	 policy	 adjustments	
introduced	 in	 Qatar,	 there	 continue	 to	 be	 new	 initiative	 announcements	 and	 ongoing	
language	confirming	 the	 importance	of	entrepreneurship	 to	development.	For	example,	












opportunities	 for	 local	 SMEs.	 19	 	 Deals	 such	 as	 this	 are	 presented	with	 similar	 tones	 of	








the	 policy	 prescriptions	 which	 advise	 entrepreneurship	 and	 SME	 support	 diverges	
between	international	financial	institutions	and	GCC	governments.	For	instance,	IFIs	would	
support	opening	debt	markets	 to	expand	 the	borrowing	potential	 of	 SMEs,	 and	 include	
non‐nationals.	They	are	thinking	of	GDP	growth	and	the	expansion	of	the	private	sector.	



















brought	 on	 by	 market	 monopolization	 by	 SOEs	 or	 other	 large	 companies.23	 GCC	
governments	are	utilizing	this	as	another	way	to	redistribute	wealth	to	citizens	however,	
with	 the	 hope	 that	 the	 SME	 promise	 of	 fuelling	 employment	 will	 be	 fulfilled.	 It	 raises	











following	 the	 footsteps	 of	 discussions	 on	 free‐trade	 agreements	 and	 foreign	 direct	
investment	which	proliferated	in	the	1990s	and	2000s	in	the	GCC.		
















informally,	 although	 not	 often	 discussed	 because	 of	 their	 undocumented	 nature,	 were	
particularly	helpful	in	the	transformation	of	countries	like	Taiwan.	Thus,	unofficial	policies	














sufficient,	 a	 subsidy	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 minimize	 the	 cost	 differential	 between	
expatriates	and	 local	 labour	 is	a	possible	step	 to	begin	chipping	away	at	 the	dual‐wage	
market.		









and	 higher	 education	 is	 important	 to	 successful	 transition	 and	 innovation.28	 As	 well,	
informal	policies	nudging	the	support	of	international	companies	and	the	introduction	of	
local	 content	 rules	 or	 tender	 board	 requirements	 will	 likely	 prove	 facilitative	 of	
entrepreneurship	as	well.	A	note	of	caution	is	in	order	however.	These	are	only	likely	to	









cultural	 aversion	 to	entrepreneurship,	 this	 research	has	discredited	 these	assumptions.	
The	challenge	therefore,	is	not	cultural	aversion	but	distorted	incentive	structures.		These	
structures	 create	 enticing	 conditions	 for	 public	 sector	 employment,	 reduce	 the	 value	
ascribed	to	labour,	deter	business	start	ups,	and	raise	the	cost	of	failure.		
	 Already	a	narrative	of	the	significance	of	entrepreneurship	and	SME	development	









require	 a	massive	 overhaul	 addressing	 labour	market	 challenges.	 Significantly,	 the	 real	
contradiction	lies	in	balancing	an	international	neoliberal	agenda	with	a	rent‐buttressed	
authoritarian	desire	to	manage	and	co‐opt	society	and	economy.	 	The	result	has	been	a	








policy	 development	 and	 it	 is	 a	 story	 of	 transition.	 It	 speaks	 to	 three	 specific	 sets	 of	
literature:	analyses	of	the	rentier	state,	examinations	of	development	and	transition,	and	
studies	 of	 innovation.	 	 The	 analysis	 of	 entrepreneurship	 and	 innovation	 promotion	
presented	 in	 this	 dissertation	 not	 only	 provides	 a	 fresh	 examination	 of	 a	 novel	 policy	
agenda	 in	 GCC	 countries,	 it	 unpacks	 the	 motivations,	 multiplicity	 of	 stakeholders	 and	
pressures,	 and	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	 multilayered	 practices	 of	 development	 choices	 and	
economic	 policy	 making.	 Its	 concern	 with	 the	 governance	 of	 development	 and	 policy	
making	practices	in	the	Gulf	will	be	of	interest	to	development	academics	and	practitioners	
















engage	 in	much	detail	 beyond	a	 token	mention	of	 the	 literature.	Not	only	 this,	 but	 this	
dissertation	 engages	 literature	 sets	 on	 development,	 innovation,	 and	 Gulf	 political	
economy	with	each	other	to	broaden	understandings	of	development	and	transition	in	the	
region.	 Incorporating	 analysis	 on	 innovation	 and	 entrepreneurship	 in	 relation	 to	
knowledge	 economies	with	 reference	 to	 the	Gulf	 experience	 is	 new	and	 allows	 a	more	
thorough	assessment	of	these	policy	mechanisms	than	would	be	possible	otherwise.			
Finally,	through	interrogating	the	entrepreneurship	policy	experience	in	the	case	
studies,	 this	 research	 extends	 beyond	 the	 often	 perfunctory	 assumptions	 gleaned	 from	
rentier	state	literature	to	investigate	the	unfolding	of	development	policies	in	the	current	
milieu.	 This	 project	 then	 has	 provided	 a	 window	 into	 transition	 and	 transformation,	
demonstrating	the	way	rentier	patterns	and	a	combination	of	novel	pressures	interact	and	
affect	the	practices	of	policy	making	and	the	Gulf	ruling	bargain.			
	
218 
 
Bibliography	
	
“16pc	of	GDP	Is	from	SMEs.”	Oman	Observer.	April	2,	2012.	
http://main.omanobserver.om/node/89237.	
2010	Census	Bahrain.	Manama:	Central	Informatics	Organization,	Kingdom	of	Bahrain,	
2010.	http://www.census2010.gov.bh/.	
3rd	Annual	ASDA’A	Burson‐Marsteller	Arab	Youth	Survey.	White	Paper.	Dubai:	ASDA’A	
Burson‐Marsteller,	March	2011.	
Aarts,	Paul,	and	Gerd	Nonneman.	Saudi	Arabia	in	the	Balance :	Political	Economy,	Society,	
Foreign	Affairs.	Washington	Square,	NY:	New	York	University	Press,	2005.	
“About	Qatar	Foundation	|	Qatar	Foundation	‐	Unlocking	Human	Potential.”	Accessed	
December	12,	2012.	http://www.qf.com.qa/discover‐qf/about‐qf.	
Abrahamovitz,	Moses.	“Resource	and	Output	Trends	in	the	United	States	Since	1870.”	
American	Economic	Review	46,	no.	2	(1956):	3–23.	
“Agro‐Industrial	Park.”	Qatar	National	Food	Security	Programme,	2011.	
http://www.qnfsp.gov.qa/programme/food/agro‐industrial‐park.	
Al‐Azri,	Khalid.	“Change	and	Conflict	in	Contemporary	Omani	Society:	The	Case	of	Kafa’a	
in	Marriage.”	British	Journal	of	Middle	Eastern	Studies	37,	no.	2	(2010):	121–137.	
doi:10.1080/13530191003794707.	
Al‐Barami,	Sharifa.	“Defining	Small	and	Medium	Enterprises	in	Oman.”	Wamda,	April	25,	
2012.	www.wamda.com/2012/04/defining‐small‐business‐in‐oman.	
Al‐Hashimi,	Said	Sultan.	The	Omani	Spring:	Towards	the	Break	of	a	New	Dawn?	Arab	
Reform	Brief.	Arab	Reform	Initiative,	November	2011.	http://www.arab‐
reform.net/sites/default/files/Omanenglish.pdf.	
Al‐Kiyumi,	Bader.	“Establish	New	Laws.”	Oman	Daily	Observer.	January	23,	2013.	
http://main.omanobserver.om/node/141039.	
Al‐Lamki,	Salma.	“Barriers	to	Omanization	in	the	Private	Sector:	The	Perceptions	of	
Omani	Graduates.”	The	International	Journal	of	Human	Resource	Management	9,	
no.	2	(1998):	377–400.	
Al‐Qasimi,	Sultan	Muhammad.	Omani‐French	Relations	1715	‐	1900.	Translated	by	B.R.	
Pridham.	London:	Forest	Row,	1996.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
219 
 
Al‐Qudsi,	Sulayman,	Ala’	Kaloti,	Shifa	Obeid,	and	Hanan	Marar.	“Trade	Volatility.	The	
Dollar	Peg	and	Inflation	in	the	GCC	Countries:	Some	Preliminary	Findings.”	The	
Arab	Bank	Review	10,	no.	1	(June	2008):	13–39.	
Al‐Quwaifili,	Iman.	“Saudi	Labor	Strikes:	Rebirth	of	a	Suppressed	Tradition.”	Al	Akhbar	
English,	January	16,	2012.	http://english.al‐akhbar.com/content/saudi‐labor‐
strikes‐rebirth‐suppressed‐tradition.	
Al‐Rasheed,	Madawi.	A	History	of	Saudi	Arabia.	2nd	ed.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	2010.	
Al‐Riyami,	Mahmoud.	“Omanis	Can	Operate	Businesses	from	Home:	MOCI.”	Muscat	Daily.	
May	2,	2011.	http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Stories‐Files/Omanis‐can‐
operate‐businesses‐from‐home‐MOCI.	
Al‐Said,	Sultan	Qaboos	bin	Said.	“Speech	Before	the	Annual	Session	of	the	Council	of	
Oman.”	Ministry	of	Information,	November	12,	2012.	
http://www.omanet.om/english/hmsq/hmsq12.asp.	
Al‐Shaibany,	Saleh.	“Thousands	of	South	Asian	Workers	Strike	at	Oman	Airport.”	Reuters.	
March	12,	2013.	http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/12/us‐oman‐strike‐
idUSBRE92B0X320130312.	
Al‐Shedi,	Asim.	“Influence	of	Expatriates	on	the	Cultural	Environment	of	Arab	Countries.”	
Oman	Daily	Observer.	October	21,	2012.	
http://main.omanobserver.om/node/117053.	
Al‐Thani,	Mohammed	Abdul‐Rahman	J.	“SME	Support	Policy,	Qatar	‐	3rd	Meeting	of	the	
MENA‐OECD	Working	Group	on	SME	Policy,	Entrepreneurship	and	Human	Capital	
Development.”	OECD,	October	26,	2009.	
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/6/43982279.pdf.	
Al‐Yousef,	Mohamed	Bin	Musa.	Oil	and	the	Transformation	of	Oman:	The	Socio‐economic	
Impact.	London:	Stacey	International,	1996.	
Al‐Zadjali,	Hamoud	Sangour.	Central	Bank	of	Oman	Circular:	Small	and	Medium	
Enterprises	(SMEs).	Circular	BM1108,	2013.	http://www.cbo‐
oman.org/circulars/2013/BM1108SME.pdf.	
Alam,	Md.	Shamsul,	and	Md.	Anwar	Ullah.	“SMEs	in	Bangladesh	and	Their	Financing:	An	
Analysis	and	Some	Recommendations.”	The	Cost	and	Management	34,	no.	3	(June	
2006):	57–72.	
Alhasan,	Hasan	Tariq.	“The	Gulf’s	Cupcake	Entrepreneurs.”	The	Guardian,	October	3,	
2012,	sec.	Comment	is	free.	
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/03/gulf‐cupcake‐
entrepreneurs.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
220 
 
Almunajjed,	Mona,	and	Karim	Sabbagh.	Youth	in	GCC	Countries:	Meeting	the	Challenge.	
Booze	&	Company,	2011.	http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/BoozCo‐GCC‐
Youth‐Challenge.pdf.	
Alsharekh,	Alanoud,	and	Robert	Springborg,	eds.	Popular	Culture	and	Political	Identity	in	
the	Arab	Gulf	States.	SOAS	Middle	East	Issues.	London:	Saqi	Books,	2008.	
Ambition,	Vision,	And	Frustration:	Omani	Commerce	Official	Speaks	Out.	Embassy	Muscat	
(Oman):	Wikileaks,	December	5,	2004.	
http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=04MUSCAT2112.	
Amsden,	Alice	H.	Asia’s	Next	Giant:	South	Korea	and	Late	Industrialization.	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	1989.	
———.	The	Rise	of	“The	Rest”:	Challenges	to	the	West	from	Late‐Industrializing	Economies.	
Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001.	
Amsden,	Alice	H.,	and	Wan‐Wen	Chu.	Beyond	Late	Development:	Taiwan’s	Upgrading	
Policies.	The	MIT	Press,	2003.	
Anderson,	Lisa.	“The	State	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa.”	Comparative	Politics	20,	
no.	1	(October	1,	1987):	1–18.	doi:10.2307/421917.	
Angrist,	Joshua	D.,	and	Adriana	Kugler.	Rural	Windfall	or	a	New	Resource	Curse?	Coca,	
Income,	and	Civil	Conflict	in	Colombia.	Working	Paper.	National	Bureau	of	
Economic	Research,	March	2005.	http://www.nber.org/papers/w11219.	
“Annual	Filing.”	The	Patent	Office	of	the	Cooperation	Council	for	the	Arab	States	of	the	Gulf.	
Accessed	June	30,	2013.	http://www.gccpo.org/Statistics/en/Default.aspx.	
Annual	Statistical	Abstract	2011.	Kuwait:	State	of	Kuwait	Central	Statistical	Bureau,	2011.	
http://www.csb.gov.kw/Socan_Statistic_EN.aspx?ID=18.	
Anwar,	Haris.	“Abu	Dhabi	Bails	Out	Dubai	World	with	$10	Billion	(Update	3).”	Bloomberg	
News.	December	14,	2009.	
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=apiaU8vfNR9A.	
Arab	Human	Development	Report	2003:	Building	a	Knowledge	Society.	New	York:	United	
Nations	Development	Programme	(UNDP),	Regional	Bureau	for	Arab	States,	2003.	
“Arab	Youth	Vote	Overwhelmingly	for	Democracy.”	Maktoob	News,	March	7,	2010.	
http://business.maktoob.com/20090000443478/Arab_youth_vote_overwhelming
ly_for_democracy/Article.htm.	
“Arabtec’s	Dubai‐based	Workers	End	Wages	Strike.”	Arabian	Business,	January	27,	2011.	
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/arabtec‐s‐dubai‐based‐workers‐end‐wages‐
strike‐‐376656.html.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
221 
 
Askari,	Hossein,	Vahid	F.	Nowshirvani,	and	Mohamed	Jaber.	Economic	Development	in	the	
Gcc:	The	Blessing	and	the	Curse	of	Oil.	illustrated	edition.	Jai	Pr,	1997.	
Aslop,	Ron.	“The	‘Trophy	Kids’	Go	to	Work.”	The	Wall	Street	Journal,	October	21,	2008.	
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455219391652725.html.	
“At	a	Crossroads.”	Oman	Economic	Review,	September	2003.	
Audretsch,	David	B.,	Isabel	Grilo,	and	A.	Roy	Thurik.	Handbook	of	Research	on	
Entrepreneurship	Policy.	Cheltenham	and	Northamton:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	
2007.	
Audretsch,	David	B.,	and	Roy	Thurik.	Innovation,	Industry	Evolution	and	Employment.	
Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999.	
Ayubi,	Nazih	N.	Over‐stating	the	Arab	State:	Politics	and	Society	in	the	Middle	East.	
I.B.Tauris,	1996.	
Bahrain	Labour	Market	Indicators.	Kingdom	of	Bahrain:	Labour	Market	Regulatory	
Authority	(LMRA),	2011.	http://www.lmra.bh/blmi.	
Barnett,	Andy,	Bruce	Yandle,	and	George	Naufal.	“Regulation,	Trust,	and	Cronyism	in	
Middle	Eastern	Societies:	The	Simple	Economics	of	‘wasta’.”	The	Journal	of	Socio‐
Economics	44	(June	2013):	41–46.	doi:10.1016/j.socec.2013.02.004.	
Barro,	Robert	J.	“Determinants	of	Democracy.”	Journal	of	Political	Economy	107,	no.	S6	
(December	1999):	S158–S183.	doi:10.1086/250107.	
Beblawi,	Hazem,	and	Giacomo	Luciani.	The	Rentier	State.	New	York::	Routledge,	1987.	
Beidas‐Strom,	Samya,	Tobias	Rasmussen,	and	David	O.	Robinson.	Gulf	Cooperation	Council	
Countries:	Enhancing	Economic	Outcomes	in	an	Uncertain	Global	Economy.	
Washington:	International	Monetary	Fund,	2011.	
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2011/1101mcd.pdf.	
Bellin,	Eva.	“The	Robustness	of	Authoritarianism	in	the	Middle	East:	Exceptionalism	in	
Comparative	Perspective.”	Comparative	Politics	36,	no.	2	(January	1,	2004):	139–
157.	doi:10.2307/4150140.	
Bellin,	Eva	Rana.	“Contingent	Democrats:	Industrialists,	Labor,	and	Democratization	in	
Late‐Developing	Countries.”	World	Politics	52,	no.	2	(2000):	175–205.	
Benhassine,	Najy.	From	Privilege	to	Competition:	Unlocking	Private‐led	Growth	in	the	
Middle	East	and	North	Africa.	MENA	Development	Report.	Washington:	World	
Bank	Publications,	2009.	
Bose,	Sugata.	A	Hundred	Horizons:	The	Indian	Ocean	in	the	Age	of	Global	Empire.	Harvard	
University	Press,	2006.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
222 
 
Braun,	Dietmar.	“Lessons	on	the	Political	Coordination	of	Knowledge	and	Innovation	
Policies.”	Science	and	Public	Policy	35,	no.	4	(May	2008):	289–298.	
Breznitz,	Dan.	“Development,	Flexibility	and	R	&	D	Performance	in	the	Taiwanese	IT	
Industry:	Capability	Creation	and	the	Effects	of	State–industry	Coevolution.”	
Industrial	and	Corporate	Change	14,	no.	1	(February	1,	2005):	153–187.	
doi:10.1093/icc/dth047.	
Buckley,	Michelle.	“Locating	Neoliberalism	in	Dubai:	Migrant	Workers	and	Class	Struggle	
in	the	Autocratic	City.”	Antipode	(2012):	no–no.	doi:10.1111/j.1467‐
8330.2012.01002.x.	
Bunglawala,	Zamila.	“Nurturing	a	Knowledge	Economy	in	Qatar.”	Brookings	Doha	Center,	
September	2011.	
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/9/qatar%20b
unglawala/09_qatar_bunglawala.	
“Capitas	Group	Wins	Deal	to	Establish	Enterprise	Qatar.”	Arab	News,	November	5,	2010.	
http://www.arabnews.com/node/359650.	
Cardoso,	Fernando	Henrique,	and	Enzo	Faletto.	Dependency	and	Development	in	Latin	
America.	Translated	by	Marjory	Mattingly	Urquidi.	Los	Angeles:	University	of	
California	Press,	1979.	
Carlsson.	“Internationalization	of	Innovation	Systems:	A	Survey	of	the	Literature.”	
Research	Policy	35,	no.	1	(2006):	56–67.	
Carlsson,	Bo,	and	Ram	Mudambi.	“Globalization,	Entrepreneurship,	and	Public	Policy:	A	
Systems	View.”	Industry	&	Innovation	10	(March	2003):	103–116.	
doi:10.1080/1366271032000068122.	
Chatterji,	Aaron	K.,	Edward	Glaeser,	and	William	Kerr.	“Clusters	of	Entrepreneurship	and	
Innovation.”	NBER	Working	Paper	Series,	No.	19013.	Harvard	Business	School	
Working	Paper,	No.	13‐090,	April	2013.	
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/10646423/13‐
090.pdf?sequence=1.	
Clark,	Janine	A.	“Field	Research	Methods	in	the	Middle	East.”	PS:	Political	Science	&	
Politics	39,	no.	03	(2006):	417–424.	doi:10.1017/S1049096506060707.	
Collier,	Paul.	Natural	Resources,	Development	and	Conflict:	Channels	of	Causation	and	
Policy	Interventions.	Washington:	World	Bank,	April	28,	2003.	http://www‐
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/04/27
/000265513_20040427110039/Rendered/PDF/28730.pdf.	
Collier,	Paul,	and	Anke	Hoeffler.	“Greed	and	Grievance	in	Civil	War.”	Oxford	Economic	
Papers	56,	no.	4	(October	1,	2004):	563–595.	doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
223 
 
———.	“Resource	Rents,	Governance,	and	Conflict.”	Journal	of	Conflict	Resolution	49,	no.	4	
(August	1,	2005):	625–633.	doi:10.1177/0022002705277551.	
“Commerce	and	Industry	Ministry	Inaugurates	SME	Program	in	Singapore.”	Oman	News	
Agency.	June	5,	2012.	
www.omannews.gov.om/ona/english/newsDetails_inc.jsp?newsID=130411.	
“Constitutions	of	the	Arab	Monarchies.”	Accessed	August	4,	2011.	
http://www2.gsu.edu/%7Epolmfh/constitutions.htm.	
Cook,	M.	A.	Studies	in	the	Economic	History	of	the	Middle	East:	From	the	Rise	of	Islam	to	the	
Present	Day.	Routledge,	1970.	
Cooper,	Andrew	F,	and	Bessma	Momani.	“The	Challenge	of	Re‐branding	Progressive	
Countries	in	the	Gulf	and	Middle	East:	Opportunities	through	New	Networked	
Engagements	Versus	Constraints	of	Embedded	Negative	Images.”	Place	Branding	
and	Public	Diplomacy	5,	no.	2	(May	2009):	103–117.	doi:10.1057/pb.2009.3.	
“Cooperation	Between	GCC	and	Indian	SMEs	Vital	for	Bilateral	Sustainability.”	Al	Bawaba	
Business.	June	17,	2013.	http://www.albawaba.com/business/gcc‐smes‐
sustainability‐499937.	
“Council	of	Ministers	/	Statement.”	Oman	News	Agency,	February	2,	2013.	
www.omannews.gov.om/ona/english/newsDetailsPrint.jsp?newsID=160144.	
Cox,	Robert	W.	Production,	Power,	and	World	Order:	Social	Forces	in	the	Making	of	History.	
Columbia	University	Press,	1987.	
Crystal,	Jill.	Oil	and	Politics	in	the	Gulf:	Rulers	and	Merchants	in	Kuwait	and	Qatar.	
Cambridge	University	Press,	1995.	
———.	Oil	and	Politics	in	the	Gulf:	Rulers	and	Merchants	in	Kuwait	and	Qatar.	1st	ed.	
Cambridge	University	Press,	1990.	
Dahlstrand,	Asa	Lindholm,	and	Lois	Stevenson.	Linking	Innovation	and	Entrepreneurship	
Policy.	Innovation	Policy	Research	for	Economic	Growth.	Swedish	Foundation	for	
Small	Business	Research,	November	2007.	
http://ipreg.org/IPREG_AsaLois_web.pdf.	
Davidson,	Christopher	M.	The	United	Arab	Emirates:	A	Study	In	Survival.	Lynne	Rienner	
Pub,	2005.	
Davis,	Graham	A.	“Learning	to	Love	the	Dutch	Disease:	Evidence	from	the	Mineral	
Economies.”	World	Development	23,	no.	10	(October	1995):	1765–1779.	
doi:10.1016/0305‐750X(95)00071‐J.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
224 
 
De	Boer,	Kito,	and	John	M.	Turner.	Beyond	Oil:	Reappraising	the	Gulf	States.	Special	
edition.	The	McKinsey	Quarterly.	McKinsey	&	Company,	2007.	
http://mkqpreview2.qdweb.net/PDFDownload.aspx?ar=1902.	
Dickinson,	Elizabeth.	“Youth	Take	up	Battle	Against	Bureacracy	in	Kuwait.”	The	National,	
March	3,	2013.	http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle‐east/youth‐take‐
up‐battle‐against‐bureacracy‐in‐kuwait.	
Dominic	J.	Brewer,	Catherine	H.	Augustine,	Gail	L.	Zellman,	Gery	Ryan,	Charles	A.	
Goldman,	Cathleen	Stasz,	and	Louay	Constant.	Education	for	a	New	Era:	Design	and	
Implementation	of	K‐12	Education	Reform	in	Qatar.	Monographs.	Santa	Monica:	
RAND	Corporation,	2007.	
Draves,	William	August,	and	Julie	Coates.	Nine	Shift:	Work,	Life	and	Education	in	the	21st	
Century.	River	Falls:	LERN	Books,	2004.	
Dresch,	Paul,	and	James	Piscatori.	Monarchies	and	Nations:	Globalisation	and	Identity	in	
the	Arab	States	of	the	Gulf.	I.	B.	Tauris,	2005.	
Drucker,	Peter.	Innovation	and	Entrepreneurship.	Revised.	Oxford:	Elsevier	Ltd.,	2007.	
Drucker,	Peter	F.	The	Age	of	Discontinuity:	Guidelines	to	Our	Changing	Society.	New	York:	
Harper	&	Row,	1969.	
“Dubai’s	Bail‐out:	The	Outstretched	Palm.”	The	Economist,	February	26,	2009.	
http://www.economist.com/node/13186145.	
Dunlop,	Imelda.	Business	and	Youth	in	the	Arab	World:	Partnerships	for	Youth	Employment	
and	Enterprise	Development.	International	Business	Leader`s	Forum,	2006.	
http://www‐dev.iblf.org/docs/BizYouthArab.pdf.	
Dunning,	Thad.	Crude	Democracy:	Natural	Resource	Wealth	and	Political	Regimes.	
Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008.	
“Duqm	Special	Economic	Zone	–	Planning	for	the	Future.”	Muscat	Daily	News,	February	9,	
2013.	http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Duqm‐Special‐Economic‐
Zone‐Planning‐for‐the‐future‐2143.	
Economic	Prospects	and	Policy	Challenges	for	the	GCC	Countries.	Annual	Meeting	of	
Ministers	of	Finance	and	Central	Bank	Governors.	Saudi	Arabia:	International	
Monetary	Fund,	October	5,	2012.	
“Economic	Update	‐	Oman:	New	Blueprint	for	Tourism.”	Oxford	Business	Group,	February	
12,	2013.	http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_updates/oman‐new‐
blueprint‐tourism.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
225 
 
Ehteshami,	Anoushiravan.	Globalization	and	Geopolitics	in	the	Middle	East:	Old	Games,	
New	Rules.	1st	ed.	Routledge,	2008.	
Ehteshami,	Anoushiravan,	and	Steven	Wright.	“Political	Change	in	the	Arab	Oil	
Monarchies:	From	Liberalization	to	Enfranchisement.”	International	Affairs	83,	no.	
5	(September	2007):	913–932.	doi:10.1111/j.1468‐2346.2007.00662.x.	
El‐Mallakh,	Ragaei.	Qatar:	Energy	and	Development.	London:	Croom	Helm,	1985.	
Entrepreneurship	and	Economic	Development:	The	Empretec	Showcase.	Geneva:	United	
Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development,	January	5,	2005.	
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webiteteb20043_en.pdf.	
Equinox	Management	Consultants	Ltd.	Gaps	in	SME	Financing:	An	Analytical	Framework.	
Ottawa:	Industry	Canada,	February	2002.	
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/vwapj/FinancingGapAnalysisEquinoxFeb20
02_e.pdf/$FILE/FinancingGapAnalysisEquinoxFeb2002_e.pdf.	
“Ericsson	Attracts	Omani	Talent	by	Launching	an	ICT	Training	Programme.”	Al	Bawaba	
Business.	June	27,	2013.	http://www.albawaba.com/business/pr/ericsson‐ict‐
training‐502479.	
Evans,	Peter	B.	Dependent	Development:	The	Alliance	of	Multinational,	State,	and	Local	
Capital	in	Brazil.	Princeton	University	Press,	1979.	
———.	Embedded	Autonomy.	Princeton	University	Press,	1995.	
“Expat	Workers	Lodge	Complaint	on	Non‐payment	of	Salaries.”	Muscat	Daily,	January	10,	
2012.	http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Expat‐workers‐lodge‐
complaint‐on‐non‐payment‐of‐salaries.	
Facts	&	Figures	2010.	Muscat:	Ministry	of	National	Economy,	June	2011.	
Felder,	Dell,	and	Mirka	Vuollo.	Qatari	Women	in	the	Workforce.	SSRN	Scholarly	Paper.	
Rochester,	NY:	Social	Science	Research	Network,	November	16,	2008.	
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1291424.	
Fenton,	Jenifer.	“Qatar	Cuts	down	on	Lessons	in	English.”	Financial	Times,	July	9,	2012.	
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c7a87610‐c9ac‐11e1‐bf00‐
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EkVaWZhp.	
Financing	SMEs	and	Entrepreneurs.	Policy	Brief.	Organization	for	Economic	Co‐operation	
and	Development	(OECD),	November	2006.	
http://www.oecd.org/cfe/37704120.pdf.	
Foley,	Sean.	The	Arab	Gulf	States:	Beyond	Oil	and	Islam.	Lynne	Rienner	Publishers,	2010.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
226 
 
Forstenlechner,	Ingo,	and	Emilie	Rutledge.	“Unemployment	in	the	Gulf:	Time	to	Update	
the‘Social	Contract’.”	Middle	East	Policy	17,	no.	2	(June	2010):	38–51.	
doi:10.1111/j.1475‐4967.2010.00437.x.	
Fox,	John	W.,	Nada	Mourtada‐Sabbah,	and	Mohammed	al‐Mutawa.	Globalization	and	the	
Gulf.	Taylor	&	Francis,	2006.	
Freeman.	“Continental,	National	and	Sub‐national	Innovation	Systems—complementarity	
and	Economic	Growth.”	Research	Policy	31,	no.	2	(2002):	191–211.	
doi:10.1016/S0048‐7333(01)00136‐6.	
Freeman,	Chris.	“The	‘National	System	of	Innovation’	in	Historical	Perspective.”	
Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics	19,	no.	1	(February	1,	1995):	5	–24.	
Frieden,	Jeffry	A.	Global	Capitalism:	Its	Fall	and	Rise	in	the	Twentieth	Century.	W.	W.	
Norton,	2007.	
“Fund	for	Development	of	Youth	Projects	Website.”	Accessed	October	31,	2012.	
http://www.youthfund.com.om/sharakah/.	
Furman,	Jeffrey	L.,	and	Richard	Hayes.	“Catching	up	or	Standing	Still?”	Research	Policy	33,	
no.	9	(November	2004):	1329–1354.	doi:10.1016/j.respol.2004.09.006.	
Gates,	Susan	M.,	and	Kristin	J.	Leuschner.	In	the	Name	of	Entrepreneurship?:	The	Logic	and	
Effects	of	Special	Regulatory	Treatment	for	Small	Business.	Santa	Monica:	Rand	
Corporation,	2007.	
GCC	Economic	Insight.	Doha:	Qatar	National	Bank,	2012.	
http://www.qnb.com.qa/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%
2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1355478588574&ssbina
ry=true.	
GCC	Petrochemicals	&	Chemicals	Industry:	Facts	&	Figures	2011.	Dubai:	Gulf	
Petrochemicals	&	Chemicals	Association,	2012.	
http://www.gpcaforum.net/facts2011.pdf.	
GCC:	A	Statistical	Glance.	Riyadh:	The	Cooperation	Council	for	the	Arab	States	of	the	Gulf,	
Secretariat	General,	December	2012.	http://sites.gcc‐sg.org/DLibrary/index‐
eng.php?action=ShowOne&BID=569.	
General	Secretariate	for	Development	Planning.	Qatar	National	Development	Strategy	
2011‐2016:	Towards	Qatar	National	Vision	2030.	Doha:	General	Secretariate	for	
Development	Planning,	June	2011.	
George,	Alexander	L.,	and	Andrew	Bennett.	Case	Studies	and	Theory	Development	in	the	
Social	Sciences.	The	MIT	Press,	2005.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
227 
 
Gerring,	John.	“What	Is	a	Case	Study	and	What	Is	It	Good	For?”	The	American	Political	
Science	Review	98,	no.	2	(May	1,	2004):	341–354.	
Glasser,	Bradley	Louis.	Economic	Development	and	Political	Reform:	The	Impact	of	
External	Capital	on	the	Middle	East.	Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	2001.	
Global	Employment	Trends	2013:	Recovering	from	a	Second	Jobs	Dip.	Geneva:	International	
Labour	Organization,	2013.	http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/‐‐‐
dgreports/‐‐‐dcomm/‐‐‐publ/documents/publication/wcms_202326.pdf.	
Gonzalez,	Gabriella.	Facing	Human	Capital	Challenges	of	the	21st	Century:	Education	and	
Labor	Market	Initiatives	in	Lebanon,	Oman,	Qatar,	and	the	United	Arab	Emirates.	
Santa	Monica:	Rand	Corporation,	2008.	
Greenwood,	S.	“Bad	for	Business?:	Entrepreneurs	and	Democracy	in	the	Arab	World.”	
Comparative	Political	Studies	41,	no.	6	(November	2007):	837–860.	
doi:10.1177/0010414007300123.	
Grupp,	Hariolf,	and	Mary	Ellen	Mogee.	“Indicators	for	National	Science	and	Technology	
Policy:	How	Robust	Are	Composite	Indicators?”	Research	Policy	33,	no.	9	
(November	2004):	1373–1384.	doi:10.1016/j.respol.2004.09.007.	
Haas,	Peter	M.	“Introduction:	Epistemic	Communities	and	International	Policy	
Coordination.”	International	Organization	46,	no.	01	(1992):	1–35.	
doi:10.1017/S0020818300001442.	
Hakimian,	Hassan,	and	Ziba	Moshaver.	The	State	and	Global	Change:	The	Political	
Economy	of	Transition	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa.	Routledge,	2001.	
Hanieh,	Adam.	Capitalism	and	Class	in	the	Gulf	Arab	States.	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	
2011.	
———.	“Khaleeji‐Capital:	Class‐Formation	and	Regional	Integration	in	the	Middle‐East	
Gulf.”	Historical	Materialism	18,	no.	2	(2010):	35–76.	
doi:10.1163/156920610X512435.	
Haque,	Khatija.	GCC	Outlook	2012.	Quarterly.	Dubai:	Emirates	National	Bank	Dubai,	
January	12,	2012.	
http://www.emiratesnbd.com/assets/cms/docs/quarterlyReports/2012/GCCQua
rterlyQ12012.pdf.	
Harders,	Cilja,	and	Matteo	Legrenzi.	Beyond	Regionalism?:	Regional	Cooperation,	
Regionalism	and	Regionalization	in	the	Middle	East.	Ashgate	Publishing,	Ltd.,	2008.	
Heard‐Bey,	Frauke.	“The	United	Arab	Emirates:	Statehood	and	Nation‐Building	in	a	
Traditional	Society.”	Middle	East	Journal	59,	no.	3	(July	1,	2005):	357–375.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
228 
 
Herb,	Michael.	All	in	the	Family:	Absolutism,	Revolution,	and	Democracy	in	the	Middle	
Eastern	Monarchies.	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	1999.	
———.	“Emirs	and	Parliaments	in	the	Gulf.”	Journal	of	Democracy	13,	no.	4	(2002):	41–
47.	doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0068.	
———.	“No	Representation	Without	Taxation?	Rents,	Development,	and	Democracy.”	
Comparative	Politics	37,	no.	3	(April	1,	2005):	297–316.	doi:10.2307/20072891.	
Hertog,	Steffen.	Benchmarking	SME	Policies	in	the	GCC:	a	Survey	of	Challenges	and	
Opportunities.	The	EU‐GCC	Chamber	Forum.	Brussels:	Eurochambres,	2010.	
http://www.europolitique.info/pdf/gratuit_fr/270047‐fr.pdf.	
———.	“Defying	the	Resource	Curse:	Explaining	Successful	State‐Owned	Enterprises	in	
Rentier	States.”	World	Politics	62,	no.	02	(2010):	261–301.	
doi:10.1017/S0043887110000055.	
———.	Princes,	Brokers,	and	Bureaucrats:	Oil	and	the	State	in	Saudi	Arabia.	Cornell	
University	Press,	2010.	
———.	“The	Sociology	of	the	Gulf	Rentier	Systems:	Societies	of	Intermediaries.”	
Comparative	Studies	in	Society	and	History	52,	no.	02	(2010):	282–318.	
doi:10.1017/S0010417510000058.	
Heydemann,	Steven.	Networks	of	Privilege	in	the	Middle	East:	The	Politics	of	Economic	
Reform	Revisited.	1st	ed.	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2004.	
Hinnebusch,	Raymond.	“Authoritarian	Persistence,	Democratization	Theory	and	the	
Middle	East:	An	Overview	and	Critique.”	Democratization	13,	no.	3	(2006):	373–
395.	doi:10.1080/13510340600579243.	
“His	Majesty	the	Sultan	Announces	New	Measures	to	Boost	SMEs.”	Muscat	Daily.	January	
28,	2013.	http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/His‐Majesty‐the‐Sultan‐
announces‐new‐measures‐to‐boost‐SMEs‐202a.	
Holtz,	Greta	C.	“Entrepreneurship,	an	Engine	for	Employment.”	Times	of	Oman.	December	
15,	2012.	http://www.timesofoman.com/Columns/Article‐687.aspx.	
Howe,	Neil,	and	William	Strauss.	Millennials	Rising:	The	Next	Great	Generation.	Random	
House	LLC,	2000.	
Hudson,	Michael	C.,	ed.	The	Middle	East	Dilemma:	The	Politics	and	Economics	of	Arab	
Integration.	New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1998.	
Hvidt,	Martin.	“Economic	and	Institutional	Reforms	in	the	Arab	Gulf	Countries.”	The	
Middle	East	Journal	65,	no.	1	(2011):	85–102.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
229 
 
———.	“Public	–	Private	Ties	and	Their	Contribution	to	Development:	The	Case	of	
Dubai.”	Middle	Eastern	Studies	43,	no.	4	(2007):	557.	
doi:10.1080/00263200701348862.	
———.	“The	Dubai	Model:	An	Outline	of	Key	Development‐Process	Elements	in	Dubai.”	
International	Journal	of	Middle	East	Studies	41,	no.	03	(2009):	397–418.	
doi:10.1017/S0020743809091120.	
“Industrial	Development	Hallmarks	in	Qatar.”	Qatar	News	Agency,	2012.	
http://www.qnaol.net/QNAEn/Main_Sectors/Energy_Industry/Pages/Industrialr
enaissancehallmarksinQatar.aspx.	
“Industries	Qatar	Website.”	Industries	Qatar,	2013.	
http://www.industriesqatar.com.qa/IQ/IQ.nsf/en_Pages/en_AboutUs_IQGroupCo
mpanies.	
Innovation	Policy:	A	Guide	for	Developing	Countries.	Washington:	The	International	Bank	
for	Reconstruction	and	Development	/	World	Bank,	2010.	
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2460/548930P
UB0EPI11C10Dislosed061312010.pdf?sequence=1.	
“International	Energy	Statistics.”	Independent	Statistics	&	Analysis:	U.S.	Energy	
Information	Administration	(eia),	2013.	
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm.	
International	Financial	Corporation.	Doing	Business	2010:	Oman.	Washington,	D.C.:	The	
International	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	/	World	Bank,	2009.	
———.	Doing	Business	2010:	Qatar.	Washington:	The	International	Bank	for	
Reconstruction	and	Development	/	World	Bank,	2009.	
———.	Doing	Business	2011:	Making	a	Difference	for	Entrepreneurs.	Washington:	The	
International	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	/	World	Bank,	2010.	
———.	Doing	Business	2012	‐	Economy	Profile:	Oman.	Washington:	The	International	
Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	/	World	Bank,	2012.	
———.	Doing	Business	2012	‐	Economy	Profile:	Qatar.	Washington:	The	International	
Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	/	World	Bank,	2012.	
International	Monetary	Fund.	World	Economic	Outlook	April	2012:	Growth	Resuming,	
Dangers	Remain.	World	Economic	and	Financial	Surveys.	Washington:	
International	Monetary	Fund,	2012.	
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/pdf/text.pdf.	
“ITA	Signs	MoU	with	Injaz	Oman	on	IT	Entrepreneurship.”	Oman	Daily	Observer.	May	3,	
2012.	http://main.omanobserver.om/node/93499.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
230 
 
Janardhan,	N.	Boom	Amid	Gloom:	The	Spirit	of	Possibility	in	the	21st	Century	Gulf.	Reading:	
Ithaca	Press,	2011.	http://site.ebrary.com/id/10480937.	
Johnson,	Chalmers	A.	MITI	and	the	Japanese	Miracle:	The	Growth	of	Industrial	Policy,	1925‐
1975.	Stanford	University	Press,	1982.	
Jones,	Toby	Craig.	Desert	Kingdom:	How	Oil	and	Water	Forged	Modern	Saudi	Arabia.	
Harvard	University	Press,	2010.	
Kamrava,	Mehran.	“Royal	Factionalism	and	Political	Liberalization	in	Qatar.”	The	Middle	
East	Journal	63,	no.	3	(2009):	401–420.	doi:10.3751/63.3.13.	
———.	“Structural	Impediments	to	Economic	Globalization	in	the	Middle	East.”	Middle	
East	Policy	XI,	no.	4	(Winter	2004):	96–112.	
———.	The	Modern	Middle	East:	A	Political	History	Since	the	First	World	War.	1st	ed.	
University	of	California	Press,	2005.	
Kanna,	Ahmed.	“A	Politics	of	Non‐Recognition?	Biopolitics	of	Arab	Gulf	Worker	Protests	
in	the	Year	of	Uprisings.”	Interface	4,	no.	1	(May	2012):	146–164.	
———.	Dubai:	The	City	As	Corporation.	Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2011.	
———.	“The	Arab	World’s	Forgotten	Rebellions:	Foreign	Workers	and	Biopolitics	in	the	
Gulf.”	South	Asian	Magazine	for	Action	and	Reflection	(SAMAR),	May	31,	2011.	
http://samarmagazine.org/archive/articles/357.	
Karl,	Terry	Lynn.	The	Paradox	of	Plenty:	Oil	Booms	and	Petro‐States.	University	of	
California	Press,	1997.	
Kefela,	Ghirmai	T.	“Knowledge‐based	Economy	and	Society	Has	Become	a	Vital	
Commodity	to	Countries.”	International	NGO	Journal	5,	no.	7	(August	2010):	160–
166.	
Khan,	Gulam	Ali.	“MOCI	Revises	Definition	of	SMEs	‐	Muscat	Daily.”	Muscat	Daily.	June	29,	
2012.	http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Business/MoCI‐revises‐definition‐
of‐SMEs.	
Khodr,	Hiba.	“The	Dynamics	of	International	Education	in	Qatar:	Exploring	the	Policy	
Drivers	Behind	the	Development	of	Education	City.”	Journal	of	Emerging	Trends	in	
Educational	Research	and	Policy	Studies	2,	no.	6	(December	2011):	574+.	
Kim,	Eun	Mee.	“Contradictions	and	Limits	of	a	Developmental	State:	With	Illustrations	
from	the	South	Korean	Case.”	Social	Problems	40,	no.	2	(May	1993):	228–249.	
doi:10.2307/3096924.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
231 
 
Kim,	Jeong‐Hyun,	and	Chi	Huang.	“Dynamics	of	State	Strength	and	Policy	Choices:	A	Case	
Study	of	South	Korea	and	Taiwan.”	Pacific	Focus	6,	no.	2	(September	1,	1991):	83–
108.	doi:10.1111/j.1976‐5118.1991.tb00090.x.	
Kim,	Wonik.	“Rethinking	Colonialism	and	the	Origins	of	the	Developmental	State	in	East	
Asia.”	Journal	of	Contemporary	Asia	39	(August	2009):	382–399.	
doi:10.1080/00472330902944446.	
Kinninmont,	Jane.	The	GCC	in	2020:	The	Gulf	and	Its	People.	The	GCC	to	2020:	Outlook	for	a	
Rapidly	Changing	Region.	Economist	Intelligence	Unit,	September	2009.	
———.	To	What	Extent	Is	Twitter	Changing	Gulf	Societies?	London:	Chatham	House,	
February	2013.	
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20E
ast/0213kinninmont.pdf.	
Klapper,	Leora,	and	Manuel	Quesada	Delgado.	Entrepreneurship:	New	Data	on	Business	
Creation	and	How	to	Promote	It.	Viewpoint.	Washington:	The	World	Bank	Group,	
Financial	and	Private	Sector	Development	Vice	Presidency,	August	2007.	
http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/316Klapper_Delgado.p
df.	
Kohli,	Atul.	State‐Directed	Development:	Political	Power	and	Industrialization	in	the	Global	
Periphery.	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004.	
Krueger,	Anne	O.	“Government	Failures	in	Development.”	The	Journal	of	Economic	
Perspectives	4,	no.	3	(July	1,	1990):	9–23.	
Labor	Participation	Rate,	Female	(%	of	Female	Population	Ages	15+).	The	World	Bank.	
Accessed	March	29,	2013.	
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS.	
Latest	Statistical	Releases	2012.	Riyadh:	Central	Department	Of	Statistics	&	Information,	
Kingdom	of	Saudi	Arabia.	Accessed	May	6,	2013.	http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/english/.	
Lawson,	F	H.	“Economic	Liberalization	and	the	Reconfiguration	of	Authoritarianism	in	the	
Arab	Gulf	States.”	Orient	46,	no.	1	(2005):	19–43.	
Lazonick,	William.	“The	Innovative	Enterprise	and	the	Developmental	State:	Toward	an	
Economics	of	‘Organizational	Success’.”	1–51.	Bretton	Woods,	NH:	Institute	for	
New	Economic	Thinking,	2012.	http://fiid.org/wp‐
content/uploads/2012/11/Lazonick‐Innovative‐Enterprise‐and‐Developmental‐
State‐20121117.pdf.	
Leftwich,	Adrian.	“Bringing	Politics	Back	In:	Towards	a	Model	of	the	Developmental	
State.”	Journal	of	Development	Studies	31,	no.	3	(n.d.):	400–427.	
doi:10.1080/00220389508422370.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
232 
 
———.	States	of	Development:	On	the	Primacy	of	Politics	in	Development.	Wiley‐Blackwell,	
2000.	
Legrenzi,	Matteo,	and	Bessma	Momani.	Shifting	Geo‐economic	Power	of	the	Gulf:	Oil,	
Finance	and	Institutions.	Ashgate	Pub	Co,	2011.	
Leydesdorff,	Loet.	“‘While	a	Storm	Is	Raging	on	the	Open	Sea’:	Regional	Development	in	a	
Knowledge‐based	Economy.”	The	Journal	of	Technology	Transfer	31,	no.	1	(n.d.):	
189–203.	
List,	Friedrich.	National	System	of	Political	Economy:	Three	Volumes	in	One.	Original	1841.	
Cosimo	Classics,	2011.	
List‐Jensen,	Ann	Sasa.	Economic	Development	and	Authoritarianism	‐	A	Case	Study	on	the	
Korean	Developmental	State.	DIIPER	Research	Series.	Denmark:	DIIPER	and	
Department	of	History,	International	and	Social	Studies,	Aalborg	University,	2008.	
http://vbn.aau.dk/files/13994106/DIIPER_wp_5.pdf.	
Looney,	Robert	E.	Industrial	Development	and	Diversification	of	the	Arabian	Gulf	
Economies.	Vol.	70.	Contemporary	Studies	in	Economic	and	Financial	Analysis.	
Middlesex:	Jai	Pr,	1994.	
Losman,	Donald	L.	“The	Rentier	State	And	National	Oil	Companies:	An	Economic	And	
Political	Perspective.”	The	Middle	East	Journal	64	(Summer	2010):	427–445.	
doi:10.3751/64.3.15.	
———.	“The	Rentier	State	And	National	Oil	Companies:	An	Economic	And	Political	
Perspective.”	The	Middle	East	Journal	64	(Summer	2010):	427–445.	
doi:10.3751/64.3.15.	
Luciani,	Giacomo.	The	Arab	State.	University	of	California	Press,	1990.	
Lundvall,	Bengt‐Ake.	National	Systems	of	Innovation:	Toward	a	Theory	of	Innovation	and	
Interactive	Learning.	(2010)	ed.	London	and	New	York:	Anthem	Press,	1992.	
Luong,	Pauline	Jones,	and	Erika	Weinthal.	“Prelude	to	the	Resource	Curse	Explaining	Oil	
and	Gas	Development	Strategies	in	the	Soviet	Successor	States	and	Beyond.”	
Comparative	Political	Studies	34,	no.	4	(May	1,	2001):	367–399.	
doi:10.1177/0010414001034004002.	
Malas,	Nour,	and	Angus	McDowall.	“Oman	Removes	Powerful	Economy	Minister.”	The	
Wall	Street	Journal,	March	8,	2011.	
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870338670457618642238260
5668.html.	
Manpower	Research	Bulletin	2009.	Riyadh:	Central	Department	Of	Statistics	&	
Information,	Kingdom	of	Saudi	Arabia,	2009.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
233 
 
http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/english/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&
gid=86&Itemid=113.	
Marich,	Mark.	“Global	Entrepreneurship	Summit	Moves	to	GEW	2012.”	Global	
Entrepreneurship	Week,	December	7,	2011.	
http://www.unleashingideas.org/ges2012.	
Mellahi,	Kamel,	and	Said	Mohammad	Al‐Hinai.	“Local	Workers	in	Gulf	Co‐operation	
Countries:	Assets	or	Liabilities?”	Middle	Eastern	Studies	36,	no.	3	(July	1,	2000):	
177–190.	
Menon,	Praveen.	“Labour	Strikes	Erupt	in	Dubai.”	The	National,	August	31,	2009.	
http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae‐news/labour‐strikes‐erupt‐in‐dubai.	
Metcalfe,	J.	S.	“Technology	Systems	and	Technology	Policy	in	an	Evolutionary	
Framework.”	Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics	19,	no.	1	(February	1,	1995):	25–46.	
Mills,	Robin.	“Stable	Oil	Prices	Will	Not	Be	Staying	That	Way	Much	Longer.”	The	National.	
April	15,	2013,	sec.	Industry	Insights.	
http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry‐
insights/energy/stable‐oil‐prices‐will‐not‐be‐staying‐that‐way‐much‐longer.	
Mitchell,	Timothy.	Carbon	Democracy:	Political	Power	in	the	Age	of	Oil.	London;	New	York:	
Verso	Books,	2011.	
Mitra,	Dabasish.	“Oman	Seeks	Indian	Expertise	in	Developing	SME	Projects.”	Times	of	
Oman.	June	24,	2013.	http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article‐18547.aspx.	
Mogahed,	Dalia,	and	Lymari	Morales.	“The	Rare	(But	Powerful)	Opportunity‐Driven	
Young	Female	Entrepreneur.”	The	Edge,	June	26,	2011.	
Momani,	Bessma,	and	Crystal	A	Ennis.	“Between	Caution	and	Controversy:	Lessons	from	
the	Gulf	Arab	States	as	(re‐)emerging	Donors.”	Cambridge	Review	of	International	
Affairs	25,	no.	4	(2012):	605–627.	doi:10.1080/09557571.2012.734786.	
Moving	Mountains	‐	Entrepreneurship	Through	Higher	Education	Workshop	Programme.	
Muscat:	Ministry	of	Higher	Education,	The	Research	Council,	and	The	Central	
University	of	Finance	and	Economics	in	China,	March	17,	2012.	
http://mohe.gov.om/userupload/Workshop%20Programme.pdf.	
Mshrooʿ	al‐tʿdaad	al‐ʿaam	l‐lskaan	w‐al‐mnsaaakn	w‐almnshaat	2010.	Ahm	Ntaa’j	Al‐
tʿdaad	ʿla	Mstooa	al‐Sultana	2010	(tʿdaad	Census	2010).	Muscat:	Census	
Administration,	National	Centre	for	Statistics	and	Information,	2010.	
Murphy,	Caryle.	“GCC	to	Set	up	$20bn	Bailout	Fund	for	Bahrain	and	Oman.”	The	National,	
March	11,	2011.	http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle‐east/gcc‐to‐set‐
up‐20bn‐bailout‐fund‐for‐bahrain‐and‐oman.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
234 
 
Mustafa,	Riham.	“IFC	Helps	Support	Smaller	Business	in	Qatar	with	New	Web	Platform.”	
International	Finance	Corporation,	April	3,	2012.	
http://www.ifc.org/IFCExt/pressroom/IFCPressRoom.nsf/0/A0B0CF70C3F5FB6
B852579D5004BCA32.	
Najem,	Tom,	and	Martin	Hetherington,	eds.	Good	Governance	in	the	Middle	East	Oil	
Monarchies.	RoutledgeCurzon,	2003.	
Nath,	Ravindra.	“Sultan	Qaboos	Names	New	Minister.”	Khaleeji	Times.	February	27,	2011.	
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=/data/middleeast/20
11/February/middleeast_February782.xml&section=middleeast.	
New	Sports	Minister	On	The	Ball,	But	Off	Economic	Team.	Embassy	Muscat	(Oman):	
Wikileaks,	November	23,	2004.	
http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=04MUSCAT2030.	
Niblock,	Tim,	ed.	Social	and	Economic	Development	in	the	Arab	Gulf.	London:	Croom	Helm,	
1980.	
Niblock,	Tim,	and	Monica	Malik.	The	Political	Economy	of	Saudi	Arabia.	Routledge,	2007.	
Noland,	Marcus,	and	Howard	Pack.	The	Arab	Economies	in	a	Changing	World.	Peterson	
Institute	for	International	Economics,	2007.	
Oman	Development	Bank.	Future	Anticipation	Annual	Report	2010,	2010.	
“Oman	Shuffles	Cabinet	Amid	Protests	‐	Middle	East.”	Al‐Jazeera	English,	February	26,	
2011.	
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201122620711831600.ht
ml.	
“Oman’s	Sultan	Qaboos	Begins	Annual	Meet‐the‐People	Tour.”	Middle	East	Online.	January	
20,	2013.	http://www.middle‐east‐online.com/english/?id=56560.	
“Omanisation	Percentage	Per	Sector.”	Ministry	of	Manpower,	2011.	
http://www.manpower.gov.om/en/omanisation_sector.asp.	
“Omanization	in	the	Banking	Sector.”	Al‐Markazi,	December	2004.	
Omeje,	Kenneth	C.	Extractive	Economies	and	Conflicts	in	the	Global	South:	Multi‐regional	
Perspectives	on	Rentier	Politics.	Ashgate	Publishing,	Ltd.,	2008.	
“Over	2,200	Workers	Strike	Work	over	‘unpaid	Salaries’.”	Muscat	Daily,	March	5,	2012.	
http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Over‐2‐200‐workers‐strike‐work‐
over‐unpaid‐salaries.	
Oxford	Business	Group.	The	Report:	Oman	2011.	Oxford	Business	Group,	2011.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
235 
 
Palan,	Ronen,	ed.	Global	Political	Economy:	Contemporary	Theories.	1st	ed.	Routledge,	
2000.	
Parboteeah,	K.	Praveen,	John	B.	Cullen,	and	Lrong	Lim.	“Formal	Volunteering:	a	Cross‐
national	Test.”	Journal	of	World	Business	39,	no.	4	(November	2004):	431–441.	
doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2004.08.007.	
Parmar,	Neil.	“A	Vision	of	Abu	Dhabi’s	2030	Future	in	Focus.”	The	National.	August	1,	
2011.	http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry‐
insights/economics/a‐vision‐of‐abu‐dhabis‐2030‐future‐in‐focus.	
Perumal,	Santhosh	V.	“SMEs’	Contribution	to	Qatar’s	Non‐oil	GDP	Is	Lower,	Says	QDB	
Official.”	Gulf	Times.	June	3,	2012.	http://www.gulf‐
times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=50.	
Peterson,	V.	Spike.	A	Critical	Rewriting	of	Global	Political	Economy:	Integrating	
Reproductive,	Productive	and	Virtual	Economies.	London	and	New	York:	Routledge,	
2003.	
Polanyi,	Karl.	The	Great	Transformation:	The	Political	and	Economic	Origins	of	Our	Time.	
Beacon	Press,	2001.	
Porter,	Michael	E.	Competitive	Advantage	of	Nations.	Simon	and	Schuster,	1998.	
Posusney,	Marsha	Pripstein.	“Enduring	Authoritarianism:	Middle	East	Lessons	for	
Comparative	Theory.”	Comparative	Politics	36,	no.	2	(January	1,	2004):	127–138.	
doi:10.2307/4150139.	
Posusney,	Marsha	Pripstein,	and	Michele	Penner	Angrist.	Authoritarianism	In	The	Middle	
East:	Regimes	And	Resistance.	Lynne	Rienner	Publishers,	2005.	
Pratt,	Nicola.	Democracy	and	Authoritarianism	in	the	Arab	World.	Boulder:	Lynne	Rienner	
Publishers	Inc,	2006.	
Price,	David.	The	Development	of	Intellectual	Property	Regimes	in	the	Arabian	Gulf	States:	
Infidels	at	the	Gates.	1st	ed.	Routledge,	2009.	
“Putting	the	Gulf	to	Work.”	Arabian	Business,	October	26,	2010.	
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/putting‐gulf‐work‐358224.html.	
Qatar	Development	Bank,	and	International	Financial	Corporation.	“Learn	About	Business	
Startup,	How	to	Write	a	Business	Plan,	How	to	Start	a	Business,	Business	Forms,	
SME.”	SME	Toolkit	Qatar.	Accessed	May	24,	2013.	
http://qatar.smetoolkit.org/qatar/en.	
Qatar	Economic	Statistics	at	a	Glance.	Doha:	Economic	Statistics	and	National	Accounts	
Department,	Qatar	Statistics	Authority,	April	25,	2012.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
236 
 
Qatar	Information	Exchange	Database.	Doha:	Qatar	Statistics	Authority,	2012.	
http://www.qix.gov.qa.	
“Qatar	‘Must	Be	Wary’	of	Construction	Inflation.”	The	Peninsula.	March	27,	2013.	
http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/business/230782‐qatar‐%E2%80%98must‐be‐
wary%E2%80%99‐of‐construction‐inflation.html.	
“Qatar	Petroleum	Investment	Porfolito.”	Qatar	Petroleum,	2011.	
http://www.qp.com.qa/Files/Flash/QP_Map_3.swf.	
“Qatar	Science	and	Technology	Park.”	Accessed	February	12,	2012.	www.qstp.org.qa.	
Qatar	Statistics	Authority.	The	General	Census	of	Population	and	Housing,	and	
Establishment.	Doha:	Statistics	Authority,	State	of	Qatar,	April	2010.	
Qatar’s	Rising	Entrepreneurial	Spirit.	Doha:	Silatech	and	Gallup,	Inc.,	February	2012.	
http://www.gallup.com/poll/153011/qatar‐rising‐entrepreneurial‐spirit.aspx.	
Qatar’s	Third	National	Human	Development	Report:	Expanding	the	Capacities	of	Qatari	
Youth	‐	Mainstreaming	Youth	in	Development.	Doha:	General	Secretariate	for	
Development	Planning,	January	2012.	
“Qatarization	‐	What	Is	Qatarization?”	Strategic	Qatarization	Plan	for	the	Energy	and	
Industry	Sector.	Accessed	March	3,	2013.	
http://www.qatarization.com.qa/Qatarization/Qatarization.nsf/40278ec4e9ade9
1c4325725d003bc463/f6d73500302675e7432574500040a8c5?OpenDocument.	
“Record	Inflation.”	Qatar	Financial	Centre	Authority,	2007.	http://www.qfc.com.qa/en‐
us/Media‐center/Media‐news‐detail.aspx?sNewsID=68524c59‐13f6‐4d6f‐8f73‐
3d0a8c64fb02.	
Regional	Economic	Outlook:	Middle	East	and	Central	Asia.	World	Economic	and	Financial	
Surveys.	Washington:	International	Monetary	Fund,	November	2012.	
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/mcd/eng/pdf/mreo1112.pdf.	
Richards,	Alan,	and	John	Waterbury.	A	Political	Economy	of	the	Middle	East.	Third.	
Westview	Press,	2007.	
“Rio‐Tinto‐Alcan,”	2013.	http://www.riotintoalcan.com/index.asp.	
Roberts,	David.	“‘Rule	by	Whim’:	More	Thought	Needed	in	Qatar.”	MidEastPosts.com,	July	
2,	2012.	http://mideastposts.com/2012/02/rule‐by‐whim‐more‐thought‐needed‐
in‐qatar/.	
Rocha,	Hector	O.	“Entrepreneurship	and	Development:	The	Role	of	Clusters.”	Small	
Business	Economics	23,	no.	5	(December	1,	2004):	363–400.	doi:10.1007/s11187‐
004‐3991‐8.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
237 
 
Rocha,	Roberto,	Subika	Farazi,	Rania	Khouri,	and	Douglas	Pearce.	The	Status	of	Bank	
Lending	to	SMES	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	Region:	The	Results	of	a	Joint	
Survey	of	the	Union	of	Arab	Banks	and	the	World	Bank.	Financial	Flagship.	The	
World	Bank	and	the	Union	of	Arab	Banks,	June	2010.	
Ross,	Michael	L.	“Does	Oil	Hinder	Democracy?”	World	Politics	53,	no.	03	(2001):	325–361.	
doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011.	
———.	“What	Do	We	Know	About	Natural	Resources	and	Civil	War?”	Journal	of	Peace	
Research	41,	no.	3	(May	1,	2004):	337–356.	doi:10.1177/0022343304043773.	
“Royal	Decree	119/2011	Establishing	Al‐Duqm	Special	Economic	Zone	Authority	and	
Issuing	Its	Regulations.”	Special	Economic	Zone	Authority	‐	Duqm,	2011.	
http://www.duqm.gov.om/resources/royal‐decree.pdf.	
Sachs,	Jeffrey	D.,	and	Andrew	M.	Warner.	“The	Curse	of	Natural	Resources.”	European	
Economic	Review	45,	no.	4–6	(May	2001):	827–838.	doi:10.1016/S0014‐
2921(01)00125‐8.	
Santarelli,	Enrico.	Entrepreneurship,	Growth,	and	Innovation:	The	Dynamics	of	Firms	and	
Industries.	New	York:	Springer,	2006.	
Sayigh,	Yusif	A.	Elusive	Development:	From	Dependence	to	Self‐Reliance	in	the	Arab	Region.	
Routledge,	1991.	
Scharpf,	Fritz	W.	“Games	Real	Actors	Could	Play	Positive	and	Negative	Coordination	in	
Embedded	Negotiations.”	Journal	of	Theoretical	Politics	6,	no.	1	(January	1,	1994):	
27–53.	doi:10.1177/0951692894006001002.	
Schlumberger,	Oliver,	ed.	Debating	Arab	Authoritarianism:	Dynamics	and	Durability	in	
Nondemocratic	Regimes.	Stanford	University	Press,	2007.	
———.	“Structural	Reform,	Economic	Order,	and	Development:	Patrimonial	Capitalism.”	
Review	of	International	Political	Economy	15,	no.	4	(n.d.):	622–649.	
doi:10.1080/09692290802260670.	
Scholte,	Jan	Aart.	Globalization:	a	Critical	Introduction.	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2000.	
Schumpeter,	Joseph	Alois.	The	Theory	of	Economic	Development:	An	Inquiry	Into	Profits,	
Capital,	Credit,	Interest,	and	the	Business	Cycle.	New	Brunswick:	Transaction	
Publishers,	1934.	
Schwab,	Klaus.	The	Global	Competitiveness	Report	2012‐2013.	Geneva:	World	Economic	
Forum,	2012.	http://www.weforum.org/reports/global‐competitiveness‐report‐
2012‐2013.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
238 
 
Schwarz,	Rolf.	“The	Political	Economy	of	State‐formation	in	the	Arab	Middle	East:	Rentier	
States,	Economic	Reform,	and	Democratization.”	Review	of	International	Political	
Economy	15,	no.	4	(2008):	599–621.	doi:10.1080/09692290802260662.	
Secretariat	of	the	Economic	Commission	for	Europe.	Economic	Survey	of	Europe.	Geneva:	
United	Nations,	2001.	http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ead/pub/011/.	
Seventh	Five‐Year	Development	Plan	(2006‐2010).	Muscat:	Ministry	of	National	Economy,	
2006.	
Seznec,	Jean‐François.	“The	Gulf	Sovereign	Wealth	Funds:	Myths	and	Reality.”	Middle	East	
Policy	15,	no.	2	(June	2008):	97–110.	doi:10.1111/j.1475‐4967.2008.00352.x.	
Seznec,	Jean‐Francois,	and	Mimi	Kirk.	Industrialization	in	the	Gulf:	A	Socioeconomic	
Revolution.	1st	ed.	Routledge,	2010.	
Sharabi,	Hisham,	ed.	Theory,	Politics,	and	the	Arab	World :	Critical	Responses.	New	York ::	
Routledge,	1990.	
Shediac,	Richard,	and	Hatem	Samman.	Meeting	the	Employment	Challenge	in	the	GCC:	The	
Need	for	a	Holistic	Strategy.	Ideation	Center	Insight.	Booze	&	Company,	2010.	
“Shell,	QDB	Sign	Deal	to	Develop	SMEs	Sector	in	Qatar.”	Al	Bawaba,	May	12,	2013.	
http://www.albawaba.com/business/shell‐sme‐qatar‐490931.	
Short‐Term	Energy	Outlook	(STEO).	Independent	Statistics	&	Analysis,	U.S.	Energy	
Information	Administration,	May	2013.	
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf.	
SIPRI	Military	Expenditure	Database	2011.	Stockholm	International	Peace	Research	
Institute,	2012.	http://milexdata.sipri.org.	
“Small	Enterprise	Centre	to	Help	Omani	Businesses	Take‐Off.”	Oman	Daily	Observer.	
January	27,	2013.	http://main.omanobserver.om/node/142797.	
SME	Finance	Policy	Guide.	Washington:	International	Finance	Corporation,	October	2011.	
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/f3ef82804a02db409b88fbd1a5d13d27/
G20_Policy_Report.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.	
“Sohar	Aluminium,”	2013.	http://www.sohar‐aluminium.com/.	
Solow,	Robert	M.	“A	Contribution	to	the	Theory	of	Economic	Growth.”	The	Quarterly	
Journal	of	Economics	70,	no.	1	(February	1,	1956):	65–94.	doi:10.2307/1884513.	
“Special	Economic	Zone	Authority	‐	Duqm.”	Accessed	June	1,	2013.	
http://www.duqm.gov.om/.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
239 
 
Springer,	Simon.	“Renewed	Authoritarianism	in	Southeast	Asia:	Undermining	Democracy	
through	Neoliberal	Reform.”	Asia	Pacific	Viewpoint	50,	no.	3	(December	1,	2009):	
271–276.	doi:10.1111/j.1467‐8373.2009.01400.x.	
Statistical	Review	2013.	Kuwait:	State	of	Kuwait	Central	Statistical	Bureau,	2013.	
http://www.csb.gov.kw/Socan_Statistic_EN.aspx?ID=18.	
Stiglitz,	Joseph	E.,	and	Shahid	Yusuf,	eds.	Rethinking	the	East	Asian	Miracle.	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2001.	
“Supreme	Education	Council:	About	the	SEC.”	Accessed	October	29,	2012.	
http://www.english.education.gov.qa/section/sec/.	
TAIB	Securities	W.L.L.	GCC	Economic	Outlook	2012.	Manama:	TAIB	Securities,	March	
2012.	
http://www.menafn.com/updates/research_center/Regional/Economic/taib060
312ev.pdf.	
Teitelbaum,	Joshua.	Political	Liberalization	in	the	Persian	Gulf.	Columbia	University	Press,	
2009.	
The	Knowledge‐Based	Economy.	Paris:	Organization	for	Economic	Co‐operation	and	
Development,	1996.	http://www.oecd.org/science/sci‐tech/1913021.pdf.	
The	Rising	Ranks	of	Women	in	the	Middle	East	Workplace.	Bayt.com	and	Yougosiraj,	April	
2007.	http://www.bayt.com/en/research‐report‐1661/.	
The	Road	Not	Traveled:	Education	Reform	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa.	MENA	
Development	Report.	Washington:	The	International	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	
Development	/	World	Bank,	2008.	
Times	News	Service.	“Khimji	Ramdas	Honoured	for	Supporting	Sanad.”	Times	of	Oman.	
December	30,	2012.	http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article‐4978.aspx.	
———.	“Saud	Bahwan	Group	Felicitates	131	High	Performing	Omani	Entrepreneurs.”	
Times	of	Oman.	February	9,	2013.	http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article‐
8056.aspx.	
———.	“Trade	Up	Seminar	Series	for	SMEs	Kicks	Off.”	Times	of	Oman.	June	23,	2013.	
http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article‐18542.aspx.	
Toumi,	Habib.	“Dubai	Police	Chief	Warns	of	Expats’	Threat	to	Gulf	Identity.”	Gulf	News.	
December	26,	2010.	http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/dubai‐police‐chief‐
warns‐of‐expats‐threat‐to‐gulf‐identity‐1.736096.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
240 
 
———.	“Public	Sector	in	Qatar	Gets	60	Per	Cent	Pay	Rise.”	Gulf	News,	September	7,	2011.	
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/public‐sector‐in‐qatar‐to‐get‐60‐per‐cent‐
pay‐rise‐1.862595.	
Twenge,	Jean	M.	Generation	Me:	Why	Today’s	Young	Americans	Are	More	Confident,	
Assertive,	Entitled‐‐and	More	Miserable	Than	Ever	Before.	New	York:	Free	Press,	
2006.	
UAE	Economic	Insight	2012.	Doha:	Qatar	National	Bank,	2012.	
http://www.qnb.com.qa/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%
2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1355477182471&ssbina
ry=true.	
“UNCTAD	to	Conduct	STIP	Review	for	Oman.”	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	
Development,	June	6,	2012.	
unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=125.	
UNESCO	Science	Report	2010:	The	Current	Status	of	Science	Around	the	World.	Paris:	
United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific	and	Cultural	Organization,	2010.	
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001899/189958e.pdf.	
Vaidya,	Sunil	K.	“Heavy	Security	Prevents	Friday	Protests	in	Sohar,	Oman.”	Gulf	News,	
April	8,	2011.	http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/heavy‐security‐prevents‐
friday‐protests‐in‐sohar‐oman‐1.789074.	
———.	“Oman	Petrol	Company	Workers	Go	on	Strike.”	Gulf	News,	May	27,	2012.	
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/oman‐petrol‐company‐workers‐go‐on‐
strike‐1.1028296.	
———.	“Qaboos	Names	Three	New	Ministers	in	Cabinet	Reshuffle	|	GulfNews.com.”	Gulf	
News,	February	29,	2012.	http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/qaboos‐names‐
three‐new‐ministers‐in‐cabinet‐reshuffle‐1.988362.	
Valdini,	Claire.	“Oman	Launches	US$260m	SME	Development	Fund	‐	Banking	&	Finance.”	
Arabian	Business,	April	24,	2012.	http://www.arabianbusiness.com/oman‐
launches‐us‐260m‐sme‐development‐fund‐455140.html.	
Valeri,	Marc.	“High	Visibility,	Low	Profile:	The	Shi’a	in	Oman	Under	Sultan	Qaboos.”	
International	Journal	of	Middle	East	Studies	42,	no.	02	(2010):	251–268.	
doi:10.1017/S0020743810000048.	
———.	Oman:	Politics	and	Society	in	the	Qaboos	State.	London:	Hurst	Publishers,	2009.	
Vision	for	Oman’	s	Economy	–	2020:	Long‐Term	Development	Strategy	(1996‐2020),	2nd	
Edition.	Muscat:	Ministry	of	National	Economy,	2007.	
Bibliography    C.A. Ennis 
241 
 
Vitalis,	Robert.	America’s	Kingdom:	Mythmaking	on	the	Saudi	Oil	Frontier.	London:	Verso,	
2009.	
Vliert,	Evert	Van	de,	Xu	Huang,	and	Robert	V.	Levine.	“National	Wealth	and	Thermal	
Climate	as	Predictors	of	Motives	for	Volunteer	Work.”	Journal	of	Cross‐Cultural	
Psychology	35,	no.	1	(January	1,	2004):	62–73.	doi:10.1177/0022022103260379.	
Wade,	Robert.	Governing	the	Market :	Economic	Theory	and	the	Role	of	Government	in	East	
Asian	Industrialization.	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1990.	
Walter,	Andrew,	and	Gautam	Sen.	Analyzing	the	Global	Political	Economy.	Princeton	
University	Press,	2009.	
Weinthal,	Erika,	and	Pauline	Jones	Luong.	“Combating	the	Resource	Curse:	An	Alternative	
Solution	to	Managing	Mineral	Wealth.”	Perspectives	on	Politics	4,	no.	01	(2006):	
35–53.	doi:10.1017/S1537592706060051.	
Wilkinson,	J.	C.	“Oman	and	East	Africa:	New	Light	on	Early	Kilwan	History	from	the	Omani	
Sources.”	The	International	Journal	of	African	Historical	Studies	14,	no.	2	(1981):	
272–305.	doi:10.2307/218046.	
Williams,	Justin,	Ramudu	Bhanugopan,	and	Alan	Fish.	“Localization	of	Human	Resources	
in	the	State	of	Qatar.”	Education,	Business	and	Society:	Contemporary	Middle	
Eastern	Issues	4,	no.	3	(2011):	193–206.	
doi:http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/10.1108/17537981111159966.	
Woo‐Cumings,	Meredith,	ed.	The	Developmental	State.	Cornell	University	Press,	1999.	
Yousef,	Tarik.	Unlocking	the	Employment	Potential	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa:	
Toward	a	New	Social	Contract.	illustrated	edition.	Washington:	World	Bank	
Publications,	2004.	
Zahlan,	Rosemarie	Said.	The	Making	of	the	Modern	Gulf	States:	Kuwait,	Bahrain,	Qatar,	the	
United	Arab	Emirates	and	Oman.	Revised	edition.	Ithaca	Press,	1999.	
Zellman,	Gail	L.,	Louay	Constant,	and	Charles	A.	Goldman.	“K‐12	Education	Reform	in	
Qatar.”	Orient	1	(2011):	55–60.	
	
